# 1NC

## Off-Case

### 1NC---T

#### T Prohibition

#### “Prohibition” requires a declaration of per se illegality

Loevinger 61 (Honorable Lee Loevinger- Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division. “THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW” , *Section of Antitrust Law* , 1961, Vol. 19, PROCEEDINGS AT THE ANNUAL MEETING, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, AUGUST 7 THROUGH 11, 1961 (1961), pp. 245-251, JSTOR accessed online via KU libraries, date accessed 9/13/21)

Running through the history of antitrust law are two contrapuntal themes: A prohibition of restraint of trade and a principle lately called the "rule of reason" which limits the prohibition. The legal rule against restraint of trade began in the 15th century in cases holding that a contract by which a man agreed not to practice his trade or profession was illegal.1 However, in the course of development of the common law, it became established that agreements which were ancillary to the sale or transfer of a trade or business and which were limited so as to impose a restriction no greater than reasonably necessary to protect the purchaser's interest.2

Thus, when the Sherman Act incorporated the common-law principles on this subject into federal statutory law 3 by adopting the concept of restraint of trade, it presumably imported both the principle that restrictions on competition are illegal and also the principle that in some circumstances a showing of reasonableness will legalize restrictions on competition. Nevertheless, when the question was first presented to the United States Supreme Court under the Sherman Act, it was clearly held (despite later disavowals4 ) that the justification of reasonableness was not available as a defense to a combination which had the effect of restraining trade.' Indeed, it was intimated that the question of reasonableness was not open to the courts in these actions at common law.6 However, when the Court reviewed this matter in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,7 it said in fairly explicit terms both that the Sherman Act prohibited only contracts or acts which unreasonably restrained competition and that the standard of reasonableness had been applied to all restraints of trade at the common law. The Court's assertion is somewhat weakened by the fact that it construed the rule of reason not as applying a standard for judging the character or consequences of the challenged conduct, but as a technique involving the application of human intelligence, or reason, to the problem of making a judgment about whether the conduct does restrain trade.'

#### Violation — rule of reason is not topical

McKibben 85 (Michael D. McKibben-Vanderbilt University Law School, J.D., 1985, Vanderbilt Law Review, Associate Editor; Patrick Wilson Scholar. The Resale Price Maintenance Compromise: A Presumption of Illegality, 38 Vanderbilt Law Review 163 (1985), Available at: <https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol38/iss1/3> , date accessed 9/13/21)

A rebuttable presumption, followed by rule of reason analysis 14 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 14]] 14. Under the rule of reason "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49. [[END FOOTNOTE 14]] in cases in which the defendant satisfies the threshold inquiry,15 would restore certainty and intellectual honesty to RPM cases. The rebuttable presumption would eliminate the need to reconcile contrary cases and the need to consider issues that parties now must address under the rule of reason. While the rebuttable presumption does not require that courts maintain or reject the Colgate doctrine,16 this Note argues that the Court could retain Colgate but primarily rely upon the guidelines and safeguards of the rebuttable presumption. This new line of inquiry would retain the benefits of the per se rule-efficiency and certainty-and would remain flexible enough to accommodate special cases in which RPM may be beneficial to the market. In many cases, the rebuttable presumption also would save society, courts, and litigants the protracted costs of rule of reason analysis.

Part II of this Note considers major RPM cases since the early 1900s, with special focus on Russell Stover and Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,'17 cases which protect the defendant under the Colgate doctrine. Part III analyzes the weaknesses of the per se rule and the benefits that could inure to manufacturers and the marketplace under the rebuttable presumption. Part IV examines the strengths and weaknesses of the rule of reason and offers an improved rule of reason approach as the second part of the rebuttable presumption standard. Finally, Part V outlines a suggested analysis for RPM disputes using a rebuttable presumption of illegality. Part V also considers the effects of the presumption on federal antitrust laws.

II. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY

A. Minimum Price Restrictions in the Supreme Court

Vertical price restrictions are written or oral directives setting a price above or below which a manufacturer wishes its distributors to sell. If the manufacturer establishes a price below which a distributor should not resell a product, the manufacturer is imposing minimum price RPM. Maximum price RPM-the setting of price ceilings- and minimum RPM are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act."' Nonprice vertical restrictions, however, which include primarily territorial distributorship limitations, generally are reviewed under the rule of reason. 19

1. Dr. Miles: The Per Se Rule

Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.20 is the basis of much of the current academic criticism of the Supreme Court's RPM approach.2 ' The plaintiff Dr. Miles, a medicine manufacturer, required its wholesalers and retailers to adhere to a minimum resale price schedule. The plaintiff also required its wholesalers to maintain control over the retailers' subsequent resale prices. The defendant Park & Sons, a wholesaler that refused to purchase from Dr. Miles under the minimum price contract, bought Dr. Miles' medicines from third parties and resold them below the plaintiff's price schedule. The plaintiff charged the defendant with inducing the plaintiff's distributors to breach their contracts by reselling to a price cutter.22 The Court denied the plaintiff's request for relief and held that the plaintiff's contract provision was void under common law and the Sherman Act. 3

After determining that the agreement between Dr. Miles and its vendees fulfilled the duality requirement of the Sherman Act,24 the Court found that the plaintiff's resale price schedule eliminated competition by controlling the price at which all purchasers received the product.25 The Court refused to accept the defendant's argument that producers of patented products have a right ordinary sellers do not have-the right to dictate the destiny of their products.26 The Court inquired whether the plaintiff had a right to restrain trade. The Court held that generally a right to control alienation does not exist without an agreement.2 7 Applying the common-law rule that contractual restraints on alienation must be reasonable and limited to the necessity of the circumstances, 2 the Court found that Dr. Miles' agreement did not fit any of the common forms of acceptable restraints.29

The Court's final inquiry was whether the benefits that the plaintiff gained from its pricing restrictions were entitled to more protection than the property rights that the defendants had in the medicine.30 The Court's response to this issue forms the heart of the per se rule.31 [[BEGIN FOOTNOTE 31]] 31. Per se rules prohibit certain conduct without inquiry into possible justifications for the conduct. Courts impose per se rules when the interests of judicial economy outweigh other interests. See Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 708 (1983). [[END FOOTNOTE 31]] Although the Court never explicitly condemned all vertical price fixing agreements, it found that the effects of the Dr. Miles scheme were the same as the effects that could result from horizontal price fixing at the dealer level. The Court, therefore, held that both kinds of price fixing were illegal.3 2 The Supreme Court's focus on the effects of the alleged violative activity, without regard to its purposes or benefits, is characteristic of other Supreme Court per se decisions. 3

#### VOTE NEG

#### FIRST---Ground---balancing tests devastate core links, because they allow the practice when it’s beneficial. AND, creates a moving target, because the disallowed behavior is context-dependent.

#### SECOND---Bidirectionality---rule of reason creates legally protected practices

### 1NC---CP

#### Multilat CP:

#### The federal government should invest in pandemic recovery, health care, infrastructure, green technology and jobs, increase engagement in multilateral institutions, and other domestic programs

#### Domestic investment sustains growth and public support for the military [KU is blue]

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U.S. President Joe Biden has declared that under his leadership, “America is back” and once again “ready to lead the world.” Biden wants to return the country to its traditional role of catalyzing international cooperation and staunchly defending liberal values abroad. His challenge, however, is primarily one of politics, not policy. Despite Biden’s victory in last year’s presidential election, his internationalist vision faces a deeply skeptical American public. The political foundations of U.S. internationalism have collapsed. The domestic consensus that long supported U.S. engagement abroad has come apart in the face of mounting partisan discord and a deepening rift between urban and rural Americans. An inward turn has accompanied these growing divides. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism, neo-isolationism, protectionism, and nativism were anathema to most of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. But Trump’s approach to statecraft tapped into public misgivings about American overreach, contributing to his victory in 2016 and helping him win the backing of 74 million voters in 2020. An “America first” approach to the world sells well when many Americans experience economic insecurity and feel that they have been on the losing end of globalization. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center revealed that roughly half the U.S. public believes that the country should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on fixing problems at home. Redressing the hardships facing many working Americans is essential to inoculating the country against “America first” and Trump’s illiberal politics of grievance. That task begins with economic renewal. Restoring popular support for the country’s internationalist calling will entail sustained investment in pandemic recovery, health care, infrastructure, green technology and jobs, and other domestic programs. Those steps will require structural political reforms to ease gridlock and ensure that U.S. foreign policy serves the interests of working Americans. What Biden needs is an “inside out” approach that will link imperatives at home to objectives abroad. Much will depend on his willingness and ability to take bold action to rebuild broad popular support for internationalism from the ground up. Success would significantly reduce the chances that the president who follows Biden, even if he or she is a Republican, would return to Trump’s self-defeating foreign policy. Such future-proofing is critical to restoring international confidence in the United States. In light of the dysfunction and polarization plaguing U.S. politics, leaders and people around the world are justifiably questioning whether Biden represents a new normal or just a fleeting reprieve from “America first.”

### 1NC---CP

#### Economy CP:

#### The United States federal government should:

[The planks supported by Pinkus]

* retool customs requirements and encourage digital e-commerce platforms
* invest in infrastructure and affordable housing
* encourage career-orientated education pathways
* encourage usage of new energy technology.

#### Solves growth and inequality

Pinkus et al 16 – Gary Pinkus is managing partner for McKinsey & Company in North America. James Manyika is a director of the McKinsey Global Institute, where Sree Ramaswamy is a senior fellow. (Gary Pinkus, James Manyika, and Sree Ramaswamy December 3, 2016, 11-11-2016, "Here’s How to Get the U.S. Economy to Grow 3.5% or More," Fortune, <http://fortune.com/2016/12/03/us-gdp-growth-donald-trump/>)

Our new research identifies five key priorities that can help shake off stagnation and create more widely shared prosperity. An ocean of ink has already been spilled about topics such as taxes, regulation, entitlements, and debt, but we believe it’s critical to shift the focus onto accelerating growth. We estimate that these five initiatives can collectively raise GDP growth to 3% or even 3.5%—levels not seen since the 1990s. Two of the biggest opportunities involve harnessing the forces of digital technology and globalization. This is somewhat ironic, since these two forces have deepened many of the disparities we see across the economy. Trade, in particular, has taken a beating of late. But the way to address those who have been left behind is to harness the growth opportunities digitization and globalization bring by getting more small businesses, more workers, and more parts of the country to participate and benefit. The United States has to reverse its persistent productivity slowdown, and improve the digital capabilities of lagging sectors and firms is an important piece of that puzzle. This effort can go hand-in-hand with encouraging more small firms to pursue opportunities in global markets. Today, fewer than 1% of US companies export, a far lower share than in any other advanced economy. Becoming an exporter was once daunting for small businesses, but the Internet has made borders less formidable. The United States can retool customs requirements and encourage small businesses to take advantage of digital e-commerce platforms to serve overseas customers. Globalization may have left some regions behind, but deeper engagement with global investors may help them catch up. Over the past decade, the top one-third of US cities captured 55% of all inward foreign direct investment, while the bottom third accounted for only 7%. Many of the regions that lost manufacturing jobs still have experienced workers, technical know-how, and industrial facilities. They are attractive destinations—and connecting them with foreign investors can help them script a second act. The three remaining priorities in our growth agenda involve putting America’s financial capital, human capital, and natural resources to work more effectively. First, we need to focus on the 80% of the population who live in the nation’s cities or surrounding metro areas. Investing in transportation infrastructure and affordable housing could make a huge difference to their productivity, their disposable income, and their quality of life. Second, the United States needs to build a more responsive labor market with more career paths outside the traditional degree track. Policy makers and the private sector need to work together to establish more apprenticeships and training programs and to leverage technology solutions to connect people with employment opportunities more efficiently. And finally, the United States can ride a wave of innovation to make the energy sector more productive, speeding the allocation of capital to the most promising opportunities. Making the entire economy more energy-efficient would spur capital investment and create household savings that could spur demand growth.

### 1NC---CP

#### Democracy & Modeling CP:

#### The United States federal government should:

Establish a Global Concert for the 21st Century

Utilize positive inducements to encourage the Philippines to adopt a Worker Welfare Standard,

Alter the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership to replace ‘consumer welfare’ with ‘worker welfare,’

Announce that we are bound to the Convention Against Torture and Geneva Convention,

Close Guantanamo Bay,

Establish a commission on human rights

Establish a bipartisan, independent commission to probe the attack on the Capitol and election challenges,

And, increase democracy promotion with allies.

#### Plank 1 solves populism terminal.

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The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers. As the history of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe demonstrated—its members were the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—a steering group of leading countries can curb the geopolitical and ideological competition that usually accompanies multipolarity.

Concerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation. A concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements, clearly distinguishing it from the UN Security Council. The UNSC serves too often as a public forum for grandstanding and is regularly paralyzed by disputes among its veto-wielding permanent members. In contrast, a concert offers a private venue that combines consensus building with cajoling and jockeying—a must since major powers will have both common and competing interests. By providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences.

A global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body. It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions. This steering group would help fashion new rules of the road and build support for collective initiatives but leave operational matters, such as deploying peacekeeping missions, delivering pandemic relief, and concluding new climate deals, to the UN and other existing bodies. The concert would thus tee up decisions that could then be taken and implemented elsewhere. It would sit atop and backstop, not supplant, the current international architecture by maintaining a dialogue that does not now exist. The UN is too big, too bureaucratic, and too formalistic. Fly-in, fly-out G-7 or G-20 summits can be useful but even at their best are woefully inadequate, in part because so much effort goes toward haggling over detailed, but often anodyne, communiqués. Phone calls between heads of state, foreign ministers, and national security advisers are too episodic and often narrow in scope.

Fashioning major-power consensus on the international norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises—the Concert of Europe relied on these important innovations to preserve peace in a multipolar world. By drawing on lessons from its nineteenth-century forebearer, a twenty-first-century global concert can do the same. Concerts do lack the certitude, predictability, and enforceability of alliances and other formalized pacts. But in designing mechanisms to preserve peace amid geopolitical flux, policymakers should strive for the workable and the attainable, not the desirable but impossible.

A GLOBAL CONCERT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A global concert would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Democracies and nondemocracies would have equal standing, and inclusion would be a function of power and influence, not values or regime type. The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop.

Members would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters. Although they would not be formal members of the concert, four regional organizations—the African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Organization of American States (OAS)—would maintain permanent delegations at the concert’s headquarters. These organizations would provide their regions with representation and the ability to help shape the concert’s agenda. When discussing issues affecting these regions, concert members would invite delegates from these bodies as well as select member states to join meetings. For example, were concert members to address a dispute in the Middle East, they could request the participation of the Arab League, its relevant members, and other involved parties, such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey.

A global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus. Like the Concert of Europe, it would privilege the territorial status quo and a view of sovereignty that precludes, except in the case of international consensus, using military force or other coercive tools to alter existing borders or topple regimes. This relatively conservative baseline would encourage buy-in from all members. At the same time, the concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty and the potential need to deny sovereign immunity to nations that engage in certain egregious activities. Those activities might include committing genocide, harboring or sponsoring terrorists, or severely exacerbating climate change by destroying rainforests.

#### Planks 2-3 solve Philippines.

Chang 93, Professor of Law, Seoul National University; Co-President, Asia Pacific Regional Arbitration Group; President, Korean Council for International Arbitration; Alternate Member, ICC International Court of Arbitration, Expert witness on Korean Laws in international arbitration and court proceedings, Harvard Law School (LLM, 1992 and SJ.D. 1994); Seoul National University (LL.B. 1985 and LL.M. 1991) (Seung Wha Chang, 1-1-1993, “Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving International Conflicts within the Pacific Community,” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3)

\*blocking statutes refers to barriers to applying US antitrust in foreign countries

V. CONCLUSION

For the last decade, extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws has resulted in continued international conflict between the U.S. and its trading partners, including the Pacific Countries. These conflicts stem mainly from the complaints of the other Pacific Countries about the long-arm jurisdiction of the U.S. courts based upon the "effects doctrine" and the treble damage remedy available in private U.S. antitrust cases. Several Pacific Countries have responded by legislating retaliatory blocking statutes. The domestic efforts of the U.S. to resolve these international conflicts are significantly limited due to their unilateral nature. Diplomatic negotiations resulting in bilateral treaties offer the best solution. In order to enhance their feasibility, such bilateral agreements should be based upon reciprocity and balancing of the parties' national interests. For this reason, any agreement should include provisions affecting both the U.S. antitrust laws and the blocking statutes of other Pacific Countries. This Article recommends that the U.S. accept proposals for the allocation of jurisdiction rules and the elimination of treble damage recovery in antitrust cases involving foreign commerce. In exchange, other Pacific Countries are encouraged to repeal or to cease invoking their blocking statutes.

#### Planks 4-6 solve democracy at home.

Shattuck 8 [John Shattuck is CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation and a lecturer on U.S. foreign policy at Tufts University. He is the author of Freedom on Fire. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from 1993 to 1998, and Ambassador to the Czech Republic from 1998 to 2000. “Restoring U.S. Credibility on Human Rights,” *American Bar Association*, Fall 2008, <https://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol35_2008/human_rights_fall2008/hr_fall08_shattuck.html>] KS

Among the many challenges facing you from the time you take office will be how to restore U.S. credibility in the world. One way to do this will be to change the global perception that the United States is a human rights violator. International public opinion of the recent U.S. record on human rights has been devastating. A poll conducted last year in eighteen countries on all continents by the British Broadcasting Corporation revealed that 67 percent disapproved of U.S. detention practices in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Another poll in Germany, Great Britain, Poland, and India found that majorities or pluralities condemned the United States for torture and other violations of international law. A third poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations showed that majorities in thirteen countries, including many traditional allies, believe “the U.S. cannot be trusted to act responsibly in the world.” Less than a decade ago, the situation was quite different. A 1999 survey published by the U.S. State Department’s Office of Research showed that the United States was viewed favorably by large majorities in France, 62 percent; Germany, 78 percent; Indonesia, 75 percent; and Turkey, 52 percent; among others. This positive climate of opinion helped produce the outpouring of international support immedi-ately following the 9/11 attacks that made it possible for this country to quickly assemble a broad coalition with United Nations (UN) approval to respond to the terrorist attacks by striking al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan. Seven years later, global support for U.S. leadership has evaporated. In nearly all the countries that registered strong support for the United States in 1999, a big downward shift of opinion had occurred by 2006. In France it was down to 39 percent; in Germany, 37 percent; and in Indonesia, 30 percent. A separate survey conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed extremely hostile attitudes toward the United States throughout the Arab and Muslim world: In Egypt, the United States polled 70 percent negative; in Pakistan, 73 percent negative; in Jordan, 85 percent negative; and in Turkey, 88 percent negative. The gap between America’s values and actions revealed by this polling data has severely eroded U.S. global influence. How can you and your administration gain it back? First, you should make it clear that one of our country’s bedrock principles is the international rule of law. Human rights are de-fined and protected by the Constitution and international treaties ratified and incorporated into our domestic law. In flaunting basic rules—such as habeas corpus, the Convention against Torture, and the Geneva Conventions—the previous administration created a series of “law-free zones.” Within these zones, detainees were abused, thousands were held indefinitely without charges, and human rights were trampled. Second, you should bring U.S. values and practices back into alignment. The United States in recent years has lost credibility by charging others with the types of human rights violations that it has committed itself. In recent annual country reports on human rights practices, the State Department has criticized other countries for engaging in torture, detention without trial, warrantless electronic surveillance, and other abuses, even though the U.S. record in these areas also has been abysmal. Fortunately, history shows that U.S. credibility on human rights can be restored when our government’s policies reflect our na-tion’s values. A series of bipartisan initiatives during five recent presidencies––three Republican and two Democratic––illustrates the point. President Gerald Ford signed the Helsinki Accords, paving the way for international recognition of the cause of human rights inside the Soviet bloc. President Jimmy Carter mobilized democratic governments to press for the release of political prisoners by repressive regimes. President Ronald Reagan signed the Con-vention against Torture and persuaded a Republican-dominated Senate to ratify it. President George H. W. Bush joined with other governments in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to nurture new democracies and respect for human rights following the end of the Cold War. And President Bill Clinton worked with NATO and the UN to implement the Genocide Conven-tion and bring an end to the human rights catastrophe in the Balkans. Mr. President, you can restore U.S. influence by reconnecting the nation’s values and policies on human rights and the rule of law. Among the initiatives that you might take are the following. Human Rights Law Enforcement. You should announce that the United States is bound by the human rights treaties and con-ventions that it has ratified and adopted as domestic law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention, and the Interna-tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. You should follow through with your commitment to close the detention center at Guan-tanamo and transfer detainees to this country for determinations whether to try them in U.S. courts or release them. Fully complying with the Geneva Conventions would not preclude the United States from trying detainees in military commissions under constitutional standards of due process, nor would it restrict the government’s authority to conduct lawful interrogations to obtain intelligence in-formation about terrorist activities. Truth Commission. At times in our recent history, the nation has created high-level commissions to probe national crises and recommend ways to prevent them in the future. In the area of human rights, these bodies have included, most notably, the Kerner Commission on race in the 1960s and the commission in the 1980s on the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. The recent commission on the events of 9/11 had a comparable scope and impact in addressing a complex and far-reaching national crisis. A similar commission could be established to compile the record of human rights abuses in the War on Terror. U.S. Commission on Human Rights. A permanent institution could be created to monitor the U.S. government’s compliance with its legal obligations on human rights. I urge you to endorse legislation pending in Congress that would establish a United States Commission on Human Rights with oversight authority and subpoena power. The legislation would require the executive branch to provide regular reports to the commission on its implementation of international human rights treaties such as the Torture Convention and the Geneva Conventions. Counterterrorism Assistance. The United States could provide assistance to other countries for counterterrorism operations that comply with basic standards on human rights. “Fighting terror” has become a convenient excuse for repressive regimes around the world to engage in further repression, often leading to more terrorism in an increasing cycle of violence. To break this cycle, this country could provide assistance and training to foreign military and law enforcement personnel in methods of fighting terrorism within the rule of law. Democracy and Human Rights Assistance. The United States should find appropriate ways to support those seeking to promote the rule of law, democracy, and human rights within their own countries. Democracy and human rights activists are the shock troops in the struggle against terrorism. But democracy and human rights can never be delivered from the barrel of a gun. Assistance to those working to build their own democratic societies must be carefully planned, sustained over time, and based on a thorough understand-ing of the unique circumstances and profound differences among cultures, religions, and countries. The new administration should work within a multilateral framework to assist those struggling around the world to bring democracy and human rights to their own societies. Responsibility to Protect. The United States should join with other countries, alliances, and international organizations to pre-vent or stop crimes against humanity and genocide. Mr. President, you could invoke the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2006, to work with other leaders to develop effective multilateral methods of preventing human rights catastrophes such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Darfur. Diplomatic and economic tools should be employed first to head off im-pending genocides, but multilateral military intervention must remain available under international law if other means have been ex-hausted. By recommitting the United States to a foreign policy conducted within a framework of human rights and the rule of law, Presi-dent Obama, you can restore America’s moral leadership in the world, and, by doing so, strengthen U.S. national security.

#### Planks 7-8 solve democracy promotion.

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Biden can further shore up the domestic foundations of U.S. statecraft by bringing strategic priorities back into alignment with political means. The Biden administration should reduce U.S. commitments in the Middle East by continuing to downsize the American military footprint in the region; the “forever wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced little good. In the meantime, Biden should return to the time-tested touchstone of U.S. statecraft: working with allies to defend democracy and promote stability in Asia and Europe. To that traditional agenda, Biden should add a new focus on combating and adjusting to climate change, promoting global health, and maintaining the U.S. edge in technological innovation. This strategic realignment is not only good policy—it is also good politics. Roughly three-quarters of American voters want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq. In contrast, staying put in Asia and Europe alongside democratic allies enjoys strong public support. NATO wins solid backing from voters of both major U.S. political parties. Democrats and Republicans also agree on the need to take a firm line toward China, and the Biden administration is on solid political footing in strengthening ties to partners in the Indo-Pacific, affirming the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, and encouraging the world’s democracies to “decouple” from China when it comes to sensitive technologies. The American public also prioritizes addressing climate change and global health. Biden can build further support for a new internationalist consensus by making significant investments in the domestic economy that raise living standards, reduce inequality, and restore the social contract. In taking on that task, Biden cannot afford to wait for bipartisan agreement in Congress, which is unlikely to emerge in an intensely polarized Washington. Biden’s agenda will require ambitious and expensive legislation the likes of which the United States has not seen since the New Deal. To get it through, Biden and his allies in Congress will need to overhaul the archaic filibuster rules in the U.S. Senate. Many observers claim that the filibuster promotes consensus by forcing the two parties to find common ground. In truth, however, the filibuster rarely has that effect: often, it simply serves to kill legislation passed by the House. By forcing the majority party to assemble a supermajority of 60 votes to pass most laws, the filibuster allows the minority to block bills, including those that enjoy broad popular support. To liberate policy from the grips of this manufactured gridlock, Biden should urge Senate Democrats to ditch the filibuster outright or significantly reform it so that Congress can get back to the business of passing needed laws. Republicans will cry foul. But they scrapped the filibuster in 2017 when it came to pushing through the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. If doing away with the filibuster makes sense when it comes to the justice system, surely it also makes sense for rebuilding the economy and guaranteeing the nation’s security. Moreover, scrapping the current supermajority requirement might actually increase bipartisanship in the long run. By advancing policies that are popular with the broader electorate, presidents would, over time, be able to once again garner support from the minority party. Consider, for example, Roosevelt’s success in securing bipartisan backing. He was able to win over numerous Republican members of Congress because they hailed from states that found much to like in the New Deal and the economic benefits of liberal internationalism. Following Roosevelt’s lead, Biden can reawaken bipartisanship through strategic public investment, using the $2 trillion “Build Back Better” infrastructure proposal he campaigned on to bridge the urban-rural divide that reinforces political paralysis and widens partisan divisions. Extending broadband networks to rural areas would promote more equitable economic growth and wider civic engagement. Repairing the nation’s ailing bridges, roads, and mass transit systems would spur growth in metropolitan areas. Transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy would create millions of new jobs and boost U.S. competitiveness in lagging sectors. By targeting infrastructure and climate investments, Biden can spark private-sector engagement in the right places and help reduce economic inequality. Strategic investments at home will also yield payoffs abroad by spurring high-tech innovation as geopolitical competition plays out over climate change, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence.

WALK THE WALK

Another way to shore up support for internationalism is to repair the American brand by standing up for democracy and human rights around the world. Partners abroad join most Americans in welcoming Biden’s efforts to put the United States back on the right side of history. But to make good on that goal, the United States must exhibit at home the values it seeks to promote abroad. During the 1950s, segregation and racial discrimination eroded U.S. credibility abroad, especially in the developing world. The passage of the watershed 1964 Civil Rights Act did not silence the United States’ most vocal foreign critics, but it did make it easier for Washington to promote social justice beyond its borders. The Trump era, in contrast, seriously compromised American moral authority. Trump’s nativistic appeals exacerbated racial tensions, and his refusal to accept the outcome of the 2020 election constituted an assault on the institutions and norms of American democracy. By the time hundreds of Trump’s supporters launched a violent attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, the country’s image among foreign partners had already sunk to historic lows. In the aftermath of these events, Biden will have to couple his defense of democracy abroad with political reform at home if he is to avoid charges of hypocrisy. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s proposal to establish a bipartisan, independent commission to probe the attack on the Capitol is a strong step in the right direction and one that Biden has sensibly endorsed. The commission’s charge should include getting to the bottom of what led to the insurrection and why security provisions at the Capitol were so inadequate. In addition, it should address how to prevent bogus challenges to the certification of future elections and propose wide-ranging reforms to strengthen the country’s electoral procedures, including the management of the transfer of power.

### 1NC---DA

#### Antitrust only passes after it’s horse-traded with Republicans for censorship prohibitions

Perera 3-12-2021, veteran cybersecurity reporter, Data security & privacy reporter for MLex (Dave, “US antitrust legislation faces uphill battle despite unified Democratic government,” <https://mlexmarketinsight.com/news-hub/editors-picks/area-of-expertise/antitrust/us-antitrust-legislation-faces-uphill-battle-despite-unified-democratic-government>)

Renewed interest among US lawmakers in antitrust legislation is unlikely to produce radical policy shifts, notwithstanding the Democratic Party’s unified control of the federal government. Democrats promised a “big, bold agenda” after they captured the Senate by a hairsbreadth in January. Democratic lawmakers may very well stick to those ambitions and announce audacious legislative proposals. But the fate of those bills is at the mercy of a political dynamic ensuring that the more liberal the policy prescriptions, the less likely they are to become law. The most likely outcome over the next two years is more funding for enforcers at the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, whether directly through appropriated funds, steeper merger notification filing fees, or both. It’s also possible Congress could incrementally tinker along the edges of antitrust. It might lower the threshold for challenging mergers, or mandate data portability requirements for social media companies. Those expecting — or fearing — more ambitious outcomes likely won’t see them enacted. So until America’s November 2022 election, scratch from the list of high probabilities reforms such as requiring dominant firms to separate lines of business, or shifting the burden of proof onto an acquiring company. Put another way, unless a bill can attract significant Republican support, not even two years of unified Democratic government can guarantee reforms. — American exceptionalism — Single party control of both congressional chambers and the presidency is relatively rare in American politics. It has occurred in fewer than a third of legislative sessions since 1980. When it strikes, it doesn’t last long — typically just the two years between one congressional election and another. Historically, unified control is a fertile period for new regulations. President George W. Bush overhauled Medicare. President Barack Obama ushered in financial sector reforms and the Affordable Care Act. Indications are that President Joe Biden is emboldened by his party’s last-minute capture of the Senate. History, of course, isn’t a blueprint. Even a brief look at past episodes of unified control reveals that not even single-party capture of the executive and legislative branches of the US government can assure the enactment of a partisan agenda. For one thing, neither political party is a monolith. Although far more politically aligned than when Democratic conservatives found common cause in the 20th century with Republicans, the major American parties nonetheless are coalitions of centrist and activist wings. For Democrats, the tensions inherent in appeasing all sides became apparent earlier this month when centrists trimmed benefits in the $1.9 trillion coronavirus stimulus package. Neither is single party grip on power secure unless it commands an overwhelming majority in the Senate, thanks to a uniquely American institution: the filibuster. In the Senate, the rules mandate a three-fifths vote before debate over a bill is cut off. In recent decades, it’s become a weapon routinely wielded by the minority party to kill legislation. The upshot is that policy legislation needs supermajority support before it can proceed, meaning the 50 Democrats of today’s Senate have little choice but to resign themselves to the grind of finding Republican supporters. There are limited exceptions. Assuming Democrats stay in unison, they don’t need Republican votes to appoint judges, approve executive branch nominations or pass fiscal legislation such as the coronavirus stimulus that just became law. It’s within Democrats’ power to abolish the filibuster, but for now, the maneuver appears safe. Asked just days ago about the matter, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters that the president’s preference is for it to stay in place. “The president is an optimist by nature,” Psaki added. — Hunting for bipartisan consensus — Not every bill introduced in Congress, nor even every bill approved by a committee or even an entire single chamber, makes it through the process because its sponsors believe it’ll become law. There are a host of bills drafted with the intent of sending a message to industry, to independent regulators, to donors, to constituents. There are bills that lawmakers view as setting out a position to influence an ongoing policy debate. Even if it won’t become law this year, it might the next year, or the next, reintroduced and refined along the way. Telltale signs of whether a bill is a serious attempt at law are the number of cosponsors, and whether that list of names includes members of both parties in good stead with their party’s leadership. Bipartisan support is important even in the House, where Democrats have the votes to completely bypass Republicans. Because the House doesn’t have the filibuster to contend with, those with the majority of seats control the chamber. House Democrats can and do pass bills in the face of absolute House Republican opposition, but — special exceptions for fiscal bills aside — those bills are dead on arrival in the Senate. As long as the filibuster exists or Democrats lack a Senate supermajority, the House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee must court Republican support if its intention is to make new law. Finding clues of what House Democrats might seriously achieve, then, may be little more difficult than looking up the policy prescriptions House Republicans favor: giving regulators more resources, shifting the burden of proof in merger cases and boosting data portability and interoperability. A report issued by now-ranking Republican Ken Buck as a rejoinder to last year’s Democratic House Judiciary antitrust subcommittee staff report on competition in digital markets allowed that the GOP shares other Democratic concerns, including predatory pricing, monopoly leveraging and control over marketplace platforms. That conciliatory signal also came weighted, with warnings that Congress should be wary of “handing additional regulatory to agencies in an attempt to micromanage.” Instead, try instead telling enforcers they should return to first principles, the Colorado lawmaker advised. Whether Republicans and Democrats in the Senate can find common cause is an even more fraught question. Unlike its House counterpart, the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on antitrust hasn't conducted a 16-month investigation into digital monopolization. The subcommittee’s senior Republican, Utah’s Mike Lee, is prone to touting the importance of the consumer welfare standard and rails against online platforms “eager to impose the ideological censorship called for by their political benefactors.” Lee also says he’s open to working with subcommittee Chairwoman Amy Klobuchar on strengthening enforcement, adding the caveat that current antitrust laws are sufficient. Klobuchar, a Minnesota Democrat, doesn’t need Lee to get a bill through her subcommittee, but failing to find consensus with Republicans imperils her chances of making law. The prospects for her Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act becoming law as current written aren't good. — 'Big tech is out to get conservatives' — A looming question hanging over any bill, even one tailored to win bipartisan support, is whether it could be derailed by Republican anger at online platforms for alleged anti-conservative bias. A right-wing trope especially spread by President Donald Trump during his last year in office — the belief that platforms use their content moderation powers to silence conservatives — has mainstream acceptance in Republican circles. It’s a refrain almost obligatory for Republican lawmakers to repeat when discussing any issue related to online platforms. “Big tech is out to get conservatives,” House Judiciary Committee ranking member Jim Jordan of Ohio has said more than once. Democrats have their own share of anger at online platforms’ content-moderation practices, to be sure. They accuse online platforms of circumventing consumer protections, undermining civil rights laws and not doing enough to stymie disinformation. It’s Republicans, though, who appear the angriest, and are the more likely to insist that any legislative reform touching online platforms address content moderation, with the intention of making it harder, not easier, for online platforms to remove users, potentially imperiling a compromise measure.

#### That allows the GOP to successfully weaponize misinformation---triggers epistemic decay and cements a perma-GOP government

Carpenter 21, contributing writer for The Nation. She received the James Aronson Award for Social Justice Journalism in 2018, and has been a finalist for the Livingston Awards and the National Awards for Education Reporting. Her writing has also appeared in Rolling Stone, Guernica, and various other publications (Zoe, “Misinformation Is Destroying Our Country. Can Anything Rein It In?,” *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/right-wing-media-misinformation/>)

Natali Fierros Bock says she could feel this mass delusion calcifying in the wake of the election in Pinal County, a rural area between Phoenix and Tucson where she serves as co–executive director of the group Rural Arizona Engagement. “It feels like an existential crisis,” Bock adds. Many of the Sharpiegate claims online referred to Pinal County, and Gosar, whose district includes a portion of the area, was reportedly responsible for helping organize the January 6 “Stop the Steal” rally in Washington that resulted in the deaths of five people. Mark Finchem, a Republican who represents part of Pinal County in the statehouse, was also in Washington on January 6. The Capitol insurrection threw into relief the real-world consequences of America’s increasingly siloed media ecosystem, which is characterized on the right by an expanding web of outlets and platforms willing to entertain an alternative version of reality. Social media companies, confronted with their role in spreading misinformation, scrambled to implement reforms. But right-wing misinformation is not just a technological problem, and it is far from being fixed. Any hope that the events of January 6 might provoke a reckoning within conservative media and the Republican Party has by now evaporated. The GOP remains eager to weaponize misinformation, not only to win elections but also to advance its policy agenda. A prime example is the aggressive effort under way in a number of states to restrict access to the ballot. In Arizona, Republicans have introduced nearly two dozen bills that would make it more difficult to vote, with the big lie about election fraud as a pretext. “When you can sell somebody the idea that their elections were stolen, they’ve been violated, right? So then you need protection,” Bock says, explaining the conservative justification for the suite of new restrictions in her state. Voting rights is her organization’s “number one concern” at the moment. But Bock’s fears about political misinformation are more sweeping. Community organizing is difficult in the best of times. “But when you can’t agree on what is true and not true, when my reality doesn’t match the reality of the person I’m speaking to, it makes it more difficult to find common ground,” she says. “If we can’t agree on a common truth, if we can’t find a starting place, then how does it end?” Around the time of the 2016 election, Kate Starbird, a professor at the University of Washington who studies misinformation during crises, noticed that more and more social media users were incorporating markers of political identity into their online personas—hashtags and memes and other signifiers of their ideological alignment. In the footage from the Capitol she saw the same symbols, outfits, and flags as those she’d been watching spread in far-right communities online. “To see those caricatures come alive in this violent riot or insurrection, whatever you want to call it, was horrifying, but it was all very recognizable for me,” Starbird says. “There was a time in which we were like, ‘Oh, those are bots, those aren’t real people,’ or ‘That’s someone play-acting,’ or ‘We’re putting on our online persona and that doesn’t really reflect who we are in an offline sense.’ January 6 pretty much disabused us of that notion.” It was a particularly rude awakening for social media companies, which had long been reluctant to respond to the misinformation that flourished on their platforms, treating it as an issue of speech that could be divorced from real-world consequences. Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms had made some changes in anticipation of a contested election, announcing plans to label or remove content delegitimizing election results, for instance. Facebook blocked new campaign ads for the week leading up to the election; Twitter labeled hundreds of thousands of misleading tweets with fact-checking notes. Yet wild claims about election fraud spread virally anyway, ping-ponging from individual social media users to right-wing influencers and media. During the 2016 campaign, most public concern about misinformation centered on shadowy foreign actors posing as news sources or US citizens. This turned out to be an oversimplification, though many on the center and left offered it as an explanation for Hillary Clinton’s defeat in 2016; blaming Russian state actors alone ignored factors like sexism, missteps made by the Clinton campaign itself, and the home-grown feedback loop of right-wing media. In 2020, according to research done by Starbird and other contributors to the Election Integrity Project, those most influential in disseminating misinformation were largely verified, “blue check” social media users who were authentic, in the sense that they were who they said they were—Donald Trump, for example, and his adult sons. DONATE NOW TO POWER THE NATION. Readers like you make our independent journalism possible. Another key aspect in the creation of the big lie was what Starbird calls “participatory disinformation.” Trump was tweeting about the election being stolen from him months beforehand, but once voting got under way, “what we see is that he kind of relies on the crowd, the audiences, to create the evidence to fit the frame,” Starbird explains. Individuals posted their personal experiences online, which were shared by more influential accounts and eventually featured in media stories that placed the anecdotes within the broader narrative of a stolen election. Some of the anecdotes that fueled Sharpiegate came from people who used a felt-tip pen to vote in person, then saw online that their vote had been canceled—though the “canceled” vote actually referred to mail-in ballots that voters had requested before deciding to vote in person. “It’s a really powerful kind of propaganda, because the people that were helping to create these narratives really did think they were experiencing fraud,” Starbird says. Action by content moderators usually came too late and was complicated by the fact that many claims of disenfranchisement by individual users were difficult to verify or disprove. The Capitol riot led the tech giants to take more aggressive action against Trump and other peddlers of misinformation. Twitter and Facebook kicked Trump off their platforms and shut down tens of thousands of accounts and pages. Facebook clamped down on some of its groups, which the company’s own data scientists had previously warned were incubating misinformation and “enthusiastic calls for violence,” according to an internal presentation. Google and Apple booted Parler, a social media site used primarily by the far right, from their app stores, and Amazon stopped hosting Parler’s data on its cloud infrastructure system, forcing it temporarily offline. But these measures were largely reactions to harm already done. “Moderation doesn’t reduce the demand for [misleading] content, and demand for that content has grown during some periods of time when the platforms weren’t moderating or weren’t addressing some of the more egregious ways their tools were abused,” says Renée DiResta, technical research manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. Deplatforming individuals or denying service to companies that tolerate violent rhetoric, as Amazon did with Parler, can have an impact, particularly in the short term and when done at scale. It reduces the reach of influential liars and can make it more difficult for “alt-tech” apps to operate. A notorious example of deplatforming involved Alex Jones, the conspiracy theorist behind the site Infowars. Jones was kicked off Apple, Facebook, YouTube, and Spotify in 2018 for his repeated endorsement of violence. He lost nearly 2.5 million subscribers on YouTube alone, and in the three weeks after his accounts were cut off, Infowars’ daily average visits dropped from close to 1.4 million to 715,000. But Jones didn’t disappear—he migrated to Parler, Gab, and other alt-tech platforms, and he spoke at a rally in Washington the night before the Capitol attack. One outcome of unplugging Trump and other right-wing influencers has been a surge of interest in those alternative social media platforms, where more dangerous echo chambers can form and, in encrypted spaces, be more difficult to monitor. “Isn’t this just going to make the extreme communities worse? Yes,” says Ethan Zuckerman, founder of the Institute for Digital Public Infrastructure at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. “But we’re already headed there, and at least the good news is that [extremists] aren’t going to be recruiting in these mainstream spaces.” The bad news, in Zuckerman’s view, is that the far right is now leading the effort to create new forms of online community. “The Nazis right now have an incentive to build alternative distributed media, and the rest of us are behind, because we don’t have the incentive to do it,” Zuckerman explains. He argues that a digital infrastructure that is smaller, distributed, and not-for-profit is the path to a better Internet. “And my real deep fear is that we end up ceding the design of this way of building social networks to far-right extremists, because they are the ones who need these new spaces to discuss and organize.” In March, Trump spokesman Jason Miller said on Fox that the former president was likely to return to social media this spring “with his own platform.” A more fundamental problem than Trump’s presence or absence on Twitter is the power that a single executive—Jack Dorsey, in the case of Twitter—has in making that decision. Social media companies have become so big that they have little fear of accountability in the form of competition. “To put it simply, companies that once were scrappy, underdog startups that challenged the status quo have become the kinds of monopolies we last saw in the era of oil barons and railroad tycoons,” concluded a recent report by the staff of the Democratic members of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust. For now, the reforms at Facebook and other companies remain largely superficial. The platforms are still based on algorithms that reward outrageous content and are still financed via the collection and sale of user data. Karen Hao of MIT Technology Review recently reported that a former Facebook AI researcher told her “his team conducted ‘study after study’ confirming the same basic idea: models that maximize engagement increase polarization.” Hao’s investigation concluded that Facebook leadership’s relentless pursuit of growth “repeatedly weakened or halted many initiatives meant to clean up misinformation on the platform.” The modest “break glass” measures Facebook took during the election in response to the swell of misinformation, which included tweaks to its ranking algorithm to emphasize news sources it considered “authoritative,” have already been reversed. Tech companies could do more, as the election-time tweaks revealed. But they still “refuse to see misinformation as a core feature of their product,” says Joan Donovan, research director for the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University. The problem of misinformation appears so vast “because that’s exactly what the technology allows.” There are some signs of a growing appetite for regulation on Capitol Hill. Democrats have proposed reforms to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which insulates tech companies from legal liability for content posted to their platforms, such as requiring more transparency about content moderation and opening platforms to lawsuits in limited circumstances when content causes real-world harm. (GOP critiques of Section 230, on the other hand, make the false argument that it allows platforms to discriminate against conservatives.) Another legislative tactic would focus on the algorithms that platforms use to amplify content, rather than on the content itself. A bill introduced by two House Democrats would make companies liable if their algorithms promote content linked to acts of violence. Democratic lawmakers are also eyeing changes to antitrust law, while several antitrust lawsuits have been filed against Facebook and Google. But litigation could take years. Even breaking up Big Tech would leave intact its predatory business model. To address this, Zuckerman and other experts have called for a tax on targeted digital advertising. Such a tax would discourage targeted advertising, and the revenue could be used to fund public-service media. Held to account? Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey testified remotely before the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2020. (Matt York / AP) Social media plays a key role in amplifying conspiracy theories and political misinformation, but it didn’t create them. “When we think of disinformation as something that appeared [only in the Trump era], and that we used to have this agreed-upon narrative of what was true and then social platforms came into the picture and now that’s all fragmented… that makes a lot of assumptions about the idea that everyone used to agree on what was true and what was false,” says Alice E. Marwick, an assistant professor at the University of North Carolina who studies social media and society. Politicians have long leveraged misinformation, particularly racist tropes. But it’s been made particularly potent not just by social media, Marwick argues, but by the right-wing media industry that profits from lies. “The American online public sphere is a shambles because it was grafted onto a television and radio public sphere that was already deeply broken,” argue Yochai Benkler, Robert Faris, and Hal Roberts of Harvard’s Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society in their book Network Propaganda. The collapse of local news left a vacuum that for many Americans has been filled by partisan outlets that, on the right, are characterized by blatant disregard for journalistic standards of sourcing and verification. This insulated world of right-wing outlets, which stretches from those that bill themselves as objective sources, Fox News chief among them, to talk radio and extreme sites like Infowars and The Gateway Pundit, “represents a radicalization of roughly a third of the American media system,” the authors write. The conservative movement spent decades building this apparatus to peddle lies and fear along with miracle cures and pyramid schemes, and was so successful that Fox and other far-right outlets ended up in a tight two-step with the White House. Fox chairman Rupert Murdoch maintained a close relationship with Trump, as did Sean Hannity and former Fox News copresident Bill Shine, who became White House communications director in 2018. The backlash against Fox in the wake of the election hinted at a possible dethroning of the ruler of the right’s media machine. Its farther-right rival Newsmax TV posted a higher rating than Fox for the first time ever in the month after the election, following supportive tweets from Trump, and during the week of November 9 it passed Breitbart as the most-visited conservative website. But Fox quickly regained its perch. The network backpedaled rapidly during its post-election ratings slump, firing an editor who’d defended the projection of a Biden win in Arizona and replacing news programming with opinion content. According to Media Matters, Fox News pushed the idea of a stolen election nearly 800 times in the two weeks after declaring Biden the winner. The network’s ad revenue increased 31 percent during the final quarter of 2020, while its parent company, Fox Corporation, saw a 17 percent jump in pretax profit. The far-right media ecosystem has become so powerful in part because there’s been no downside to lying. Instead, the Trump administration demonstrated that there was a market opportunity in serving up misinformation that purports to back up what people want to believe. “In this day and age, people want something that tends to affirm their views and opinions,” Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy told The New York Times’ Ben Smith in an interview published shortly after the election. Claims of a rigged election were “great for news,” he said in another interview. Trump’s departure from the White House won’t necessarily reduce the demand for this kind of content. Since the Capitol riot, two voting-systems companies have launched an unusual effort to hold right-wing outlets and influencers accountable for some of the lies they’ve spread. Dominion Voting Systems, a major provider of voting technology, and another company called Smartmatic were the subjects of myriad outlandish claims related to election fraud, many of which were used in lawsuits filed by Trump’s campaign and were repeatedly broadcast on Fox, Newsmax TV, and OAN. Since January the companies have filed several defamation suits against Trump campaign lawyers Sidney Powell and Rudy Giuliani, MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell, and Fox News and three of its hosts. Dominion alleges that as a result of false accusations, its “founder and employees have been harassed and have received death threats, and Dominion has suffered unprecedented and irreparable harm.” The threat of legal action forced a number of media companies to issue corrections for stories about supposed election meddling that mentioned Dominion. The conservative website American Thinker published a statement admitting its stories about Dominion were “completely false and have no basis in fact” and “rel[ied] on discredited sources who have peddled debunked theories.” OAN simply deleted all of the stories about Dominion from its website without comment. These lawsuits will not dismantle the world of right-wing media, but they have prompted a more robust debate about how media and social media companies could be held liable for lies that turn lethal—and whether this type of legal action should be pursued, given the protections afforded by the First Amendment and the fact that the powerful often use libel law to bully journalists. Alternative reality: Trump supporters in Maricopa County derided Fox for reporting on election night that Biden had won the state. (Hannah McKay / Pool / Getty Images) Ethan Zuckerman has been thinking about how to build a better Internet for years, a preoccupation not unrelated to the fact that, in the 1990s, he wrote the code that created pop-up ads. (“I’m sorry. Our intentions were good,” he wrote in 2014.) Still, he believes that framing misinformation as a problem of media and technology is myopic. “It’s very hard to conclude that this is purely an informational problem,” Zuckerman says. “It’s a power problem.” The GOP is increasingly tolerant of, and even reliant on, weaponized misinformation. “We’re in a place where the Republican Party realizes that as much as 70 percent of their voters don’t believe that Biden was legitimately elected, and they are now deeply reluctant to contradict what their voters believe,” Zuckerman says. Republicans are reluctant, at least in part, because of a legitimate fear of primary challenges from the right, but also because they learned from Trump the power of using conspiracy theories to mobilize alienated voters by preying on their deep mistrust of public institutions. It’s one thing for an ordinary citizen to retweet a false claim; it’s another for elected officials to legitimize conspiracy theories. But holding the GOP to account may prove to be even harder than reforming Big Tech. The radical grass roots have been empowered by small-dollar fundraising and gerrymandering, while more moderate Republicans are retiring or leaving the party. Writer Erick Trickey argued recently in The Washington Post that what undercut a similar wave of conservative crackpot paranoia driven by the John Birch Society in the 1960s was explicit denunciation by prominent conservatives like William Buckley and Ronald Reagan as well as Republican congressional leaders. But today’s party leaders have been unwilling to excommunicate conspiracy-mongers. In the aftermath of the Capitol riot, elected officials who spread rumors that the violence was actually the result of antifascists—including Arizona’s Paul Gosar and Andy Biggs—gained notoriety, while those critical of Trump were publicly humiliated. The embrace of conspiratorial narratives has been particularly pronounced in state GOP organizations. The Texas GOP recently incorporated the QAnon slogan “We are the storm” into official publicity media, and the Oregon GOP’s executive committee endorsed the theory that the riot had been a “false flag” operation. In March, members of the Oregon GOP voted to replace its Trump-supporting chairman with a candidate even farther out on the extremist fringe. Weaponized misinformation could have a lasting impact not only on the shape of the GOP but also on public policy. Republicans are now using the big lie to try to restrict voting rights in Arizona, Georgia, and dozens of other states. As of February 19, according to the Brennan Center for Justice, lawmakers in 43 states had introduced more than 250 bills restricting access to voting, “over seven times the number of restrictive bills as compared to roughly this time last year.” In late March, Georgia Governor Brian Kemp signed a 95-page bill making it harder to vote in that state in a number of ways. Many of the far-right extremists, politicians, and media influencers who spread misinformation about the presidential election are now pushing falsehoods about Covid-19 vaccines. The rumors, which have spread on social media apps like Telegram that are frequented by QAnon adherents and militia groups, among others, range from standard anti-vax talking points to absurd claims that the vaccines are part of a secret plan hatched by Bill Gates to implant trackable microchips, or that they cause infertility or alter human DNA. Sidestepping the craziest conspiracies, prominent conservatives like Tucker Carlson and Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who has become one of the GOP’s leading purveyors of misinformation, are casting doubt about vaccine safety under the pretense of “just asking questions.” Vaccine misinformation plays into the longstanding conservative effort to sow mistrust in government, and it appears to be having an effect: A third of Republicans now say they don’t want to get vaccinated. These are the true costs of misinformation: deadly riots, policy changes that could disenfranchise legitimate voters, scores of preventable deaths. These translate into financial externalities: the additional expense of securing the Capitol, additional dollars devoted to the pandemic response. More abstract but no less real are the social costs: the parents lost down QAnon rabbit holes, the erosion of factual foundations that permit productive argument. The problem with the far right’s universe of “alternative facts” is not that it’s hermetically sealed from the universe the rest of us live in. Rather, it’s that these universes cannot truly be separated. If we’ve learned anything in the past six months, it’s that epistemological distance doesn’t prevent collisions in the real world that can be lethal to individuals—and potentially ruinous for democratic systems.

#### Disinformation undermines collective responses to existential threats

Roston 21, citing Bak-Coleman, PhD, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Washington Center for an Informed Public (Eric, “As Climate Change Fries the World, Social Media Is Frying Our Brains,” *Bloomberg News*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-29/as-climate-change-fries-the-world-social-media-is-frying-our-brains>)

Amid emergency heat, flooding, and famine, it’s even more critical that people recognize and agree at least on the big picture. And yet, as recent history has shown us time and again, they don’t. Much of that can be blamed on the pandemic of misinformation—concerning climate change, Covid-19, vaccines, and so much more— now running rampant on social media. It reminds Joseph Bak-Coleman of fish. Bak-Coleman is the lead author of a provocative new article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences about scientists’ inability thus far to adequately inform policymakers about how digital technology is impeding efforts to solve climate change and other collective-behavior problems. Individual fish swimming in a school intuit each other so rapidly and clearly that they can instantaneously and in unison pivot away from whatever dangers they encounter. Insofar as that is true, they have a limited error margin for passing along bad information. “It costs energy when you get scared for no reason, and it also costs life if you don’t get scared when you should,” said Bak-Coleman, a University of Washington postdoctoral scholar with expertise in neuroscience and evolutionary biology. “Animal groups are highly tuned to do these really fantastic feats of behavior. But it’s all quite fragile.” The development of digital communications has eroded or vaporized community protections developed over millennia to ensure at least a minimally healthy flow of information, which leads to healthy decision-making. That loss, Bak-Coleman and his co-authors write, “combined with rapid distribution of falsehood, may present one of the larger threats to human well-being.” Think of it like this. If you wanted to make the most obvious statement in the world, you could do worse than: “Technology now allows people to communicate instantaneously and across great distances.” Yet if you wanted to elicit the most tortured answer in the world, you might ask something incredibly similar: “What happens when people can communicate instantaneously and across great distances?” The tension between the obvious statement and the unanswerable question—which holds within it just about all of the world’s large-scale problems, including climate change—is so great, Bak-Coleman and his colleagues propose a whole new academic discipline just to try to understand it. As physiology has medicine and climate science has emissions-mitigation and adaptation–planning, they argue, the digital-misinformation pandemic requires an applied science—or as they call it, a “crisis discipline.” The need for such a discipline is also urgent, they argue, because “given that algorithms and companies are already altering our global patterns of behavior for financial reasons, there is no safe hands-off approach.” Despite the many joys and productive uses of digital communication, it routinely conveys so many falsehoods, so quickly, that many people are left either unable to see or unwilling to fix existential dilemmas, leaving humanity overall in a precarious condition.

## Inequality

### 1NC---Turn

#### Growth is unsustainable — pursuit causes extinction and turns war.

Trainer 20, PhD from University of Sydney. Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales (Ted, The Simpler Way: Collected Writings of Ted Trainer, *The Simplicity Institute*, pp. 3-6)

1. Unsustainability

The way of life we have in rich countries is grossly unsustainable. There is no possibility of all people on Earth ever rising to rich world per capita levels of consumption of energy, minerals, timber, water, food, phosphorous etc. These rates of consumption are generating numer-ous alarming global problems, now threatening our survival and the survival of other species. Most people have no idea of the magnitude of the overshoot – of how far we are beyond sustainable levels of re-source use and environmental impact. If all the estimated 9.8 billion people living on earth in 2050 were to consume resources at the pres-ent per capita rate in rich countries, world annual resource production rates would have to be about eight times as great as they are now.

For instance, the ‘Ecological Footprint’ analysis indicates that the amount of productive land required to provide one person in Australia with food, water, energy and settlement area is about 6.6 ha (Global Footprint Network, 2019). If 9.8 billion people were to live as Australians do, approximately 65 billion ha of productive land would be required. However, the total amount of productive land available is only 12 billion ha. If we assume one third of this should be set aside for nature (see, e.g., Baillie Yang, 2018) the amount available for humans might be about 8 billion ha. In other words, our rich world per capita footprint is about eight times as big as it would ever be possible for all of the world’s people to sustainably share.

Figures for some other items indicate much worse ratios. For instance, the top 10 nations consuming iron ore and bauxite (from which we ob-tain aluminium and steel) have per capita use rates that are respectively around 65 and 90 times the rates for all the other nations (Wiedmann et al., 2015). Mineral ore grades are falling. All people could not rise to present rich world levels of mineral use. The same case can be made with respect to just about all other resources and ecosystem services, such as agricultural land, forests, fisheries, water and biomass.

These simple figures clearly demonstrate the impossibility of all people ever having the material ‘living standards’ we have taken for granted in rich countries like Australia. We are not just a little beyond sustainable levels of resource demand and ecological impact – we are far beyond sustainable levels. Rich world practices, systems and ‘living standards’ are grossly unsustainable, and can never be extended to all the world’s people. Again, few people seem to grasp the magnitude of the over-shoot. We must face up to dramatic reductions in our present per capita levels of production and consumption.

1.1. Now add the absurd commitment to economic growth

The main worry is not the present level of resource use and ecological impact discussed above, it is the level we will rise to given the obsession with constantly increasing the amount of production and consumption. The supreme goal in all countries is to raise incomes, ‘living standards’ and GDP as much as possible, constantly and without any idea of a limit. That is, the most important goal is economic growth.

Consider the implications. If we assume a) a 3% p.a. economic growth, b) a population of 9.8 billion, c) all the world’s people rising to the living standards we in the rich world would have in 2050 given 3% p.a. growth – in that scenario, the total volume of world economic output would be 20 times as great as it is now and doubling every 23 years thereafter.

So even though the present levels of production and consumption are grossly unsustainable, the determination to have continual increase in income and economic output will multiply these towards absurd and impossible levels in coming decades.

Why analyse in terms of 9.8 billion rising to rich world levels? Because a) it is not morally acceptable to assume that they remain much poorer than we are, and b) that’s what everyone aspires to, so we had better think about whether it is viable.

1.2 But what about technical advance?

When confronted by global sustainability problems most people just assume that technical advance and ‘green growth’ will solve them, enabling us to go on living with ever-increasing levels of affluence. They do not realise that the magnitude of the problems rules this out.

The core ‘tech-fix’ faith is that resource demand and environmental impacts can be ‘decoupled’ from economic growth, i.e., that produc-tion and consumption can go on increasing while resource demand is sufficiently reduced. This is extremely implausible (see Part Three of this anthology for more detail). How likely is it that the world’s amount of production could be multiplied by 20 while resource use and environmental impacts are reduced by, say, 50% – i.e., a factor 40 reduction? None of the thirty or more reports over the last 20 years show any global reduction at all; they all show that as GDP rises so do the impacts. The recent review essay by Hickel and Kallis (2019) pro-vides a powerful critique of ‘green growth’ (see also Ward et al., 2016).

1.3 Global problems should be seen in terms of ‘limits to growth’

The ‘limits to growth’ perspective (Meadows et al., 1972) is essential if we are to understand the most serious global problems facing us:

The environmental problem is basically due to the fact that far too much producing and consuming is going on, taking too many resources rom nature and dumping too many wastes back into nature. We are eliminating species mainly because we are taking or ruining so much habitat. The environmental problems cannot be solved in an economy that is geared to providing ever-rising production, con-sumption, ‘living standards’ and GDP (see the next essay, ‘Why this economy must be scrapped’, for more detail).

Third World poverty and underdevelopment are inevitable if a few living in rich countries insist on taking far more of the world’s re-sources than all could have. The Third World can never develop to rich world levels of consumption, because there are far too few re-sources for that. (For more detail on this issue, see the essay ‘Third World development’ in Part Two.)

Conflict and war are inevitable if all aspire to rich world rates of consumption, and if rich countries insist on limitless growth on a planet with limited resources. Rich countries now have to support repressive regimes willing to establish policies that enable our cor-porations to ship out cheap resources, use Third World land for export crops, exploit cheap labour etc. This means we must be ready to get rid of regimes and to invade and run countries that threaten to follow policies contrary to our First World interests. Our rich world living standards could not be as high as they are if a great deal of repression and violence was not taking place, and rich countries contribute significantly to this. If we are determined to remain affluent, we should remain heavily armed! (This issue is developed in the essay in part Two called ‘If you want affluence, prepare for war’.)

Social cohesion is deteriorating and quality of life is being damaged. This is so even in the richest nations, because the supreme goals are raising business turnover, incomes and the GDP, not meet-ing needs, building community and improving the quality of life. (Some details of this decline in quality of life and the benefits of an alternative way to live are discussed in Part Four.)

#### Warming causes extinction and makes economic decline and war inevitable.

Spratt et al. 20, David Spratt: Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration and co-author of What Lies Beneath: The understatement of existential climate risk and Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action. Alia Armstead: Research Coordinator for Breakthrough. Ian Dunlop: co-author of What Lies Beneath and of the Club of Rome’s Climate Emergency Plan. He is a senior member of the Breakthrough Advisory Board (How Economics Has Underestimated Climate Damage and Encouraged Inaction, *Breakthrough - National Centre for Climate Restoration*, Accessible: https://www.breakthroughonline.org.au/publications)

THREE DEGREES OF WARMING Cost–benefit analysis, the mainstay of climate change economics, requires dollar numbers to be put on the costs of acting to reduce the level of future warming as compared to the damage caused by not acting, for various emissions scenarios. The first requirement is that these numbers can be reasonably estimated. Recent work from the University of Melbourne has shown that on current global emission patterns, a conservative estimate of costs of inaction for Australia would be $A584.5 billion by 2030, $A762 billion by 2050, and more than $A5 trillion in cumulative damages from now until 2100. On the other hand, the cost of effective emissions reduction is estimated to be $A35.5 billion up to 2030, or 0.14% of cumulative GDP (Kompas et al. 2019). The estimated costs in the report and the majority of economic analyses to date focus on infrastructure damage, agricultural and labour productivity losses, human health impacts and ecosystem losses, but this is just the tip of the iceberg. The costs of extreme weather events, pollution and ecosystem and biodiversity loss are not included. More importantly, neither are the economic damages that Australia will incur as 3°C of warming sweeps through Asia and the Pacific, devastating nations, disrupting major trading partners and supply chains, and likely turning the region — the “disaster alley” of global climate disruption — into one of social chaos and breakdown (Dunlop & Spratt 2017). Thirteen years ago, senior US national security analysts looked at the consequences of 3°C of warming and concluded that it would “give rise to massive nonlinear societal events. In this scenario, nations around the world will be overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges… Armed conflict between nations over resources… is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to outright chaos” (Campbell et al. 2007). A survey of the scientific literature on the likely impacts of 3°C paints a frightening picture (Spratt and Dunlop 2019). In such a world, it is likely that the structures of societies will be severely tested, and some will crash. The poorest nations will suffer first and most deeply from climate change, but no region will escape. Water availability will decrease sharply in the lowerlatitude dry tropics and subtropics, and affect almost two billion people worldwide. Agriculture will become nonviable in the dry subtropics. The Sahara will jump the Mediterranean as Europeans begin a long trek north. Water flows into the great rivers of Asia will be reduced by the loss of more than one-half, and perhaps much more, of the Himalayan ice sheet. Aridification will emerge over more than 30% of the world’s land surface, most severely in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, rural Australia and across the southwestern United States. Most regions in the world will experience a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production will be inadequate to feed the global population and food prices will skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutritional content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, aridification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human summer habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile will be inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Kolkata, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Miami — abandoned. Deadly heat conditions will persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, Central America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation, aridification, conflicts over land and water, and rising sea levels will contribute up to a billion people being displaced. Refugee conventions may give way to walls and blockades. One of the most recent and detailed cost-benefit analyses to be published uses detailed country-specific damage calculations. It finds that losses from climate damages for the higher emission scenarios will be up to 42% of global GDP by 2100. This is ten times the figure suggested by Nordhaus in his Nobel oration. Even so, the authors acknowledge that they do not account for “possible amplifications, for example, due to a potential destabilization of societies” (Ueckerdt et al. 2019). UNDERESTIMATING DAMAGE Economic analysis of climate change has systematically underestimated the impacts of future damage, and in particular failed to account for non-linear changes in the climate system. A recent report (see page 12), describes the problem of missing risks in economic assessments of climate change impacts. Do we have a realistic measure of the economic costs from future climate damages? “In a word, no,” is the answer from Prof. Tom Kompas, who says projections for economic damages under different global warming scenarios “are difficult to come by, save for simple, highly aggregated measures drawn from basic computational models… which can often be very misleading given their extreme and implicit tendency to average effects” (Kompas 2020). This deficiency in analysis is not restricted to IAMs. It is a broader methodological problem. Stated most bluntly, in the sphere of economics, there is no robust methodology for understanding the full range of economic consequences of climate disruption. Such a methodology may not be possible because it would require a systems-level analysis of global interactions in the physical, economic and sociopolitical spheres. There are also profound challenges in understanding how physical impacts translate into economic and social consequences. Economic analysis of climate change impacts falls into two broad categories: estimates of climate-warming-related economic damage; and cost–benefit analysis of various mitigation and technological paths, using IAMs. In both cases, there are big grey areas because such work requires understanding of: • Cumulative greenhouse gas emissions for the period under consideration; • How that affects atmospheric greenhouse gas levels; • The direct physical climate consequences for temperature and precipitation patterns, the range of extreme events, and impacts on major climate system elements such as the cryosphere, sea levels, carbon stores, ocean and atmospheric circulations; • How these physical changes impact the biosphere, agricultural land and water resources, and hence the impact on human societies and their ability to fulfil their basic needs for food, water and shelter; • How this impacts social and political relationships, and hence stability at local, regional and global levels; and • How climate-induced disruptions in one human system, for example the financial system, interact and feedback on other human system elements to act as climate and economic disruption impact multipliers. There are significant uncertainties in moving through these steps. What is the climate sensitivity value — the relationship between changes in greenhouse gas levels and temperature? How do changes in the basic physical system affect agriculture, tourism, labour productivity and human health, let alone more complex issues such as where we live and social organisation? How can accounting be made for non-linear climate system changes given the basic unpredictability of such events? How do the more immediate socio-economic impacts become translated into national and human security consequences: the breakdown of society, forced migration and conflict? How can disruptions in one or several systems affect other systems? Australia’s 2019-2020 megafires are a good case study, in which impacts spread across various systems: housing, infrastructure and communications, local economies, banking services, water and food security, agriculture and tourism, as well as the losses of biodiversity and ecosystems. The problem of analysis can also be seen in the very wide range of estimates of the damage caused by the mega fires, from $A4 billion up to $A100 billion. All these difficult-to-analyse and quantify possibilities mean that, particularly at the higher end of the range of projected warming, the uncertainties are such that no credible estimates in dollar terms can be made. And it is foolish to try and reduce devastating social and human security consequences to a monetary figure. What is the value of a human life? What is the value of the lives lost in the Syrian war, where climate impacts (drought and desertification) became an accelerant to instability? There are big issues concerning the underestimation of physical impacts, and the failure to account for non-linear changes, system thresholds and mutually reinforcing processes. Risk analysis has been poor, and there is scant recognition within the academic literature that “high-end” outcomes may eventuate and produce economic damage beyond quantification. The reports of the IPCC have exhibited a preference for conservative projections and scholarly reticence (Spratt & Dunlop 2018). MISSING RISKS • Economic assessments of the potential future risks of climate change have been omitting or grossly underestimating many of the most serious consequences for lives and livelihoods because these risks are difficult to quantify precisely and lie outside of human experience. • Scientists are growing in confidence about the evidence for the largest potential impacts of climate change and the rising probability that major thresholds in the Earth’s climate system will be breached as global mean surface temperature rises, particularly if warming exceeds 2°C above the preindustrial level. • Many of these impacts will grow and occur concurrently across the world as global temperature climbs. • Some of these impacts involve thresholds in the climate system beyond which major impacts accelerate, or become irreversible and unstoppable. • When a threshold is breached, it might cause one or more other thresholds to be exceeded as well, leading to a cascade of impacts. • Many of these impacts could exceed the capacity of human populations to adapt, and would significantly affect and disrupt the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people worldwide. • These impacts would also undermine economic growth and development, exacerbate poverty and destabilise communities. • Economic assessments fail to take account of the potential for large concurrent impacts across the world that would cause mass migration, displacement and conflict, with huge loss of life. • Economic assessments that are expressed solely in terms of effects on output (e.g. gross domestic product), or that only extrapolate from past experience, or that use inappropriate discounting, do not provide a clear indication of the potential risks to lives and livelihoods. • It is likely that there are additional risks that we are not yet anticipating simply because scientists have not yet detected their possibility, as we have entered a period of climate change that is unprecedented in human history. • The lack of firm quantifications is not a reason to ignore these risks, and when the missing risks are taken into account, the case for strong and urgent action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions becomes even more compelling. From: “The missing economic risks in assessments of climate change impacts” (DeFries et al. 2019). This scientific reticence is one basis for economic reticence. Naomi Oreskes and Nicholas Stern say that since climate scientists have been underestimating the rate of climate change and the severity of its effects, “then economists will necessarily underestimate their costs” (Oreskes & Stern 2019). When the climate conditions change sufficiently for experience to no longer be a reliable guide to the future, then economic estimates become more and more uncertain. In many cases, modellers: simply omit it from the model, assessment or discussion. In economic assessments of climate change, some of the largest factors, like thresholds in the climate system, when a tiny change could tip the system catastrophically, and possible limits to the human capacity to adapt, are omitted for this reason. In effect, economists have assigned them a value of zero, when the risks are decidedly not (Oreskes & Stern 2019). The consequence of ignoring the “missing risks” is that a stark reality is overlooked: the damage caused by climate change may be infinite, beyond all equations, models and cost-benefit analysis (see Beyond quantification, page 6). An IMF Working Paper notes a growing agreement between economists and scientists “that risk of catastrophic and irreversible disaster is rising, implying potentially infinite costs of unmitigated climate change, including, in the extreme, human extinction” (Krogstrup & Oman 2019).

#### A second recession during COVID guarantees a successful transition — it both forces degrowth policies and makes them more popular.

Kallis et al. 20, ICREA Professor at the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, With: Susan Paulson, Giacomo D’Alisa, Federico Demaria (Giorgios, “The case for degrowth in a time of pandemic,” *openDemocracy*, 5/14/2020, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/case-degrowth-time-pandemic/>)

The pandemic has lain bare the fragility of existing economic systems. Wealthy nations have more than enough resources to cover public health and basic needs during a crisis, and could weather declines in non-essential parts of the economy by reallocating work and resources to essential ones. Yet the way current economic systems are organized around constant circulation, any decline in market activity threatens systemic collapse, provoking generalized unemployment and impoverishment. It doesn’t have to be this way. To be more resilient to crises – pandemic, climatic, financial, or political – we need to build systems capable of scaling back production in ways that do not cause loss of livelihood or life. We make the case for degrowth. Conservative outlets such as [Forbes](https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2020/04/29/still-against-degrowth/), the [Financial Times](https://www.ft.com/content/0b171892-8afd-11ea-9dcb-fe6871f4145a), or the [Spectator](https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/the-coronavirus-crisis-reveals-the-misery-of-degrowth-), have been pronouncing that the coronavirus crisis reveals “the misery of degrowth”. But what is happening during the pandemic [is not degrowth](https://twitter.com/DegrowthMemes/status/1255783275987177473). Degrowth is a project of living meaningfully, enjoying simple pleasures, commoning, sharing and relating more with others, and working less, in more equal societies. The goal of degrowth is to purposefully slow things down in order to minimize harm to humans and earth systems and to reduce exploitation. The current situation is terrible, not because carbon emissions are declining, which is good, but because many lives are lost; it is terrible not because GDPs are going down, to which we are indifferent, but because processes in place to protect livelihoods when growth falters are grossly insufficient and unjust. We would like to see societies become slower by design, not disaster. This pandemic is a growth-induced disaster, harbinger of more to come. Drives for growth have accelerated global flows of material and money, paving the way for lightning-fast circulation of bodies and diseases. The economic policies and social arrangements proposed by degrowth offer ways to make such situations more liveable and just, to emerge stronger and better post-crisis, and to reorient practices and politics towards care and community solidarity. The end of growth will not necessarily involve a smooth transition. It may very well be unplanned, unwilled, and messy, in conditions not of our own choosing. Conditions like the ones we are living through now. History often evolves with punctuations; periods of seeming paralysis can reach a tipping point, when unexpected events open new possibilities and violently close others. The COVID-19 pandemic is such an event. Suddenly, things take radical new directions, and the unthinkable becomes thinkable, for better or for worse. Severe economic depression led to Roosevelt’s New Deal, and also to Hitler’s Third Reich. What are the possibilities and dangers now? Amid this pandemic, many scientific, political, and moral authorities are communicating the message that caring for people’s health and wellbeing should come before profit, and that is great. A resurgence of a care ethic that we advocate in our forthcoming book [The Case for Degrowth](https://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9781509535620) is evident in the willingness of people to stay home to protect their elders, and in the spirit of duty and sacrifice among care and health workers. Of course, many stay home also because they fear the virus and worry about themselves, or to avoid police fines. And many care workers go to work because they must earn a living. Acting collectively against crises, pandemic, or climate change requires such combinations of sacrifice and solidarity, self and collective interest, government interventions and people’s participation. Deep inequalities are coming into play in new ways. Residents of some countries are suffering different, and sometimes more severe, hardships than those of others, as are those who are deprived of full citizenship in prisons, migrant labor camps, and refugee settlements. Within each country, actors differentiated by gender, racial, socioeconomic, and occupational positions suffer different vulnerabilities in the face of the disease, and of the economic downturns that follow. Data from countries around the world show that [COVID tends to be much more severe and deadly in men](https://www.livescience.com/why-covid-19-more-severe-men.html) than in women. US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention show a disproportionate burden of illness and death among [racial and ethnic minority groups](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html). Nurses, health aids, and caretakers, positions in which women prevail, are especially vulnerable to infection. As are millions of men working in essential jobs including sanitation, trucking, taxi-driving, and meat packing. These jobs, in very large majority performed by men, were already among the most dangerous occupations before adding exposure to coronavirus. While some have the luxury of sheltering at home, others must choose between unemployment without an adequate safety net and working at jobs that expose them to the coronavirus. Yet, unless whole populations are protected, not even the wealthiest are fully safe from contagion. In this crisis, like others before, [people have mobilized and self-organized](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/31/virus-neighbours-covid-19) where businesses and governments have failed to provide for their needs – from mutual aid groups delivering food and medicines for elders, to groups of doctors, engineers, and hackers collaborating to 3-D print components for oxygen ventilators, to students babysitting the children of doctors and nurses. The proliferation of caring and commoning endeavors, which form the bedrock of the degrowth societies we envision, are all the more commendable given the contagious nature of the virus. After the pandemic is over, and the difficult path of economic reconstruction starts, this resurgent dynamism of commoning and care will be vital. Positive impulses among individuals and grassroots networks are necessary but not sufficient for sustained change. We need governments to secure healthcare for all, protect the environment, and provide economic safety nets. [The degrowth-supporting policies](https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/can-we-prosper-without-growth-10-policy-proposals/) we advocate were necessary before the pandemic, and are more so during and after: a Green New Deal and public investment program, work-sharing, a basic care income, universal public services, and support for community economies. So is the reorganization of public finance through measures including carbon fees, caps on wealth and high incomes, taxes on natural resource use, and pollution. Whereas degrowth debates have traditionally focused on demobilizing resource-intensive and ecologically damaging aspects of current economies, [pandemic responses](https://tribunemag.co.uk/2020/03/the-anti-wartime-economy) deal with demobilizing those aspects not immediately essential for sustaining life. We coincide in facing the fundamental challenge of managing political economies without growth during and after the pandemic: how to demobilize parts of the capitalist economy while securing the provisioning of basic goods and services, experimenting with resource-light ways of enjoying ourselves, and finding collective meanings in life. Radical proposals are already being considered and selectively adopted across the political spectrum as they provide concrete solutions amid the pandemic. Companies and governments have reduced working hours and implemented work-sharing; different forms of basic income are being debated; financial measures have been instituted to subsidize workers in the quarantine period and after businesses close; an international campaign for [care income](https://globalwomenstrike.net/) has been launched; governments have engaged the productive apparatus to secure vital supplies and services; and moratoriums are being considered or imposed on rent, mortgage, and debt payments. There is growing understanding that vast government spending will be required. The world will change after the pandemic, and there will be struggles over which paths to take. People will have to fight to direct change toward more equitable and resilient societies that have gentler impacts on humans and natural environments. Powerful actors will try to reconstitute status quo arrangements, and to shift costs to those with less power. It takes organizing and a confluence of alliances and circumstances to ensure that it won’t be the environment and the workers who pay the bill, but those who profited most from the growth that preceded this disaster. [Degrowth is not forced deprivation](https://vocabulary.degrowth.org/), but an aspiration to secure enough for everyone to live with dignity and without fear; to experience friendship, love, and health; to be able to give and receive care; to enjoy leisure and nature, and to legitimize a life that it is also an experience of interdependence and vulnerability. This goal will not be met by subsidizing fossil fuel companies, airlines, cruise ships, hotels, and tourism mega-businesses. Instead, states need to finance Green New Deals and rebuild their health and care infrastructures, creating jobs in a just transition to economies that are less environmentally damaging. As oil prices fall, fossil fuels should be taxed heavily, raising funds to support green and social investments, and to provide tax breaks and dividends to working people. Rather than using public money to bail out corporations and banks, we urge the establishment of a [basic care income](https://comune-info.net/reddito-di-cura/) that will help people and communities to reconstruct their lives and livelihoods. These fundamental questions related to the strategies for socio-ecological transformation will be at the center of the [international Vienna degrowth conference](https://www.degrowthvienna2020.org/en/landing-page/) taking place as an online event in late May 2020. A good starting point are the principles for the recovery of the economy and the basis of creating a just society contained in the open letter [‘Degrowth: New Roots for the Economy’](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/oureconomy/degrowth-new-roots-economy/). This crisis arguably opens up more dangers than it does possibilities. We worry about the politics of fear that the coronavirus pandemic engenders, the intensification of surveillance and control of peoples’ movements, xenophobia and blame of others, as well as home isolation that curbs commoning and political organizing. Once measures such as curfews, quarantines, rule-by-decree, border controls, or election postponements are taken, they can easily become part of the arsenal of political possibility, opening dystopian horizons. To counter these risks, degrowth motivates and guides us to re-found societies on the commons of mutual aid and care, orienting collective pursuits away from growth and toward wellbeing and equity. These are not just lofty aspirations; in our forthcoming book [The Case for Degrowth](https://politybooks.com/bookdetail/?isbn=9781509535620) we identify everyday practices and concrete policies to start building the world we want today, together with political strategies to support synergy among these efforts in the construction of equitable and low-impact societies. This book is unlike any other on degrowth, in that it is the first to try to address the hard question of ‘how to’ in the current political conjuncture. Before the pandemic, we had to work hard to convince people of the case for degrowth. Our job may be somewhat easier now amid such tangible evidence that the current system is crumbling under its own weight. As we embark on the second major global economic crisis in a dozen years, perhaps some of us will be more willing to question the wisdom of producing and consuming more and more, just to keep the system going. The time is ripe for us to refocus on what really matters: not GDP, but the health and wellbeing of our people and our planet.

#### Economic decline will be peaceful — COVID proves.

Walt 20, Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen, May 13th, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?” *Foreign Policy*, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/>, Accessed 04-20-2021)

For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely?

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.

This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.

Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.

I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.

Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely.

Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible.

If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished.

On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

#### Growth-driven tech innovation proliferates and advances the technology necessary to conduct bioterrorism.

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Whatever the actual potential of these technologies, it is clear that a powerful technological imaginary exists among policy makers, technologists, and economists that contributes to an unshakeable faith in innovation and human ingenuity to solve the decoupling challenge. Degrowth proponents have so far mainly challenged this optimism by emphasizing the limited potential of renewable energy due to its intermittency and high land and raw material demands (e.g. Kallis, 2018). However, this may downplay the (at least theoretical) potential for convergent breakthroughs in nanotechnology, synthetic biology, and AI to vastly improve renewable energy efficiency and storage systems while designing new materials to substitute for depleting minerals (Diamandis and Kotler, 2014). More broadly, while degrowthers have to some extent considered individual FIR technologies (particularly AI and biotechnology) (e.g. Kallis, 2018; Kerschner et al., 2018), they have yet to address their convergent and mutually amplifying character, which leaves them vulnerable to the arguments of techno-optimists. Of course, the revolutionary promise of these technologies may fail to materialize, and, given the magnitude of the decoupling challenge, degrowth advocates are right to be skeptical. However, due to irreducible uncertainty combined with the ‘exponential’ and ‘revolutionary’ potential of the FIR (Schwab, 2017), even more rigorous critical assessments would always be insufficient in the eyes of the techno-optimists. Therefore, an alternative line of response should also be pursued: what if the FIR does succeed in decoupling economic growth from total environmental impact? What unintended consequences then might this give rise to?3 Dual-use technologies and the democratization of violence First, we must consider that all these are ‘dual-use technologies’, or technologies with potential both for economic productivity and violence. As Blum and Wittes (2015, p. 2) explain, these technologies are driving a trend referred to as the ‘democratization of violence’ in which the ‘destructive power once reserved to states is now the potential province of individuals’. Rather than simply a matter of creating new individual weapons, Blum and Wittes (2015, pp. 39, 7-8) emphasize that convergent FIR technologies are generating ‘whole technological fields – a series of breakthroughs in basic science and engineering’ that ‘generate creativity in their users to build and invent new things, new weapons, and new modes of attack’. And to compound the problem, while FIR technologies empower individuals to kill and provoke systemic chaos unlike any other time in history, they also empower states to monitor the minute details of private and public life and potentially constrict individual and collective freedoms, while the unprecedented threats enabled by these same technologies will likely reinforce governmental efforts to intensify securitization as deeply as is technologically feasible. Blum and Wittes summarize the emerging predicament as follows: How should we think about the relationship between liberty and security when we both rely on governments to protect us from radically empowered fellow citizens around the globe and also fear the power those same technologies give to governments? (Blum and Wittes, 2015, p. 13) Blum and Wittes do not consider how the earth system crisis will intersect with these threats, either as a positive or negative feedback. But it should be clear that, in a world of FIR-driven sustainability solutions, they would inevitably intensify, and it is thus necessary to consider what new problems and governmental responses they would engender.4 Without claiming to exhaustively describe the security risks created by the FIR, I will focus on three emerging areas of concern: biosecurity, cybersecurity, and state securitization, and will then discuss how they may collectively generate a spiral of insecurity and securitization. Biotechnology and the emerging terrain of biosecurity To begin with biosecurity, both the promise and peril of biotechnology – particularly the still nascent field of synthetic biology – is its immense creative potential. As a recent report from the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) describes: synthetic biology is expected to (1) expand the range of what could be produced, including making bacteria and viruses more harmful; (2) decrease the amount of time required to engineer such organisms; and (3) expand the range of actors who could undertake such efforts. (NAS, 2018, p. 4) For example, manipulating DNA structures in microorganisms can make certain agents more virulent, improve their resistance to antibiotics and vaccines, make them less detectable by already limited surveillance systems, transform harmless microorganisms into deadly ones, and make pathogens more resilient to diverse atmospheric conditions, thus increasing their lifespan (Charlet, 2018; NAS, 2018). At present these capabilities remain limited and dependent on highly advanced techniques and laboratory equipment, which is why most experts believe there have to date been no mass casualty bioterror attacks (NAS, 2018). However, the NAS notes that improvements in synthesis technology have followed a ‘Moore’s Law–like’ curve for both reductions in costs and increases in the length of constructs that are attainable’, and that ‘these trends are likely to continue’ (NAS, 2018, pp. 18–19). Moreover, automated DNA synthesis techniques remove much of the time-consuming and technically difficult aspects of manipulating DNA, further reducing barriers to access (Wintle et al., 2017). And in the future, experts warn that ‘convergent capabilities’ between synthetic biology, information technology, nanotechnology, and 3D printing may enable ‘sudden’ breakthroughs in bioweaponization (e.g. by improving bio-agent stability and delivery, providing advance[d]s aerosolization capability, and accelerating the ‘Design-and-Build’ cycle) (NAS, 2018, p. 87). The possibilities of bio-weaponization will expand as these techniques diffuse, which are already enabling the formation of a ‘DIYbio’ movement in which amateur scientists, inventors, and others are increasingly ‘capable of doing at home what just a few years ago was only possible in the most advanced university, government or industry laboratories’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1109). The new CRIPSR/Cas9 gene editing technique further expands the range of genomic tinkering available to individuals, which has been widely embraced by the DIYbio community as a powerful tool that ‘makes it easy, cheap, and fast to move genes around – any genes, in any living thing’ (Maxmen, 2015). The capacities of DIY biohackers remain limited in important ways, though the trends described above suggests they will continue to increase as barriers to advanced bio-weaponization fall (NAS, 2018). And while the risks are evident, the democratization of these techniques may also facilitate the diffusion and customization of local solutions to environmental and health challenges while enhancing popular participation in the direction of biotechnological evolution away from transnational corporate dominance (Bennett et al., 2009). We can therefore say that these emerging technologies pose a unique kind of ‘security dilemma’: while their development and diffusion may strengthen local and global capacities to solve environmental challenges, they may also imperil global security by unleashing uniquely powerful and complex violence capabilities. Synthetic biology is only in its early stages, and governments from the UK to China aim to ‘accelerate [its] industrialization and commercialization’ in order ‘to drive economic growth’ and ‘develop solutions to key challenges across the bioeconomy, spanning health, chemicals, advanced materials, energy, food, security and environmental protection’ (Synthetic Biology Leadership Council, 2016, pp. 13, 4). If calls for emergency action to exponentially expand the green economy indeed accelerate these trends (Falk et al., 2018), then by 2030 (and more so by 2040) we will live in a world where genetically engineered biofuels dramatically increase, genetic tinkering with crop varieties is normalized to enhance agricultural resilience, and gene drives are deployed to control old and new disease vectors intensified by climate change (among other potential applications), which would exponentially expand the number of individuals with biotech expertise and access to the needed equipment. Therefore, while we have yet to experience a catastrophic bioterror attack, rapid advances in synthetic biology are nonetheless creating a ‘black swan waiting to happen’ (Bennett et al., 2009, p. 1110), and the risk is that such black swans could become increasingly ‘normal’ if this technology becomes a key engine of economic growth and green technological innovation.

### 1NC---Turn

#### No soft power impact

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability. Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend. Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world. Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46 Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average. Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### 1ac can’t no link---Kupchan is about the plan being key to restore US leadership---inserting because we read on the counterplan.

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U.S. President Joe Biden has declared that under his leadership, “America is back” and once again “ready to lead the world.” Biden wants to return the country to its traditional role of catalyzing international cooperation and staunchly defending liberal values abroad. His challenge, however, is primarily one of politics, not policy. Despite Biden’s victory in last year’s presidential election, his internationalist vision faces a deeply skeptical American public. The political foundations of U.S. internationalism have collapsed. The domestic consensus that long supported U.S. engagement abroad has come apart in the face of mounting partisan discord and a deepening rift between urban and rural Americans. An inward turn has accompanied these growing divides. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism, neo-isolationism, protectionism, and nativism were anathema to most of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. But Trump’s approach to statecraft tapped into public misgivings about American overreach, contributing to his victory in 2016 and helping him win the backing of 74 million voters in 2020. An “America first” approach to the world sells well when many Americans experience economic insecurity and feel that they have been on the losing end of globalization. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center revealed that roughly half the U.S. public believes that the country should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate more on fixing problems at home. Redressing the hardships facing many working Americans is essential to inoculating the country against “America first” and Trump’s illiberal politics of grievance. That task begins with economic renewal. Restoring popular support for the country’s internationalist calling will entail sustained investment in pandemic recovery, health care, infrastructure, green technology and jobs, and other domestic programs. Those steps will require structural political reforms to ease gridlock and ensure that U.S. foreign policy serves the interests of working Americans. What Biden needs is an “inside out” approach that will link imperatives at home to objectives abroad. Much will depend on his willingness and ability to take bold action to rebuild broad popular support for internationalism from the ground up. Success would significantly reduce the chances that the president who follows Biden, even if he or she is a Republican, would return to Trump’s self-defeating foreign policy. Such future-proofing is critical to restoring international confidence in the United States. In light of the dysfunction and polarization plaguing U.S. politics, leaders and people around the world are justifiably questioning whether Biden represents a new normal or just a fleeting reprieve from “America first.”

#### Leadership is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

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As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.

#### Pursing heg locks in overstretch and a Russia-China axis.

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There is little sign of active “splitting” currently, however. (A notable exception is recent collaboration with Beijing over North Korea’s nuclear program, even if it is marred by tension and distrust.) Rather, the United States is encouraging the perception of a common enemy. By militarily positioning itself within striking distance of Russia and China through a semi-encircling presence in eastern Europe and north-east Asia, expanding alliances, entertaining further expansion, ramping up freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOP) in the South China Sea, reviving the pursuit of an antiballistic missile shield, establishing a reputation as a sponsor of “color revolutions” and as an overthrower of regimes, Washington helps draw Beijing and Moscow closer together into a balancing coalition. A nascent Russia-China alliance is suggested by Russia’s own interagency inquiry into the possibility, the frequency of Putin-Xi contact, deliberate tightening of economic interaction, and overt displays and declarations of close military ties through joint exercises and arms sales.24

It does not have to be this way. The United States has a geopolitical advantage—its distant location. Most powers, most of the time, are more concerned by the potential threat of other nearby land powers than distant sea powers.25Based in the Western hemisphere, the United States has less of a compelling security interest in adversaries ’backyards, allowing Washington the choice of adopting a more distant pose. Russia and China, by contrast, are neighbors so cannot withdraw, both are primarily continental land-based military powers, and historically such proximity can exacerbate rivalries and mutual fears. Sino-Russian antagonism remains a built-in possibility. Only under the right conditions, though, can the rivalries again grow. This is not a plea for a trilateral realignment whereby one state agrees to be the United States’ “geopolitical hammer” and teams up with Washington to contain the other. Rather, it is to suggest that more American restraint in one theater could make space for Russia-China frictions to take effect in another.

This geopolitical principle will prove controversial. The bipartisan consensus among security experts in Washington is to assume that only a state of preponderance over all rivals will suffice. Policymakers assume that the problem lies in Washington’s failure to apply enough power, or to apply enough power efficiently enough. They then call for the allocation of more resources and their smarter use in order to sustain U.S. dominance. The congressionally-mandated2018National Defense Strategy Commission report, appointed to make recommendations, is a case in point. It takes dominance as the obvious U.S. national interest. It complains that as rivals challenge American power, U.S. military superiority and its capacity to wage concurrent wars has eroded, due tor-educed defense expenditure, and advises that it spend more while cutting entitlements.26On this logic, a defense budget that is already10 times the size of Russia’s and four times the size of China’s is not enough, for U.S. grand strategy must go beyond defense and deterrence to achieve unchallengeable strength. That the pursuit of dominance could be the source of the problem, not the answer, is not considered.

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more.

Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expend-able for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources.

To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place.

Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### Russia-China coordination triggers global war.

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While Washington takes a wait-and-see approach, Moscow and Beijing could be coordinating to significantly thwart U.S. interests over the next 15 to 25 years. The two powers may never forge a formal military alliance, but they could still work together in ways that cause major headaches for the United States. Imagine, for example, that Russia and China coordinate the timing of hostile actions on their peripheries. If China made aggressive moves in support of its sovereignty claim in the South China Sea at the same time that Russia made further incursions into Ukraine, U.S. forces would struggle to respond effectively to either gambit.

Nonmilitary collaboration between Russia and China could weaken the United States and even threaten its way of life. Both countries are likely to use their cyber and disinformation capabilities to, as the director of national intelligence put it in January, “steal information, to influence our citizens, or to disrupt critical infrastructure.” China currently does not exhibit Russia’s zeal for using such measures, particularly against the United States; but if U.S.-Chinese relations darken, Beijing could plausibly take a page from Russia’s playbook and mount coordinated, deniable cyberattacks or interference campaigns against the United States.

China and Russia behave very differently in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives, but the combined effect of their actions is often greater than the sum of its parts. In Europe, for example, China has amassed economic influence through growing trade relationships and Belt and Road-related infrastructure investments not contingent on standards for democratic governance and human rights, particularly in eastern Europe, Greece, and Italy. This engagement will ultimately translate into political leverage, as it already has in many countries in Asia. Russia, for its part, appears intent on pursuing hybrid tactics that disrupt democratic processes. On their own, each of these activities is already worrisome for the United States and Europe. But a scenario in which each country’s actions amplify the other’s is not hard to imagine. China, for example, could eventually use its growing ownership of European ports and rail lines to slow a NATO response to Russian aggression. Likewise, Beijing could use the economic leverage it has accrued to quietly dissuade an already reluctant NATO member state such as Hungary or Turkey from responding to Russia’s hybrid tactics, which could ultimately serve to discredit NATO’s commitment to collective defense.

## Modeling

### 1NC---AT: Modeling

#### No modeling---other countries see US antitrust as irrational, even if we get things right.

William E. Kovacic 15, Professor of Law and Policy at George Washington University, former General Counsel for the Federal Trade Commission, J.D. from Columbia University, “The United States and Its Future Influence on Global Competition Policy,” George Mason Law Review, Vol. 22, 2015, accessed via Lexis

One force that reduces the perceived legitimacy of the U.S. system is a widely accepted narrative, reflected in popular discourse and scholarly commentary, which portrays federal enforcement as irrational and unstable. 65 [\*1172] In this interpretation of modern U.S. enforcement history, antitrust policy undergoes recurring erratic shifts, with a small number of lucid intervals. For the most part, the irrationality narrative suggests that U.S. antitrust policy embraced unsupportable extremes of over-enforcement in the 1960s and 1970s, under-enforcement from 1981 to 1988 and 2001 to 2008, and achieved a sensible, balanced equilibrium only from 1993 to 2000 and 2009 to the present. 66 This accounting of antitrust history raises a troublesome question: why should any jurisdiction outside the U.S. respect a system that has lost its mind in roughly 41 of the past 55 years?

Policy-making in the irrationality narrative is sharply discontinuous, and the enforcement institutions have little evident capacity for self-assessment or correction over time. 67 Individual leaders count for everything, and institutional arrangements fail to discipline policy-making; 68 appoint a wise official and you get good results, but pick a zealot and the agency swerves toward frantic hyperactivity or utter indolence. The irrationality narrative is the public policy equivalent of an interpretation of Formula One racing that attributes the outcome in races entirely to the driver and treats the quality of the car and supporting team as largely irrelevant.

The irrationality account of U.S. enforcement history derives power from the stature of the narrators. Despite its unreliable reading of U.S. experience, the narrative's academic pedigree is daunting. Some of the greatest scholars in U.S. competition law have contributed to the story. If nonentities constructed the narrative, foreign observers would dismiss it out of hand. Instead, the narrative of irrationality and instability, often presented with the metaphor of a wildly swinging pendulum, originated and developed in the work of some of the field's most influential commentators. On many occasions outside the U.S., I have heard enforcement officials, practitioners, and scholars speak of the irrationality narrative as though it were an established truth. To these observers, the stature of the scholars who popularized the irrationality narrative invariably lends verisimilitude to the story.

As described below, the irrationality narrative of the U.S. system serves the aims of the right and the left in the debate about federal enforcement policy. For those who favor more intervention or less intervention, alike, the image of a system dangerously out of control serves to frame their own "sensible" policy proposals. By this technique, the narrator emerges as the voice of wisdom in a crazed policy environment.

[\*1173] The architecture of the modern irrationality narrative took shape in 1978 when Professor Robert Bork published the first edition of his transformative treatise, The Antitrust Paradox. 69 Professor Bork's central thesis was that "modern antitrust has so decayed that the policy is no longer intellectually respectable." 70 Each institution with a role in the implementation of the antitrust laws--the courts, the Congress, and the federal enforcement agencies--caused the decay. On antitrust matters, the Congress displayed the mentality of "the sheriff of a frontier town" who "did not sift evidence, distinguish between suspects, and solve crimes, but merely walked the main street and every so often pistol-whipped a few people." 71 With few exceptions, the courts embraced a view of antitrust law that "teaches the necessity for government intervention when no such necessity exists, and even when intervention is positively harmful." 72 Without regard to adverse economic effects, the DOJ and the FTC "must continually press on to fresh territory, seeking theories that broaden the application of the law and make violations easier to establish." 73

In Professor Bork's telling, the implementing institutions were capricious, reckless, or bent upon self-aggrandizement. 74 As a group, the institutions have gone mad, for they have no tendency or, perhaps, any capacity to reflect on their experience, identify error, and make corrections. 75 Instead, the U.S. antitrust system had "an inbuilt thrust toward greater severity or further extension." 76 Nothing, Professor Bork warned, seemed able to contain the destructive march of intervention: "This process has no obvious stopping point." 77

The image of a system out of control served Professor Bork's rhetorical aims; it showed the urgency for reform by presenting a system in shambles. The image also distorted (more mildly, misread) current trends substantially. When The Antitrust Paradox appeared in January 1978, each institution Professor Bork rebuked--the Congress, the courts, and the federal enforcement agencies--had taken steps to rebalance the antitrust system. 78 The adjustments came slowly, but they were coming, nonetheless. If Professor Bork had acknowledged that the seemingly out-of-control institutions [\*1174] were making important adjustments, his book would have lost some (maybe much) of its force.

A second decisive contribution to the irrationality narrative came in the late 1980s and early 1990s from one of Professor Bork's harshest critics, Professor Robert Pitofsky. Though Professor Pitofsky scorned Professor Bork's calls for a vast retrenchment of antitrust enforcement, he used his own version of the irrationality narrative while setting out a more interventionist agenda. 79 Describing federal merger enforcement from the early 1960s through the early 1990s, Professor Pitofsky wrote:

American antitrust policy has tried to balance possible threats to competition against merger benefits, but remarkably, has careened from one extreme to another in this balancing process. For example, the United States had by far the most stringent antimerger policy in the world in the 1960s, striking down mergers among small firms in unconcentrated markets. By the 1980s, the United States maintained an extremely lenient merger policy, regularly allowing billion dollar mergers to go through without government challenge, even when they involved direct competitors. 80

Like Professor Bork in The Antitrust Paradox, Professor Pitofsky presented a system run amok. Federal policy "careen[s] from one extreme to another," like an automobile with an impaired driver swerving across the centerline. 81 No institutional feature in the U.S. system provided needed balance. 82

In Professor Pitofsky's version of the narrative, the solution to the aberrant enforcement behavior came by way of appointments--including his own--to the federal agencies. 83 In 2002, after chairing the FTC from 1995 to 2001, Professor Pitofsky said federal merger control by the late 1990s "stopped careening from aggressive enforcement based in some part on a populist ideology to minimalist enforcement based on hostility to the core assumptions of antitrust . . . ." 84 Under the Clinton Administration's appointees, federal policy stopped "careening," avoiding the extremes of an overheated, populist-inspired activism of the 1960s and the "minimalist" program of the Reagan presidency with its "hostility to the core assumptions of antitrust." 85

For Professor Pitofsky, like Professor Bork, the narrative of a system gripped by irrational, erratic variations in behavior served an important instrumental purpose. The portrayal of a regime swinging wildly between extremes allowed Professor Pitofsky to claim the role--as suggested in the [\*1175] title of his 2002 article, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A View from the Middle--of the wise centrist. 86 Professor Pitofsky underscored the rationality of his own program by juxtaposing it against the irrationality of his predecessors. 87 Clinton Administration antitrust officials strove to claim the mantle of wise centrism. 88 As the following passage from an essay in The Economist in 2000 shows, they framed their program as a sensible middle way between the irrational interventionism of the 1960s and 1970s and the inactivity of the 1980s:

It helps that [DOJ Assistant Attorney General Joel] Klein and his counterpart at the FTC, Robert Pitofsky, have been deliberately low-key in talking about their activities, claiming that they are modest and in the legal mainstream of legal thought and economics. They concede that they have been more interventionist than the laissez-faire ideologues of the Reagan years, but they say they are nothing like the trust-busting zealots of the 1960s who saw evil in every big company or merger. 89

In reporting on the Clinton administration strategy, The Economist presents the federal enforcement policy just as the DOJ and FTC leadership wished: a "modest" and "mainstream" program standing between two eras of irrationality; one guided by "trust-busting zealots" and the other led by "laissez-faire ideologues." 90

Taken on its own terms, the irrationality interpretation of U.S. antitrust history provides a grim picture of the American system. One should be wary of a system that intermittently has lucid policymaking intervals, but its normal state is irrationality. If everything depends on the appointment of wise centrists to head the agencies, nothing good can happen when the [\*1176] choice of DOJ or FTC leadership is not so inspired. Because personalities are decisive, when the wise centrists depart, nothing in the institutions themselves can prevent the system from returning quickly to bad old habits.

As the quotation presented above illustrates, the wise centrism story acquires force if periods of thoughtless extremism bracket the sensible policy era. As developed by Professor Pitofsky and other antitrust scholars, the irrationality narrative derives its power from the system's tendency to embrace extremes. 91 Dramatic variations in performance demonstrate the absence of thoughtful policy-making. The narrator seems sane by comparison if all others appear to be deranged. Professor Pitofsky's article in 2002 about the future of antitrust policy used this framing technique. 92 He wrote that "during the Reagan years, there was no enforcement whatsoever against non-horizontal mergers and joint ventures, boycotts, minimum resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing contracts, tie-in sales, attempts to monopolize, and monopolization." 93

The passage quoted above highlights two recurring features of the irrationality narrative. First, Professor Pitofsky's statement uses sweeping, categorical language ("no enforcement whatsoever") to describe the period of extreme inactivity. 94 In the 2002 article and in other papers, Professor Pitofsky made strong claims of inactivity to portray the Reagan Administration antitrust program as a gross departure from good practice. 95 Second, the portrayal of events, though written with the utmost self-assurance, often cannot withstand fact-checking and is verifiably incorrect. 96

[\*1177] Professor Pitofsky has plenty of esteemed company in telling the U.S. irrationality story by making bold claims belied by actual enforcement experience. As noted above, Professor Bork's denunciation of antitrust policy circa 1978 ignored important doctrinal and policy developments that fit poorly with a system out of control. 97 The story of horrible decay is less compelling if the asserted flaws are not so horrible. Other accounts of U.S. enforcement experience by the field's leading commentators include claims that during the Reagan Administration "merger enforcement ground to a halt," 98 that antitrust "[e]nforcement ceased," 99 and that the DOJ and the FTC "did not file a single vertical case." 100 Why did the U.S. system lose its mind? The answer, say two of America's best scholars, is that "extremists" took control of the enforcement agencies. 101 Experts in the U.S. might excuse these descriptions of federal enforcement as careless hyperbole. In my experience, foreign observers are more likely to take them at face value.

The story of U.S. antitrust policy in the 1980s is considerably more complex. Crucial factual tenets of the irrationality narrative are unsupportable. Merger enforcement never halted, 102 enforcement never ceased, 103 and vertical restraints cases (at least a few) still appeared. 104 To look beyond the categorical statements of inactivity and recount enforcement developments [\*1178] accurately would reveal a more thoughtful enforcement program at work. There is a major difference, for example, between saying a merger enforcement program has disappeared, and saying that boundaries have been reset, but policed actively.

Would a fuller, more accurate account of federal enforcement trends over time reveal intense debate about the proper direction of policy? Of course. Has policy shifted across administrations, especially after a regime change? No doubt. Yet, liberated from the irrationality narrative's determination to accentuate the magnitude of changes and cast decision-makers as senseless extremists, a more faithful account of U.S. federal enforcement history would portray adjustments as more gradual and nuanced, in most cases, than the irrationality narrative suggests. The discipline imposed by institutional arrangements, not simply patterns in leadership appointments (whether irrational officials or prudent centrists), would account for refinements over time.

#### No populism impact---states won’t risk war, isolation, AND are already stagnant.

John Mueller 21, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies, "The Rise of China, the Assertiveness of Russia, and the Antics of Iran," in The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency, Chapter 6, 02/17/2021, pg. 163-167.

Complacency, Appeasement, Self-destruction, and the New Cold War

It could be argued that the policies proposed here to deal with the international problems, whether real or imagined, presented by China, Russia, and Iran constitute exercises not only in complacency, but also in appeasement. That argument would be correct. As discussed in the Prologue to this book, appeasement can work to avoid military conflict as can be seen in the case of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. As also discussed there, appeasement has been given a bad name by the experience with Hitler in 1938.

Hitlers are very rare, but there are some resonances today in Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping. Both are shrewd, determined, authoritarian, and seem to be quite intelligent, and both are fully in charge, are surrounded by sychophants, and appear to have essentially unlimited tenure in office. Moreover, both, like Hitler in the 1930s, are appreciated domestically for maintaining a stable political and economic environment. However, unlike Hitler, both run trading states and need a stable and essentially congenial international environment to flourish.128 Most importantly, except for China’s claim to Taiwan, neither seems to harbor Hitler-like dreams of extensive expansion by military means. Both are leading their countries in an illiberal direction which will hamper economic growth while maintaining a kleptocratic system. But this may be acceptable to populations enjoying historically high living standards and fearful of less stable alternatives. Both do seem to want to overcome what they view as past humiliations – ones going back to the opium war of 1839 in the case of China and to the collapse of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union in 1989–91 in the case of Russia. Primarily, both seem to want to be treated with respect and deference. Unlike Hitler’s Germany, however, both seem to be entirely appeasable. That scarcely seems to present or represent a threat. The United States, after all, continually declares itself to be the indispensable nation. If the United States is allowed to wallow in such self-important, childish, essentially meaningless, and decidedly fatuous proclamations, why should other nations be denied the opportunity to emit similar inconsequential rattlings? If that constitutes appeasement, so be it. If the two countries want to be able to say they now preside over a “sphere of influence,” it scarcely seems worth risking world war to somehow keep them from doing so – and if the United States were substantially disarmed, it would not have the capacity to even try.

If China and Russia get off on self-absorbed pretensions about being big players, that should be of little concern – and their success rate is unlikely to be any better than that of the United States. Charap and Colton observe that “The Kremlin’s idee fixe that Russia needs to be the leader of a pack of post-Soviet states in order to be taken seriously as a global power broker is more of a feel-good mantra than a fact-based strategy, and it irks even the closest of allies.” And they further suggest that

The towel should also be thrown in on the geo-ideational shadow-boxing over the Russian assertion of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet Eurasia and the Western opposition to it. Would either side be able to specify what precisely they mean by a regional sphere of influence? How would it differ from, say, US relations with the western-hemisphere states or from Germany’s with its EU neighbors?129

Applying the Gingrich gospel, then, it certainly seems that, although China, Russia, and Iran may present some “challenges” to US policy, there is little or nothing to suggest a need to maintain a large US military force-in-being to keep these countries in line. Indeed, all three monsters seem to be in some stage of self-destruction or descent into stagnation – not, perhaps, unlike the Communist “threat” during the Cold War. Complacency thus seems to be a viable policy.

However, it may be useful to look specifically at a couple of worst-case scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China (after it builds up its navy more) and an invasion of the Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia by Russia. It is wildly unlikely that China or Russia would carry out such economically self-destructive acts: the economic lessons from Putin’s comparatively minor Ukraine gambit are clear, and these are unlikely to be lost on the Chinese. Moreover, the analyses of Michael Beckley certainly suggest that Taiwan has the conventional military capacity to concentrate the mind of, if not necessarily fully to deter, any Chinese attackers. It has “spent decades preparing for this exact contingency,” has an advanced early warning system, can call into action massed forces to defend “fortified positions on home soil with precision-guided munitions,” and has supply dumps, booby traps, an wide array of mobile missile launchers, artillery, and minelayers. In addition, there are only 14 locations that can support amphibious landing and these are, not surprisingly, well-fortified by the defenders.130

The United States may not necessarily be able to deter or stop military attacks on Taiwan or on the Baltics under its current force levels.131 And if it cannot credibly do so with military forces currently in being, it would not be able to do so, obviously, if its forces were much reduced. However, the most likely response in either eventuality would be for the United States to wage a campaign of economic and military (including naval) harassment and to support local – or partisan – resistance as it did in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion there in 1979. 132 Such a response does not require the United States to have, and perpetually to maintain, huge forces in place and at the ready to deal with such improbable eventualities.

The current wariness about, and hostility toward, Russia and China is sometimes said to constitute “a new Cold War.”133 There are, of course, considerable differences. In particular, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union – indeed the whole international Communist movement – was under the sway of a Marxist theory that explicitly and determinedly advocated the destruction of capitalism and probably of democracy, and by violence to the degree required. Neither Russia nor China today sports such cosmic goals or is enamored of such destructive methods. However, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the United States was strongly inclined during the Cold War massively to inflate the threat that it imagined the Communist adversary to present. The current “new Cold War” is thus in an important respect quite a bit like the old one: it is an expensive, substantially militarized, and often hysterical campaign to deal with threats that do not exist or are likely to selfdestruct.134

It may also be useful to evaluate terms that are often bandied about in considerations within foreign policy circles about the rise of China, the assertiveness of Russia, and the antics of Iran. High among these is “hegemony.” Sorting through various definitions, Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow array several that seem to capture the essence of the concept: domination, controlling leadership, or the ability to shape international rules according to the hegemon’s own interests. Hegemony, then, is an extreme word suggesting supremacy, mastery, preponderant influence, and full control. Hegemons force others to bend to their will whether they like it or not. Reich and Lebow also include a mellower designation applied by John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan in which a hegemon is defined as an entity that has the ability to establish a set of norms that others willingly embrace.135 But this really seems to constitute an extreme watering-down of the word and suggests opinion leadership or entrepreneurship and success at persuasion, not hegemony.

Moreover, insofar as they carry meaning, the militarized application of American primacy and hegemony to order the world has often been a fiasco.136 Indeed, it is impressive that the hegemon, endowed by definition by what Reich and Lebow aptly call a grossly disproportionate military capacity, has had such a miserable record of military achievement since 1945 – an issue discussed frequently in this book.137 Reich and Lebow argue that it is incumbent on IR scholars to cut themselves loose from the concept of hegemony.138 It seems even more important for the foreign policy establishment to do so.

There is also absurdity in getting up tight over something as vacuous as the venerable “sphere of influence” concept (or conceit). The notion that world affairs are a process in which countries scamper around the world seeking to establish spheres of influence is at best decidedly unhelpful and at worst utterly misguided. But the concept continues to be embraced in some quarters as if it had some palpable meaning. For example, in early 2017, the august National Intelligence Council opined that “Geopolitical competition is on the rise as China and Russia seek to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which US influence does not dominate.”139 Setting aside the issue of the degree to which American “influence” could be said to “dominate” anywhere (we still wait, for example, for dominated Mexico supinely to pay for a wall to seal off its self-infatuated neighbor’s southern border), it doesn’t bloody well matter whether China or Russia has, or seems to have, a “sphere of influence” someplace or other.

More importantly, the whole notion is vapid and essentially meaningless. Except perhaps in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe. When members of the House of Lords fail to pay sufficient respect to a group of women they take to be members of a ladies’ seminary who are actually fairies, their queen, outraged at the Lords’ collected effrontery, steps forward, proclaims that she happens to be an “influential fairy,” and then, with a few passes of her wand, brushes past the Lords’ pleas (“no!” “mercy!” “spare us!” and “horror!”), and summarily issues several edicts: a young man of her acquaintance shall be inducted into their House, every bill that gratifies his pleasure shall be passed, members shall be required to sit through the grouse and salmon season, and high office shall be obtainable by competitive examination. Now, that’s influence. In contrast, on December 21, 2017, when the United States sought to alter the status of Jerusalem, the United Nations General Assembly voted to repudiate the US stand in a nearly unanimous vote that included many US allies. Now, that’s not influence.

In fact, to push this point perhaps to an extreme, if we are entering an era in which economic motivations became paramount and in which military force is not deemed a sensible method for pursuing wealth, the idea of “influence” would become obsolete because, in principle, pure economic actors do not care much about influence. They care about getting rich. (As Japan and Germany have found, however, influence, status, and prestige tend to accompany the accumulation of wealth, but this is just an ancillary effect.) Suppose the president of a company could choose between two stories to tell the stockholders. One message would be, “We enjoy great influence in the industry. When we talk everybody listens. Our profits are nil.” The other would be, “No one in the industry pays the slightest attention to us or ever asks our advice. We are, in fact, the butt of jokes in the trade. We are making money hand over fist.” There is no doubt about which story would most thoroughly warm the stockholders’ hearts.

#### No nuclear terrorism.

Ward 18, analyst on the Defence, Security, and Infrastructure team at RAND Europe. Citing Dr Beyza Unal, a research fellow in nuclear policy at think tank Chatham House. (Antonia, 7/27/18, "Is Nuclear Terrorism Distracting Attention from More Realistic Threats?", *RAND*, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/07/is-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-distracting-attention.html)

Despite Obama's remarks in 2016 and these two incidents, experts and officials contest the viability of the nuclear terrorism threat. Dr Beyza Unal, a research fellow in nuclear policy at think tank Chatham House, argued there is currently no evidence that terrorist groups could build a nuclear weapon. Similarly, a report by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006 emphasized how building a nuclear bomb is a difficult task for states, let alone terrorists. This is because of the issues involved in accessing uranium and creating and maintaining it at the correct grade (enriched uranium).

While nuclear terrorism is a concern, the majority of terrorist attacks are conducted with conventional explosives. The 2017 Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report states that 40 percent of terrorist attacks used explosives. These explosives originate from a wide variety of countries across the world. According to a study by Conflict Armament Research, large quantities of explosive precursor chemicals used to make bombs as seen in the 7/7 attack in London in 2005 and the 2017 Manchester Arena attack, have been linked to supply chains in the United States, Europe, and Asia via Turkey. The threat from the spread of chemical precursors prompted the EU to begin looking at ways to tighten the regulations of these chemicals (PDF).

A nuclear terrorist attack would have grave consequences, but it is currently not a realistic or viable threat given that it would require a level of sophistication from terrorists that has not yet been witnessed. The recent focus of terrorist groups has been on simplistic strikes, such as knife and vehicular attacks. If countries are concerned about nuclear terrorism, the best way to mitigate this risk could be to tighten security at civilian and government nuclear sites. But governments would be better off focusing their efforts on combatting the spread and use of conventional weapons.

## Democracy

### 1NC---AT: Democracy

#### Their evidence for Judicial Activism is from Muffett—who cites Roe v Wade as bad law

James Muffett 14. Founder & President of Student Statesmanship Institute and President of Citizens for Traditional Values. “The Danger Of Judicial Activism”. Michigan All Rise. 9-8-14. <https://michiganallrise.org/resources/the-danger-of-judicial-activism/>

There is a battle in our nation between those who believe that judges should follow the law as intended by the legislature, and those who think judges have latitude to interpret the law according to their view of what the law ought to be. The latter are referred to as, “activist judges.” When judges insert their own personal bias, they usurp the role of the legislators whom the citizens elect to represent them in deciding disputed, difficult policy issues. Thus, judicial activism undermines the very basis of our representative democracy**.** It can be argued that activist judges have done more damage to traditional, Judeo-Christian values than the other branches of government combined. The areas of greatest damage include free enterprise, human life, marriage, personal freedoms, property rights and religious liberty. Judges who usurp the authority of the people are not merely incorrect; they are themselves unconstitutional. And they are unjust. In fact, Justice White in his Roe v. Wade dissent opinion, wrote that the court had acted “not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unrestrained imposition of its own, extra-constitutional value preferences.” In addition to short-circuiting the democratic process, this judicial approach creates an environment of unpredictability which ultimately leads to destabilization and more litigation. When judges exercising the power of judicial review are guided by the text, logic, structure, and original understanding of the Constitution and the law, they deserve our respect and gratitude. By operating with this type of judicial oversight, they are playing their part to make constitutional republican government a reality. But where judges usurp democratic legislative authority by imposing on the people their moral and political preferences, under the guise of fairness or empathy, they should be severely criticized and resolutely opposed. It is time for all citizens to wake up to this crisis and work to elect “Rule of Law” judges who exercise constitutional authority only to enforce the law as written and ensure that laws apply to everyone equally.

#### Muffett’s a conservative hack who thinks gay marriage is bad—that’s why he hates activism

Muffett and Graham 13 (James Muffett in an interview with Lester Graham, “Legislator: Gay civil rights would 'bully Christians'” , Michigan Radio NPR, <https://www.michiganradio.org/investigative/2013-05-01/legislator-gay-civil-rights-would-bully-christians> , May 1, 2013, date accessed 9/19/21)

Public polling and recent court cases have prompted greater discussion about adding protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people in Michigan’s civil rights law. Advocates for the change say it’s time to stop legally discriminating against LGBT people. Others say changing the law say it would mean people opposed to homosexual behavior would be discriminated against. The issue is beginning to play out in the Michigan legislature.

Michigan’s civil rights law is known as the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act. It prohibits discrimination based on religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, family status, and marital status.

Advocates for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people and opponents of gay rights have one thing in common: both sides say discrimination should not be allowed. Where they go from there is very different.

LGBT advocates say sexual orientation and gender expression should be included in the Elliot-Larsen protections.

Anti-gay rights advocates say there’s no need for creating special classes of people to be protected.

James Muffett is President of Citizens for Traditional Values. The group’s website describes it as a statewide, pro-family organization. Muffett against expanding Elliot-Larsen to protect LGBT people. He does not believe people are born gay or lesbian. He believes it’s a behavior. He also believes you don’t have to list every type of person to be protected in the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act.

JM: “Where do you stop the list? Do you put skinny people, you know, can you be fired for being skinny? Redheaded people or people who talk too loud, in other words, once you begin the enumeration process -which we feel like is the wrong way to go- once you do that, where do you stop?"

LG: “Under the Elliot-Larsen Act, your examples of skinny people or people with red hair, you can interpret both of those things as already being protected because you can’t be discriminated against because of your weight, you can’t be discriminated against because of your ethnic background. So, the question is: should U.S. citizens be discriminated against because of who they are? We don’t do that to other groups.”

JM: “Sure. So, discriminatory hiring and firing, you know, is wrong except for -this is a real question and I pose it back to you as a hypothetical- is it right then for the government to force you to fund or pay for something that’s morally reprehensible? And, so, this is a slippery slope down to violating the religious and the conscience rights of those who still hold that homosexuality is not a moral or a good thing for society and marriage specifically. That’s where I feel we’re not talking about that aspect of this debate at all right now. And, I think it’s a big missing part of the equation.”

#### Alt causes to Congressional inaction---they’re routinely politically spineless.

#### No rule of law impact — their evidence has no scenario for war or extinction.

#### Democracy doesn’t solve war---best models.

Campbell et al. 18, \*Doctoral Candidate in Political Science, Ohio State University. \*\*Carter Phillips and Sue Henry Associate Professor of Political Science at the Ohio State University. \*\*\*Associate Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. (\*Benjamin W., \*\*Skyler J. Cranmer, \*\*\*Bruce A. Desmarais, September 13, 2018, “Triangulating War: Network Structure and the Democratic Peace”, *Cornell University*, Accessible at: <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.04141.pdf>)

Conclusion

The dyadic understanding of the democratic peace has become ubiquitous in International Relations. By looking beyond simple dyadic analysis, accounting for the embededness of states in a much more complex network, we found the democratic peace may not be as robust as previously thought. Our results demonstrate that after accounting for the tendency for like-regime states with common enemies not to fight one another, the effect of the democratic peace not only vanishes, but jointly democratic dyads seem to be *more* conflict prone than mixed dyads. These results are consistent across operationalizations of the outcome variable, our triadic closure predictor, measurements of joint democracy, and a variety of other factors. We believe this explanation for the democratic peace is not a mechanism for understanding the democratic peace, but instead, an alternative. What we have shown here is that conflict between democracies indeed exists and the peaceful relations occasionally found are not necessarily a function of the affinity of democratic states, or intrinsic attributes of democratic states, but instead, a function of the strategic inefficiencies of fighting a state with a shared enemy. While regime type may influence the interests of states, we find that it does not directly influence the probability that any two states fight one another.

There are three major implications to our research. First, scholars should be hesitant to consider dyadic conflict in isolation, as there are network dependencies informing whether a state engages or joins a MID. Second, preferences operating in addition to network interdependencies and collaboration explain much of the democratic peace. Third, when studying conflict, scholars and practitioners should consider the cost structure of collaboration, and how these dynamics inform not only conflict initiation, but conflict escalation. Particularly interesting is that the theoretical mechanism at work here is dramatically simpler than any of the established justifications for the democratic peace. We do not rely on arguments about institutions or norms, but just the simple and intuitive proposition that it does not make much sense for two states fighting a third to also fight each other. What the existing literature seems to have missed, usually theoretically and almost always empirically, is that dyadic conflicts do not occur in isolation, but in the context of a complex network of relations.

#### American democracy is resilient---institutional buffers ensure continuity.

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American Democracy

The United States is the world’s oldest constitutional democracy. Fleeing persecution by European monarchs, the American founding fathers set up a system to check and balance the chief executive. The authors of the U.S. constitution were also very much inspired by the mixed system of government that proved so successful for the ancient Roman Republic. Individuals are selected for political positions through competitive elections. Freedom of the press, assembly, and many other liberties help to ensure that citizens have the opportunity for meaningful political participation. According to Polity, the United States has been rated as a democracy for over two centuries.3

Contemporary warnings of a possible decline in American democracy should be taken seriously, but, on inspection, they are often overblown. To be sure, American democracy is imperfect, but democracy does not require perfection. It requires free and fair elections and the broad range of civil and political rights that allow for meaningful political participation. There is no doubt that the United States meets this standard.

Worries about a U.S. president’s putative autocratic tendencies are not new; they are baked into the system. America’s founders were revolting against overbearing British monarchs and they wanted to be sure to prevent an overwhelming concentration of power in the executive branch. George Washington was criticized for his presumed monarchic ambitions. More recently, commentators criticized George W. Bush for supposedly consolidating power and creating an “imperial presidency.”4 What is truly most notable about the U.S. system, however, is not executive overreach, but the degree to which Congress and the courts, and the executive branch itself, continually step in to check the chief executive.5 This continues to remain true, even in the current era.

In sharp contrast to Russia, journalists do not have to worry that they will be shot in the back for criticizing the president. And, in distinction to China, the United States does not keep millions of Muslims locked up in re-education camps. It is perverse to draw a moral equivalence between democratic politicking in the United States and the gross evils perpetrated in Russia and China.

American democracy is strong enough to survive contemporary controversies and political scandals. There is little reason to believe that today’s headlines will be more damaging than the Teapot Dome Scandal, Watergate, Iran-Contra, or the Monica Lewinsky affair.

Indeed, contrary to the prevailing narrative, intense domestic political fights and polarization are not evidence that American democracy has failed; rather, they are proof that the system is working. Yes, democracy can be messy, but that is what makes the system great. These disagreements are not even permitted in autocratic states. Serious political conflicts of interest in autocracies often result in dead bodies. Our democratic political system gives us the ability to work out our differences through a mutually accepted and peaceful, institutionalized process. Legislative gridlock is not necessarily a problem. If half of the country strongly disagrees with a proposal, then it is not obviously a good idea, and probably should not become national law. The purpose of the U.S. government is not to enact legislation for its own sake but to ensure “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” By those measures the country is doing pretty well.

As Machiavelli argued five hundred years ago, discord within a republican system of government is not always pretty, but the results are more than worth it. Nations that desire expanded freedom at home and influence abroad should not rebuke domestic political struggles within a democracy, but celebrate them.

Indeed, the institutionalized tumult and discord in the United States will likely continue to be the primary engine for its continued international power and influence abroad.

### 1NC---Turn

#### Democracy causes drone warfare.

Kaag et al, 14 - \*John Kaag, Ph.D. Chair of Philosophy, Professor @ Umass \*\*Scott Pratt, Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Philosophy @ U of Oregon \*\*\*Sujata K. Bhatia, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Globalization; “Democracy and the Necessity of Drones,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/democracy-and-necessity-drones-0

But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare.

Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way.

In this ideal democracy, the interests of the individual are continuous with the interests of the nation as a whole. Every citizen also has the right to vote for leaders who are elected to protect the liberal democratic institutions that Americans, for good reason, hold so dear. And protection is, unfortunately, often required. There are, after all, countries and nonstate actors who have little respect for the joys of Western liberalism and who aim to undermine it at every turn.

Protecting democracy has always been a tricky proposition. Leaders such as President Obama find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they must take defensive measures to guard the nation and its citizens' rights and interests from external threats. But on the other hand, leaders must develop and then adopt defensive military strategies that minimize, hopefully even eliminate, the costs that their citizens must face; it is impermissible to send [people] men and women off to die in wars that could be won without these citizens' direct and dangerous involvement. Every citizen, even soldiers, has intrinsic value.

And so Obama and his predecessors ushered in the era drone warfare and a slew of other automated technologies that would both protect citizens and shield citizen-soldiers. Drone warfare—and its collateral damage—is a necessary consequent of a certain type of modern liberal democracy. If we are good liberal democrats, the development of drone warfare should neither surprise nor disturb us. Drones are democratic weapons. There are no other options.

But drones do disturb us. The gruesome scenes of drone strikes—at funerals and birthdays and reunions half a world away—disturb us. When we have the rare misfortune of seeing these scenes, they keep us up at night.

So why?

Our intuition about the shortcomings and moral failings of drone strikes is not just a discomfort with robot warfare or carnage, but ought to be a sign that we are uncomfortable with a particular form of liberal democracy that necessitates drone warfare.

#### Drone prolif means every hotspot goes nuclear AND states will use bioweapons!

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The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.

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## Econ CP

#### Infrastructure investment solves inequality – aggregate studies with better modeling conclude

Gibson and Rioja 14 John Gibson and Felix Rioja November 21, 2014 (Gibson --- Ph.D., Economics, Florida State University. GSU Assistant Professor. . Rioja --- Director of the Ph.D. in economics program, , consultant for the World Bank. “A Bridge to Equality: How Investing in Infrastructure Affects the Distribution of Wealth” <https://www.frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/news/conferences/2014/SIDE-workshop/papers/Gibson-Rioja.pdf> )//masw

Abstract Public infrastructure is one of the foundations for the economic growth of a country. While there is a strong consensus regarding infrastructure’s effect on growth, the results regarding the effect of infrastructure on the distribution of wealth are mixed. In this paper we examine the quantitative significance of investing in infrastructure on the degree of inequality present within a country. We calibrate our baseline model to replicate key features of a developing economy and then simulate the counter-factual wealth distribution that would arise if investment in infrastructure was increased. We find that when infrastructure influences the economy through both the utility and production functions, increasing infrastructure investment significantly increases growth and reduces wealth inequality, leading to a sharp increase in the level of wealth held by the poorest agents. However, when the utility-enhancing aspects of infrastructure are ignored, growth effects become smaller and the distributional effects are almost non-existent. 1 Introduction Going back to Adam Smith (1776), economists have asserted that the stock of public infrastructure constitutes the foundations for a country’s productive activities and economic growth. For example, firms need reliable water and electricity provision and roads in good condition to be able to produce goods and services efficiently and deliver them to the market place. While understanding the growth effects of infrastructure is extremely important, most governments are also interested in reducing, or at least not increasing, the level of inequality present in their country. Therefore, it is important that we consider the distributional affects of investing in infrastructure along with the average growth affects. It is not clear how wealth inequality may be affected by additional investment in infrastructure. On the one hand, more infrastructure may benefit the poor since it reduces transportation costs to the workplace. Similarly, an increase in infrastructure may cause labor productivity to rise, leading to an increase in the wage paid to poorer individuals. On the other hand, more affluent individuals will likely also benefit since they typically own physical capital, which will also experience productivity increases as a result of increased infrastructure. Our paper quantitatively evaluates the distributional effects of public infrastructure policies and highlights which channels (utility and/or production) are important for transmitting these effects using a heterogeneous agents model. There is a large literature on how public infrastructure affects economic growth going back to Aschauer’s (1989) seminal paper that found large effects of public infrastructure on U.S. total factor productivity. Subsequent empirical studies covering many countries have generally supported Aschauer’s finding, reporting that public infrastructure investment positively affects economic growth (see literature survey papers by Bom and Lighthart (2008) and Romp and De Haan (2007)). Barro (1990) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1994a, 1997) started a theoretical literature that developed general equilibrium models of economic growth that included public infrastructure as one of the engines of growth. Subsequent papers in this tradition, like Rioja (1999, 2003), use a “quantitative theory” approach where a general equilibrium model is used to analyze the quantitative effects of various policy changes in infrastructure investment. A key simplifying assumption of the above mentioned models is that a country consists of a single representative household. This assumption, while innocuous when one is concerned with aggregate growth patterns, implies that these models are unable to address how wealth distributions vary as policies change. While there is strong consensus that investing in infrastructure leads to economic growth, the empirical literature as described, for example, in the recent survey paper by Calderon and Serven (2014), has found mixed results on the effects of infrastructure on inequality. For example, the cross-country empirical studies by Calderon and Serven (2004) and Calderon and Chong (2004) find some evidence that infrastructure can help reduce inequality. At a more micro level, Khandker, Bakht, and Koolwal (2009), find that the poorest households benefitted the most from road improvement projects in Bangladesh. Conversely, Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2004) find that infrastructure spending may have contributed to income inequality in Africa due to the siphoning of funds designated for infrastructure and the construction of large, inefficient infrastructure projects. Similarly, Khandker and Koolwal (2010) find that richer households benefitted more than poorer households from more access to paved roads and irrigation programs in Bangladesh. Given these mixed results, there is a clear need for a theoretical framework that could shed light on the channels through which infrastructure affects wealth accumulation. Theoretically, a related paper to ours is Glomm and Ravikumar (1994b) which studies the growth and inequality effects of a pure public good (describde as Public Sector R&D) which affects production. They find that, in the long-run, public sector R&D affects the growth rate of GDP per capita, but does not affect income inequality, which is introduced by agents having different initial endowments. Ferreira (1995) develops a model with three types of agents: subsistence workers, middle-class entrepreneurs and upper-class entrepreneurs. Ferreira (1995) shows theoretically that increasing infrastructure can reduce inequality in a country, but his results are sensitive to exogenous credit constraints that prevent subsistence workers and middle class entrepreneurs from accumulating increasing stocks of private capital. Klenert et al. (2014) develop a model with two types of agents, middle-income and high income agents, who are made to differ in terms of their rate of time preference, savings behavior, and labor supply choice. They find that in the long-run, inequality can be reduced by increasing infrastructure. However, Klenert et al. (2014) do not have low-income agents in their model, yet real-world policymakers are typically very concerned about how lowincome individuals are affected by policies. Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) develop and simulate a model populated by many agents who differ in terms of their initial wealth levels. Contrary to Ferreira (1995) and to Klenert et al. (2014), they find that, in the long-run, an increase in infrastructure investment leads to an increase in the dispersion of income and wealth distributions and an increase in inequality. The somewhat contradicting results in the papers described above suggest that a clear answer to the question, “How does investing in infrastructure affect wealth inequality?” requires more investigation, in particular of the channels through which infrastructure may affect the distribution of wealth. In our paper, we go further than Ferreira (1995), Klenert et al. (2014) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) by both calibrating our model to data and providing detailed quantitative evaluations of the distributional effects of various infrastructure policy changes. In order to achieve this, we modify the model presented in Aiyagari (1994) to include an endogenous labor supply decision and to allow infrastructure to impact the agents’s utility function and the economy-wide production function.1 One advantage of our incomplete markets model approach compared to the previous literature is that heterogeneity arises not as an ex-ante 1For a review of the equilibrium concept and other technical details see Hugget (1993). The interested reader is referred to Heathcote et al. (2009) and Guvenen (2011) for an excellent review of incomplete markets models. initial condition to the problem (as in Chatterjee and Turnovsky, 2012) or as exogenously imposed differences between agents (as in Ferreira, 1995; and Klenert et al., 2014), but rather endogenously as individuals optimally respond to the economic environment. A second advantage of our approach is that we can use wage and income data to calibrate our model to a particular country, in our case Mexico, where a lack of infrastructure is a major issue. A third advantage of our approach is that it allows us to consider both aggregated and disaggregated distributional effects. Not only can we examine how aggregate measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, change with the various policies, but we can also examine how the share of wealth held by each individual quintile or decile is affected. In our model infrastructure affects individual choices through two main channels. The first channel operates through the production function. Specifically, the level of infrastructure present in the economy, as well as the tax instruments used to finance its construction, impacts the wage rate and the rental rate on capital. Therefore, investing in infrastructure alters the marginal product of labor and capital which, in turn, influence individuals’ labor supply and capital accumulation decisions. The second channel operates through the agents’ utility function. Specifically, the stock of infrastructure interacts with individual hours devoted to leisure, giving rise to a measure of effective leisure. By using effective leisure, we are able to capture the utility-enhancing aspects of infrastructure that have been document in the literature (See Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011)). Ultimately, we find that an expansion of infrastructure leads to a large reduction of wealth inequality regardless of the financing method used. However, if the increased investment is financed by a tax on interest income, then output growth will be lower than if other financing methods (consumption tax, labor income tax or international donations) had been used. In order to determine which channel, production or utility, drive our distributional results, we resolve our model (both baseline and policy changes) with the utility-enhancing aspects of infrastructure removed. In this case, we find that increasing infrastructure investment leads to a very small increase in wealth inequality, indicating that the utility channel is the channel through which distributional effects operate. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes the calibration and computational procedure. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 concludes. 2 Model In order to study the distributional effects of investing in infrastructure, we build upon the model developed in Aiyagari (1994). Specifically, we extend the Aiyagari model by adding an endogenous labor supply decision and by allowing infrastructure to impact the agents’ utility function and the economy-wide production function. The following subsections provide a detailed description of our model setup. 2.1 Households The economy is populated by a large number of agents who possess identical preferences over consumption, c, and effective leisure, L = lKG, where l denotes individual hours devoted to leisure and KG denotes the aggregate stock of infrastructure in the economy. Their period utility function is given by: u(c, L) = 1 γ c −ξ + ηL−ξ − γ ξ (1) where γ and ξ determine the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity of substitution respectively, while γ is the relative weight on effective leisure in the utility function. We follow Chatterjee and Ghosh (2011) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) by allowing infrastructure to affect individual utility through an interaction with private leisure. Justification for this modeling strategy can be found in Agenor and Canuto (2013) who find evidence that 6 infrastructure makes non-market activities like home production and child rearing more ef- ficient. In our model, all non-market activities are implicitly lumped into leisure. Hence, modeling infrastructure augmenting leisure is consistent with Agenor and Canuto (2013). This modeling strategy can also be justified intuitively. For example, infrastructure like electricity networks provide agents with electricity supply that allows them to enjoy their leisure more at night. Similarly, roads provide access for agents to enjoy leisure outside the immediate vicinity of their homes. We also consider a version of the model where agents simply derive utility from consumption and leisure. This allows us to identify which channel, production or utility, is driving our distributional results. While the agents’s preferences are identical, they differ in terms of their labor position. Some agents are unemployed and receive unemployment benefits, b, from the government, while other agents are employed and receive labor income from the firm.2 Labor income, defined by wnθ, consists of the following three components; the aggregate wage rate, w, the agent’s labor supply, n, and the agent’s labor productivity, θ. Therefore, while all employed agents take the same aggregate wage as given, they face different efficiency wages depending on their specific realization of θ when choosing their labor supply. Each agent’s labor position is the result of the idiosyncratic shock, θ, that occurs at the start of each period. We use a five state Markov process for θ, where the first state corresponds to unemployment (θ = 0). The remaining four values of θ, along with their transition probabilities, are estimated from the Mexican data following the method outlined in Heer and Maussner (2009) (See calibration section for more details). While agents lack the ability to perfectly insure against fluctuations in θ, they have the ability to save by accumulating assets, a, that pay a market determined return, r. Standard precautionary savings motives apply, and agents will accumulate assets while their productivity is high 2While the country to which we subsequently calibrate the model, Mexico, does not have unemployment insurance at the national level, unemployment benefits equal to the monthly minimum wage are paid in Mexico City. 7 in order to partially insure against the risk of becoming less productive or unemployed in the future. Over time, these differences in productivity translate into large differences in individual asset holdings, giving rise to an endogenous wealth distribution. An agent’s individual state consists of their asset holdings, a, and their labor productivity, θ. Given their current state, each agent chooses consumption, c, labor, n, leisure, l, and their next period asset level, a 0 , to maximize the present discounted value of their expected utility. We can setup the household’s problem as the following dynamic program: V (a, θ) = max c,n,l,a0 " u(c, L) + β X θ 0 π(θ 0 |θ)V (a 0 , θ0 ) # s.t. (1 + τc)c + a 0 ≤    (1 + (1 − τa)r)a + (1 − τn)wnθ if employed (1 + (1 − τa)r)a + b if unemployed    (2) n + l ≤ 1 (3) k 0 ≥ 0 (4) Equation (2) is the household’s budget constraint. It simply states that a household’s spending on consumption and investment cannot exceed their current resources. The terms τc, τa and τn found in this equation denote the marginal tax rates on consumption, interest income and labor income respectively. These taxes are collected by the government in order to fi- nance the unemployment benefit, b, provide infrastructure, KG, and engage in government consumption, G. Equation (3) is a standard time constraint. It states that all time is either spent working or taking leisure. In the event that an agent is unemployed (θ = 0), l = 1, n = 0 and equation (3) becomes redundant. Equation (4) is a no-borrowing constraint, which prevents any household from carrying a negative asset balance. 8 Solving the household’s problem yields the following Euler equations: uc = β X θ 0 π(θ 0 |θ)uc 0(1 + (1 − τa)r 0 ) + (1 + τc)λ3 (5) ul = uc (1 − τn)wθ 1 + τc (6) Equation (5) governs the household’s choice between consuming more today and investing more in assets. The shadow price on the no-borrowing constraint, λ3, appears in this equation because the constraint may occasionally bind. Equation (6) governs the household’s choice between working more hours and taking leisure. This equation can be used to derive the following optimal labor supply condition that is a function of an agent’s current labor productivity and his current and future individual asset holdings: n(θ, a) = 1 + τc + h η(1+τc) K ξ G(1−τn)wθ i 1 1+ξ [a 0 (a, θ) − (1 + (1 − τa)r)a] 1 + τc + h η(1+τc) K ξ G(1−τn)wθ i 1 1+ξ (1 − τn)wθ (7) Therefore, given an agent’s state (a, θ) and their optimal investment decision rule, a 0 (a, θ), equation (7) yields the agent’s optimal labor supply decision rule. As mentioned earlier, there are two channels through which infrastructure influences individual choices. Both of the these channels can be seen in equation (7). The first channel is transmitted indirectly through factor prices, w and r, and marginal taxes, τc, τn and τa. As we will see in the results section, increasing the level of infrastructure increases both factor prices. Also, under standard balanced budget assumptions, if the government increases infrastructure investment they must offset these costs through increased taxation. So, at least one of the marginal tax rates will rise. How these indirect effects influence labor supply is hard to determine ex ante. An increase in the wage rate gives rise to both income and substitution effects that push the labor supply decision in opposite directions. Furthermore, 9 an increase in tax rates reduce the marginal benefit of working, leading to a reduction in labor supply. The second channel is transmitted directly through the presence of KG in the optimal labor supply decision rule. Specifically, increasing infrastructure increases effective leisure, L, leading to a reduction in the marginal utility of leisure. Therefore, the direct effect of increasing infrastructure is an increase in hours worked and a reduction in leisure hours. 2.2 Firm’s Problem On the production side of the economy, there is a single representative firm that takes as inputs aggregate capital, K, aggregate labor, N, and infrastructure, KG. While infrastructure is provided by the government at an aggregate level, aggregate capital and labor must be computed from the individual households’ solutions: K = X θ Z a¯ 0 af(a, θ)da (8) N = X θ Z a¯ 0 θn(a, θ)f(a, θ)da (9) where f(a, θ) denotes the invariant density of individual states. Therefore, K is simply the average of individual asset holdings while N is the average of the individual productivityweighted labor supplies. The firm combines KG, K and N to produce aggregate output using the following technology: Y = K φ GKαN 1−α (10) The firm chooses aggregate capital and labor in order to solve the following period specific 10 profit maximization problem: max K,N K φ GKαN 1−α − wN − (r + δ)K which yields: r = αKφ G K N α−1 − δ (11) w = (1 − α)K φ G K N α (12) The outcome of the firm’s problem is that the gross return on capital, r + δ, and the wage rate, w, are both equal to their respective factors’ marginal products. 2.3 Government The government provides unemployment benefits, b, produces infrastructure, KG, and consumes, G. In terms of unemployment benefits, the government pays out a fixed amount, b, to each unemployed individual. Therefore, the total payment made by the government for unemployment benefits, B, is given by: B = Z a¯ 0 bf(a, θ = 0)da (13) Like all other forms of capital, infrastructure is subject to depreciation. We assume that infrastructure depreciates at a constant rate, δG, each period. The government’s job is to invest in infrastructure at a rate that keeps up with depreciation so that the stock of infrastructure is constant in steady state. Therefore, the government’s total spending on infrastructure in given by δGKG. Furthermore, we assume that the government’s total spending on infrastructure is a share, x, of the economy’s GDP. δGKG = xY = xKφ GKαN 1−α (14) 11 We can then use equation (14) to solve for the level of infrastructure in the economy as: KG = xKαN1−α δG 1 1−φ (15) Putting everything together, we see that total government spending, T S, is given by: T S = B + δGKG + G (16) As discussed in the household’s problem, the government levies marginal taxes on consumption, labor income and interest income. These taxes are denoted by τc, τn and τa respectively. The government collects these taxes from all individuals, except the labor income tax which is not collected from the unemployed. Therefore, the government’s total revenue, T R, is given by: T R = τcC + τnwN + τarK (17) Finally, we require that the government balance it’s budget every period, so the government’s budget constraint is given by: T S = T R (18) Later, we will consider the case where the government receives international donations, D, to finance additional infrastructure investment. However, for the time being we have assumed that D = 0. 2.4 Equilibrium A stationary equilibrium for this economy is a value function, v(a, θ), individual decision rules, a 0 (a, θ), n(a, θ), l(a, θ) and c(a, θ), a time-invariant density of individual states, f(a, θ), time invariant factor prices, w and r, time-invariant government taxes and transfers, τa, τn, 12 τc, and b, and a vector of aggregates, K, N, C, KG, B, G, T S, D and T R such that: 1. Given the factor prices, government taxes and transfers, and the level of infrastructure in the economy, the value function solves the household’s problem and the individual decision rules are the optimal decision rules. 2. The vector of aggregates are obtained as follows: K = X θ Z a¯ 0 af(a, θ)da N = X θ Z a¯ 0 θn(a, θ)f(a, θ)da C = X θ Z a¯ 0 c(a, θ)f(a, θ)da KG = xKαN1−α δG 1 1−φ B = Z a¯ 0 bf(a, θ = 0)da T S = B + δGKG + G T R = τcC + τnwN + τarK 3. Factor prices, w and r, satisfy the firm’s FOCs (equations (11) and (12)) 4. Goods market clears: C + δK + δGKG + G = K φ GKαN1−α+D 5. Government balances its budget: T S = T R 6. Distribution of individual states is stationary: F(a 0 , θ0 ) = P θ π(θ 0 |θ)F(a 0−1 (a 0 , θ), θ) 13 3 Calibration and Solution In this section, we will describe the methods used to calibrate our model to data. We will also describe the basic numerical methods used to approximate the solution to our model. 3.1 Preference and Production Parameters The model is calibrated to an annual frequency. Standard values are used for the discount rate, β, set to 0.96, the rate of depreciation on private capital, δ, set to 0.06, and the rate of depreciation on infrastructure, δG, set to 0.04. Public infrastructure is mostly structures which depreciate slower than equipment which is a major component of private capital (along with private capital structures). The production function is assumed to display constant returns to scale in aggregate capital, K, and labor, N. The income shares are set to their standard values of 0.36 for capital and 0.64 for labor, which are consistent with Gollin’s (2002) estimates for developing countries. The share of infrastructure in production, φ, is set to 0.15, which is an average estimate for developing countries according to Bom and Ligthart (2008). The utility function parameters, η, γ and ξ are set to match the intertemporal and intratemporal elasticity of substitution and the level of hours worked at steady state. Specifically, we set γ = −1.5 and ξ = 1.5 so that both the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 1−γ , and the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 1+ξ , equals 0.4.3 With γ and ξ pinned down, η is set to match the steady state level of hours worked in the economy. For a complete review of the preference and production parameters, see Table 1. 3.2 Income Shock Process The Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) collects household surveys that include data on employment status, income, and worker flows. The National Survey 3See Guvenen (2006) for empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For the intratemporal elasticity of substitution, we adopt the value, 0.4, reported in Stern (1976). 14 of Occupation and Employment (ENOE) surveys over 100,000 households in 48 metropolitan and rural areas in Mexico every quarter. Since ENOE started in 2005, we focus on the period 2005 to 2010.4 Individuals are surveyed for 5 consecutive quarters, so we assemble a longitudinal panel to determine transition probabilities among income quintiles. The average productivities, [θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5] (19) are estimated from the data for the average income of each quartile. We normalize the average productivity across all four quartiles to 1 following Heer and Trede (2003). These are presented in Table 2 along with the transition probability matrix. The first row and first column of this matrix tell us about the transition from unemployment to working and vice versa. Following Heer and Trede (2003), we assume that agents’ skills erode while in the unemployment state, so that agents may only transition from unemployment to the lowest productivity employment state. The exact values in the first row and column of the transition matrix are set to match the average rate and duration of unemployment observed in the data. During the period that we study, the average unemployment rate in Mexico was 3.99 percent, while the average duration of unemployment was approximately 10 months (OECD Stats, 2014).5 The lower 4x4 of the transition matrix is obtained as the average transition probability between two consecutive years in our sample period. The results have been renormalized to ensure that each row sums to 1. 4The household survey prior to ENOE’s creation was ENEU which had somewhat different coverage and methodology. 5Given that our model is calibrated to an annual frequency, it is impossible for us to exactly match the duration of unemployment found in the data. However, we set the probability of remaining unemployed to a low value, which allows to come close to the empirical estimate. 15 3.3 Solution Method and Methodology With the model calibrated to the Mexican data, we proceed by approximating a solution to the model economy. According to Calderon and Serven (2010), public infrastructure investment in Mexico averaged about 2% of GDP during the last 3 decades. Hence, for our baseline solution we set x, the ratio of infrastructure spending to GDP, equal to 0.02, so that the government spends approximately 2% of GDP on infrastructure. Following from the fact that Mexico does not have a comprehensive unemployment insurance program, we set the unemployment benefit, b, to a very small value equal to 1% of the average labor income earned by the least productive worker.6 According to the World Tax Indicators (2014), the average tax rate on income in Mexico is 10%, which applies to any type of income: labor income, interest income, etc. Therefore, we set the marginal tax rates as follows: τa = 0.1, τn = 0.1. The indirect tax rate (value added, sales tax) in Mexico is 15%, therefore τc = 0.15. With all tax rates set, government consumption, G, is backed out using the government’s budget constraint: G = τarK + τnwN + τcC − δKG − B (20) To solve the model we employ standard methods for computing the stationary distribution of an incomplete markets model with idiosyncratic shocks. Specifically, we start with guesses of aggregate capital, K, and labor, N. We use these values to compute r, w, and KG, using equations (11), (12) and (15). We discretize private assets, restricting assets to 100 unevenly spaced grid points on the interval (0,15).7 Given these asset values, we use equation (7) to solve for all possible optimal labor supply decisions. With these values in hand, we use value function iteration with linear interpolation to solve for the agents’ decisions rules. Next, these decision rules are used to solve for the invariant density, f(a, θ). Since we are 6This level of unemployment benefit is needed to ensure that all agents, even those with no assets, can afford a positive level of consumption in all periods. 7While we use 15 as the upper limit of our asset grid in our baseline case, we increase this to 35 when conducting policy experiments. 16 interested in how this wealth density changes across specification, we approximate it on a much finer grid than we used to compute the decision rules (2000 grid points). Once we have the invariant density, we update our values of K and N and repeat the process until K and N no longer change.8 4 Results In this section we will provide an overview of our model’s results. We will compare the outcomes of our baseline calibration to four alternatives where infrastructure investment, as a share of GDP, is increased. We focus on analyzing the long-run or steady state effects of these infrastructure policy changes, which we think is an appropriate time framework since infrastructure has effects that accumulate over a number of years. The four alternatives differ in how the additional infrastructure is financed. For the first three alternatives, we adjust the marginal tax rates (τa, τn and τc) individually in order to determine if one financing strategy dominates the others in terms of average growth or distributional effects. For the fourth alternative, we allow the additional infrastructure to be financed by international donations, D. As this method does not require an increase in tax rates, we can assess whether increased taxation or the additional infrastructure itself caused the distributional effects. We also repeat the preceeding exercise on a version of our model where the utilityenhancing aspects of infrastructure have been removed. By comparing both sets of solutions we are able to identify through which channel, production or utility, the distributional effects operate. Before proceeding further into the results, we should indicate how well our baseline model replicates Mexico’s wealth distribution. Table 3 presents the share of wealth held by each quintile and decile for Mexico along with the values recovered from the two different versions 8See Heer and Maussner (2009) for a textbook treatment of these methods. 17 of our model, one where the utility channel is operational and one where the utility channel has been shutdown. Inspection of Table 3 indicates that our baseline model does a reasonable job at replicating the degree of wealth concentration observed in the data. However, it is clear that our baseline model underestimates the share of wealth held by the poorest agents and underestimates the share of wealth held by the richest agents. The fact that our model incorrectly estimates the share of wealth held in the tails of the asset distribution is a common shortcoming of incomplete markets models that are calibrated using income data. Alternatively, one could calibrate the labor productivity shock so that the baseline model’s wealth distribution matches the data as close as possible (See Castaneda et al (1998)). However, as we will see in the next few sections, the degree of redistribution that occurs following an increase in infrastructure investment is driven primarily by the labor supply decision. Therefore, given that our focus is on quantifying the degree of redistribution, it is more important for us to accurately match labor productivities and transition probabilities than the wealth distribution at a point in time. Similarly, we could match the wealth distribution more closely by introducing heterogeneity in discount rates (See Krusell and Smith (1998)), but as the individual labor supply decision is independent of the discount rate this addition would not substantially alter our results. 4.1 Average (Growth) Results As mentioned earlier, the government spends 2% of GDP on infrastructure in our baseline calibration. In a detailed study of Latin America countries, Fay and Morison (2007) propose that these countries require about 5% of GDP to be spent on infrastructure investment. Similar public investment levels were successfully undertaken in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea in the 1970s and 80s building up those countries’ infrastructure stock. We examine what happens in our model when the government increases its spending on infrastructure to 5% of GDP. The first four columns of Table 4 present the results of this experiment, where 18 the first column corresponds to our baseline case (x = 0.02) and the next four columns corresponds to the specific method used to finance the extra spending. Inspection of these columns reveal many similarities between the various financing schemes. For example, in all cases aggregate capital, K, aggregate output, Y , and aggregate consumption, C increase. These aggregate results are consistent with the literature findings described in the introduction. Since we focus on long-run or steady state effects, one can think of these effects occurring over a period of say 30 years. Hence, the large increases in output and other variables have reasonable sizes if they are divided over a 30 year period. Furthermore, the aggregate wage rate, w, and the rental rate on capital, r, increase in all specifications as well. Another common theme across specifications is that aggregate labor, N, increases significantly. This follows from the fact that the strong increase in KG drives down the marginal utility of leisure leading to an increase in labor supply following the policy change. As unemployment is exogenous to our model, the entire labor response occurs through fluctuations in hours worked. Therefore, one can view the large increase in hours worked following the policy experiment as capturing the increase in both the intensive and extensive margins that may follow an expansion of infrastructure. Further inspection of Table 4 indicates that while the direction of the results are consistent across specifications, the magnitudes differ. For example, if the tax on interest income is used to finance the additional infrastructure, then aggregate capital will increases from 2.66 to 5.38. However, if the labor income tax, consumption tax, or donations are used, then K will increase to 5.81, 6.04, 5.91 respectively. This result is intuitive, as increasing the tax on interest income discourages saving while the other financing methods avoid such distortions. Perhaps more importantly, these differences are also present for aggregate output. If the interest income tax is used, then aggregate output grows from 0.57 to 1.28 while the other financing methods (τn, τc and D) increase this value to 1.32, 1.35, 1.31 respectively. If one evaluated the performance of these financing methods solely on the basis of increasing 19 aggregate output, then the consumption tax would be preferred. 4.2 Distributional Results The results presented in the previous section support the widely-held belief that infrastructure investment stimulates growth. Furthermore, if we were to focus solely on the average results we would conclude that financing the expansion of infrastructure by a tax on interest income is the worst strategy as it leads to the smallest increase in aggregate capital and output. Similarly, we would conclude that financing through a consumption tax is preferable as it leads to the largest growth in these variables. However, we are not yet able to conclude which financing strategy is the best as we have only considered part of the story. We are also interested in how the distribution of wealth is affected by the policy change, and the previously documented results are silent on this front. The first two panels of Figure 1 present plots of the wealth density of the baseline calibration above the densities recovered after the policy change. These plots indicate that, regardless of the financing method used, increasing infrastructure spending reduces inequality. This can be seen by the widening of the densities and their tendency to shift right following the policy change. The third panel of Figure 1 presents the wealth distributions for the model both before and after the policy change. The results again paint a consistent picture. Increasing infrastructure investment reduces inequality regardless of the financing method used. Now that we have the qualitative result that investing in infrastructure reduces wealth inequality regardless of the financing scheme, we can consider the quantitative implications. The first five columns of Table 5 present the distributional results of this policy experiment. The first thing to notice is that the results under column ∆D are very similar to the other policy change columns. This indicates that the distributional effects we are observing are 20 driven by the increase in infrastructure, not distortions from tax rate changes.9 Further inspection of the first four columns indicates that if the additional infrastructure investment is financed by the interest income tax, then the wealth Gini falls from 0.387 to 0.375. However, if the labor income tax or the consumption tax is used, the wealth Gini falls to 0.370 or 0.371 respectively. We can also determine the magnitude of the distributional effects by looking at the share of wealth held by various segments of the economy. Inspection of these results confirms the finding that increasing infrastructure investment reduces inequality and the level of redistribution is consistent across financing methods. Specifically, increasing infrastructure investment, as a fraction of GDP, from 2% to 5% increases the share of wealth held by the bottom quintile from 3.95% to 4.49% on average. Also, the share of wealth held by the top quintile falls from 41.43% to 40.75% on average. This leads to a reduction in wealth concentration (top quintile over bottom quintile) of 13.4 percent on average. Similarly, we see that the share of wealth held by the bottom decile rises from 1.28 to 1.43 on average, while the share of wealth held by the top decile falls from 23.82 to 23.53 on average. These changes result in a reduction in wealth concentration (top decile over bottom decile) of 11% on average. In sum, additional infrastructure increases the share of wealth for poorer segments and reduces the share of wealth of the wealthier segments. Taken in combination with the average growth results presented in the previous section, we see that expanding infrastructure from 2% to 5% of output increases the level wealth held by the bottom quintile by 147% in the long run. The intuition of these results is discussed in section 4.4. 9We also solved a version of the model where taxes are never used. Instead, international donations are used to finance all government spending, unemployment insurance and infrastructure both before and after the policy change. The results from this model (available upon request) are consistent with what is presented here. 21 4.3 Remove Utility Channel The previous results indicate that the degree of wealth inequality can be reduced by increasing investment in infrastructure. Furthermore, we find that there are only small differences in the distributional effects depending on which financing method is used. These results where found while allowing infrastructure to influence the model through two distinct channels, production and utility. In order to determine which channel is driving our distributional results, we repeat our previous exercise with the utility channel shutdown. Specifically, we remove the utility-enhancing feature of infrastructure by using the following utility function: u(c, l) = 1 γ c −ξ + ηl−ξ − ξ γ Under this utility function, the agents’ optimal labor supply decision rule becomes: n(θ, a) = 1 + τc + h η(1+τc) (1−τn)wθ i 1 1+ξ [a 0 (a, θ) − (1 + (1 − τa)r)a] 1 + τc + h η(1+τc) (1−τn)wθ i 1 1+ξ (1 − τn)wθ (21) Notice that KG no longer enters the agents’ optimal labor supply decision rule directly as it did in equation (7). Therefore, changes in infrastructure will only influence labor supply indirectly through changes in factor prices, w and r, and changes in tax rates, τa, τn and τc. In order to ensure comparability between model specifications, we maintain the same calibration throughout. The only parameter value that must change when the utility channel is removed is η, which was originally set so N ≈ 0.33 when 2% of output was dedicated to infrastructure investment. In order to keep N constant between the two baseline cases, η must be increased from 0.75 to 4.77. We find that removing the utility channel significantly alters both the growth and distributional results presented earlier. As for the growth results, inspection of Table 4 indicates 22 that while increasing infrastructure investment from 2% to 5% of GDP still increases capital, output and consumption, the increases are much smaller than they were when both channels were operational. For example, when both channels were operational, steady state output grew on average by 128.8% with the policy change. When the utility channel is shut down, average output growth fell to approximately 18%. This result suggests that earlier work on the average growth effects of investing in infrastructure may have underestimate the full effect, as they ignored the utility-enhancing aspects of infrastructure. As for the distributional results, Figure 2 presents the asset densities and distributions that are recovered when the utility channel has been shutdown. Inspection of these plots clearly indicates that distributional effects are now much smaller than they were when both channels were operational. This can be seen by the very slight movements in densities and distributions following the policy change once the utility channel has been shutdown. Our quantitative results support this finding. Inspection of the last five columns of Table 5 indicate that when the additional investment is financed by either the interest income tax, consumption tax or international donations, the wealth Gini actually increases slightly from 0.386 to 0.393, 0.388 and 0.388 respectively, indicating a very slight increase in wealth inequality. However, if the labor income tax was used, then the wealth Gini would fall slightly to 0.385. Similarly, we find that increasing infrastructure investment no longer leads to large changes in the share of wealth held by the various quintiles or deciles. The small distributional effects observed when the utility-enhancing channel is shut down is consistent with the theoretical findings of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994b) and indicates that the utility channel is the channel through which distributional effects operate. 4.4 Discussion of Results In this section we discuss and compare the intuition of both with- and without-utility-channel results. The differences in distributional effects observed between the two cases considered 23 follows from differences in the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in infrastructure. When the utility-enhancing aspects of infrastructure are considered, agents’ utility is a function of effective leisure. In this case, an increase in infrastructure will cause the agents’ utility to rise and their marginal utility of leisure to fall. This reduction in the marginal utility of leisure causes agents to supply more labor regardless of wealth levels, but the trade-offs are such that lower and middle wealth agents increase their labor supply more than the rich. This increase in labor income for poor and middle-wealth agents allows them to both consume more and save more, where the latter works to reduce wealth inequality. The large distributional effects stem from the large responses in labor supply to changes in infrastructure that occur in this case. These large changes can be seen in the change in N that are reported in the first four columns of Table 4. When the utility-enhancing aspects of infrastructure are ignored, infrastructure no longer impacts the agents’ utility directly. Instead, it only operates indirectly through changes in factor prices, r and w, and tax rates, τa, τn and τc. As can be seen in Table 4, increasing infrastructure leads to a strong increase in the wage rate, w. A higher wage rate could cause an agent’s labor supply to change in either direction depending on if the income or substitution effect dominates. What we find is that the income effect dominates for lowwealth agents, while the substitution effect dominates for high-wealth agents. This result is intuitive as low-wealth agents were already supplying a great deal of labor prior to the policy change. So, when the utility channel is shut down, increasing infrastructure will cause poor agents to reduce their labor supply and rich agents to increase their labor supply. Ultimately, this differential effect may lead to an increase in wealth inequality. However, individual labor supplies only change slightly in this case, so the overall distributional effects are negligible. 24 5 Conclusions In this paper we investigate the distributional effect of investing in infrastructure. Our results confirm the widely-held belief that investing in infrastructure increases economic growth. Our results also suggest that a government can reduce the level of inequality present in their country by investing in infrastructure. This result can be seen by the increase in the right tail of all density functions after the policy change. Furthermore, the poorest quintile is particularly positively affected due to the combination of the growth in the economy plus the increased share of wealth accruing to them. While all financing methods increase growth and reduce inequality, they do not perform equally well at both tasks. Our results suggest that a tax on interest income should be avoided as it generates smaller growth relative to the other tax changes while yielding similar distributional effects. The results above were found when infrastructure is allowed to directly influence the aggregate production function and the agents’ individual utility functions. Therefore, infrastructure was assumed to influence individual choices through two separate channels, production and utility. While both of these channels have been discussed in the literature, no previous paper has attempted to uncover which channel drives the distribution affects. We proceed by shutting down the utility channel by removing the utility-enhancing aspects of infrastructure from the model. Once the utility channel is shutdown, we find that increasing infrastructure investment leads to a very small changes in wealth inequality. Therefore, the utility channel is the channel through which our distributional affects operate. Several related and interesting questions are left for future research. For example, are there distributional trade-offs that governments face between investing in infrastructure and investing in education (human capital formation)? It would also be interesting to expand the current model to allow for aggregate shocks, government debt and the potential for a binding government borrowing constraint. These features would allow one to consider other 25 issues such as the cyclicality of inequality and the effect of a government’s debt balance on their infrastructure investment decision over the business cy

## Modeling CP

### Populism — 2NC

#### Solves the terminal impact best ⁠— increases coordination

Albaret et al. 14, Mélanie, \*PhD, lecturer in political science at the Université Clermont-Auvergne. Bertrand Badie, Kanti Bajpai, Oleg Demidov, Nicola Horsburgh, Adam Humphreys. *et al*. (“A Twenty-First Century Concert of Powers – Promoting Great Power Multilateralism for the Post-Transatlantic Era”, *The 21st Century Concert Study Group*, pg. 10, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk\_downloads/PolicyPaper\_ATwentyFirstCenturyConcertofPowers.pdf)

In order to achieve its purpose, a 21st Century Concert will have to rest on a solid foundation of norms that guide the behavior of its members. These norms would include acknowledging the urgency of cooperation, accepting equality between and diversity among great powers, showing empathy and respect for the vital interests of the partners as well as for the interests of non-members, pursuing good neighborhood policies, renouncing the unilateral use of military force and the aim of military superiority in general, and abiding by international law. These norms will likely remain a “work in progress” as it would be unrealistic to expect all of them to be fulfilled at the outset. However, it will be important to “move towards” these norms, lest the Concert should disintegrate.

The Concert and its embedding in the existing world order

The 21st Century Concert would carefully need to integrate itself into the existing world order. Its purpose would not be to substitute but complement existing organizations and institutions. The UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, for example, should not be marginalized by the Concert; rather, intra-great power deliberations in the Concert should be used to overcome gridlock within these institutions. Relations between the Concert and other international institutions like the G20 and regional security organizations – which are of increasing importance in today’s world – should be characterized by a spirit of cooperation, as opposed to competition. At the same time, the Concert should engage with civil society and care about the legitimacy it enjoys among non-governmental organizations. The Concert would therefore be embedded within a broader framework of multilateralism. It would help prevent the ultimate common bad, a great power war, and also facilitate cooperation in other areas. Any demands it requires would therefore not mean unacceptable sacrifices, either for member or non-member states; on the contrary, creating a new forum for great power cooperation would serve their own long-term interests. A 21st Century Concert would very likely be able to improve the efficiency of global (security) governance and deepen the culture and practices of cooperation.

### Philippines — 2NC

#### The CP changes the text of the TPP to focus on worker welfare — that solves.

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After World War II, the United States engaged in a historic effort to rebuild Europe and Japan through the Marshall Plan. While the story of the Marshall Plan is well known, what is less commonly understood is that the United States exported aggressive antitrust laws to Europe during those post-war years. The Marshall Plan antitrust advisors believed that the massive consolidation in the German economy facilitated and sustained fascism, and they argued that a democratic society required a democratic economy.26 Today, in the context of increasing concentration, rising authoritarianism, and foreign governments commingling state and markets through state-owned enterprises and state capitalism, promoting economic democracy abroad should be an essential foreign policy objective. And yet, the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement designed by the Obama Administration, established the objectives of competition policy as “economic efficiency and consumer welfare,” a narrowly drawn and ideological conception of the purposes of antitrust law that has no basis in U.S. statutory law.27 Presidents and their administrations should abandon these cramped views of antitrust and instead encourage the adoption of more aggressive antitrust laws abroad.

### Democracy — 2NC

#### Closes Gitmo — that’s an alt cause only the CP solves, turns every impact.

Adelman et al 7 [Ken—UN Ambassador and Arms Control Director for President Ronald Reagan Author, Acclaimed Story-Teller, and Adventurer, Kenneth Adelman, Graham Allison, Ronald Asmus, Samuel Berger, Stephen Bosworth, Daniel Byman, Warren Christopher, Wesley Clark, Richard Clarke, Ivo Daalder, James Dobbins, Douglas Feith, Leslie Gelb, Marc Grossman, John Hamre, Gary Hart, Bruce Hoffman, Laura Holgate, John Hulsman, Robert Hunter, Tony Judt, Robert Kagan, David Kay, Andrew Krepinevich, Charles Kupchan, John Lehman, James Lindsay, Edward Luttwak, John McLaughlin, Richard Myers, William Nash, Joseph Nye, Carlos Pascual, Paul Pillar, Kenneth Pollack, Joseph Ralston, Susan Rice, Wendy Sherman, Anne-Marie Slaighter, James Steinberg, Anthony Zinni, “Guantanamo's Shadow,” *The Atlantic,* October 2007, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamos-shadow/306212/>] KS

Has the prison system at Guantanamo Bay helped or hurt the United States in its fight against al-Qaeda? 87% Hurt “Nothing has hurt America’s image and standing in the world—and nothing has undermined the global effort to combat nihilistic terrorism—than the brutal torture and dehumanizing actions of Americans in Abu Ghraib and in other prisons (secret or otherwise). America can win the fight against terrorism only if it acts in ways consistent with the values for which it stands; if its behavior descends to the level employed by the terrorists, then we have all become them instead of us.” “Gitmo has hurt the US in two different ways. At the strategic level, it has undercut the U.S. case around the world that we represent a world view and a set of values that all can admire, even those who do not wish to replicate our system and society in their own countries. Gitmo has become a symbol for cruelty and inhumanity that is repugnant to a wide sector of the world community and a powerful tool that al Qaeda can use to damage US interest and recruit others to its cause. At the tactical level, Gitmo deludes many in the US, an never more than the senior leaders of the Bush Administration, into believing that harsh interrogation techniques can produce good intelligence and is a necessary tool in fighting terrorist. This 'truth' spread from Gitmo to Iraq and we have paid a horrible price for it.” “It has hurt America disastrously. The so-called global war on terrorism depends fundamentally on America's moral authority, so that other nations will want to cooperate with us. Guantanamo has become a vibrant symbol of American exceptionalism, but this exceptionalism is unwanted around the world.” “this one is so basic. i speak as a republican so this is not a partisan comment. the founders would be rightly ashamed of us. we have forgotten, as truman and eisenhower never did, that america's power is as much about what it stands for as for its hard power characteristics. this has all been put in the worst kind of peril by Gitmo.” “The controversies that have surrounded the system have outweighed any benefit. The main reason for locating the facility at Guantanamo—to attempt to keep it out of the reach of anyone's legal system—was never justifiable.” “The Guantanamo system has hurt the U.S. and our fight against Al Qaeda. We have abandoned the moral high ground and, through our actions, have become one of the principle recruiting agents for Islamic extremism.” “Our strongest asset internationally was our reputation and credibility on human rights. We have squandered that.” “Hurt, on balance, because it has severely damaged our moral case in the world, which we have to have in order to rally support for combating Al Qaeda.” “Both in the obvious public relations way, worldwide, and quite directly, in showing Al Qaeda that we can very easily and quickly be seduced into wild overreactions. That is just what Osama Bin Laden hoped. Since it worked so well, he has an incentive to repeat." “It has done enormous damage to our reputation and soft power.”

## Economy

### O/V ⁠— 2NC

#### Only warming kills everyone.

McDonald ‘19 (Samuel Miller McDonald is a writer and geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition; 1/4/19; “Deathly Salvation”; *The Trouble*; https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation)

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less ~~suicidal~~ civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.

#### Extinction — non-state actors will deploy.

Barratt et al. ‘17 (Owen Cotton-Barratt et al; PhD in Pure Mathematics, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”; pg. 9; <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>)

Recent developments in biotechnology may, however, give people the capability to design pathogens which overcome this trade-off. Some gain-of-function research has demonstrated the feasibility of altering pathogens to create strains with dangerous new features, such as vaccine-resistant smallpox40 and human-transmissible avian flu,41 with the potential to kill millions or even billions of people. For an engineered pathogen to derail humanity’s long-term future, it would probably have to have extremely high fatality rates or destroy reproductive capability (so that it killed or prevented reproduction by all or nearly all of its victims), be extremely infectious (so that it had global reach), and have delayed onset of symptoms (so that we would fail to notice the problem and mount a response in time).42 Making such a pathogen would be close to impossible at present. However, the cost of the technology is falling rapidly,43 and adequate expertise and modern laboratories are becoming more available. Consequently, states and perhaps even terrorist groups could eventually gain the capacity to create pathogens which could deliberately or accidentally cause an existential catastrophe.

#### Extinction – terrorism, accidents, and rogue states.

Ord 20, research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University, has advised the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, and the UK Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office (Toby, March 6th, "Why we need worst-case thinking to prevent pandemics,” *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/06/worst-case-thinking-prevent-pandemics-coronavirus-existential-risk)

. Such democratisation promises to fuel a boom of entrepreneurial biotechnology. But since biotechnology can be misused to lethal effect, democratisation also means proliferation. As the pool of people with access to a technique grows, so does the chance it contains someone with malign intent. People with the motivation to wreak global destruction are mercifully rare. But they exist. Perhaps the best example is the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, active between 1984 and 1995, which sought to bring about the destruction of humanity. It attracted several thousand members, including people with advanced skills in chemistry and biology. And it demonstrated that it was not mere misanthropic ideation. It launched multiple lethal attacks using VX gas and sarin gas, killing more than 20 people and injuring thousands. It attempted to weaponise anthrax, but did not succeed. What happens when the circle of people able to create a global pandemic becomes wide enough to include members of such a group? Or members of a terrorist organisation or rogue state that could try to build an omnicidal weapon for the purposes of extortion or deterrence? The main candidate for biological existential risk in the coming decades thus stems from technology – particularly the risk of misuse by states or small groups. But this is not a case in which the world is blissfully unaware of the risks. Bertrand Russell wrote of the danger of extinction from biowarfare to Einstein in 1955. And, in 1969, the possibility was raised by the American Nobel laureate for medicine, Joshua Lederberg: “As a scientist I am profoundly concerned about the continued involvement of the United States and other nations in the development of biological warfare. This process puts the very future of human life on earth in serious peril.”

### Impact Run — 2NC

#### Growth makes catastrophic disease inevitable — extinction.

Morand & Walther 20 (\*Serge Morand; PhD, disease ecologist @ Kasetsart University; \*\*Bruno A. Walther; DPhil, Taipei Medical University; 4/20/20; “The accelerated infectious disease risk in the Anthropocene: more outbreaks and wider global spread”; pg. 3-4; Accessible at: <https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.04.20.049866>) \*”to” added to preserve grammatical integrity, brackets denote a change

We here want to draw attention to another important and noteworthy feature of the Anthropocene which greatly affects public health, human well-being, and economic performance. These findings are especially pertinent as the world reels from the health, social and economic impact of the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic (El Zowalaty and Järhult, 2020; Ghebreyesus and Swaminathan, 2020; Lorusso et al., 2020). The increasing connectivity of human populations due to international trade and travel (Guimerà et al., 2005; Colizza et al., 2006; Brockmann and Helbing, 2013; Gabrielli et al., 2019), the rapid growth of the transport of wild and domesticated animals worldwide (Rosen and Smith, 2010; Schneider, 2012; Rohr et al., 2019; Levitt, 2020), and other factors such as the increasing encroachment of human populations on hitherto isolated wild animal populations through loss and fragmentation of wild habitats (Patz et al., 2004; Despommier et al., 2006; Pongsiri et al., 2009; Myers et al., 2013) have led to a great acceleration of infectious disease risks, e.g., the increase in emerging infectious diseases and drug-resistant microbes since 1940 (Jones et al., 2008) and the increase in the number of disease outbreaks since 1980 (Smith et al., 2014). To expand the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014) to the beginning of the Anthropocene, we investigated whether the number of disease outbreaks has increased since the Second World War. In addition, we examined whether the global pattern of infectious disease outbreaks changed possibly due [to] the increasing connectivity of human populations. In other words, have the disease outbreaks become more globalized in the sense that these outbreaks are increasingly shared by countries worldwide? To investigate these questions, we used a the most complete, reliable, and up-to-date global dataset (GIDEON Informatics, 2020) which had already been used in the previous analysis (Smith et al., 2014). This dataset can be used to enumerated the recorded annual number of disease outbreaks. To investigate the changing global patterns of disease outbreaks, we used this dataset to calculate two measures which have been recently introduced into ecological and parasitological studies. These two measures, namely modularity and centrality, quantify the connectivity of bipartite networks. Modularity is defined as the extent to which nodes (specifically, sites and species for presenceabsence matrices) in a compartment are more likely to be connected to each other than to other nodes of the network (Thébault, 2013). The calculation of a modularity measure is useful for global phenomena because it allows the overall level of compartmentalization (or fragmentation) into compartments (or clusters, modules, subgroups, or subsets) of an entire dataset to be quantified. High modularity in a global network means that subgroups of countries and disease outbreaks interact more strongly among themselves (that is, within a compartment) than with the other subgroups (that is, among compartments) (Bordes et al., 2015). Centrality is defined as the degree of the connectedness of a node (e.g., a keystone species in ecological studies; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010). In the context of our study, centrality is the degree of the connectedness of a country and those countries connected to it. We estimated the countries which are the potential centres of disease outbreaks by investigating the eigenvector centrality of a given country in a network of countries which share disease outbreaks among each other. Eigenvector centrality is a generalization of degree centrality, which is the number of connections a country has to other countries in terms of sharing disease outbreaks. Eigenvector centrality considers countries to be highly central if the connected countries to them through shared outbreaks are connected to many other well-connected countries (Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001; Wells et al., 2020). Modularity and centrality analyses have been used to investigate various ecological, parasitological and epidemiological questions (e.g., Tylianakis et al., 2007; Jordán, 2009; González et al., 2010; Anderson and Sukhdeo, 2011; Bascompte and Jordano, 2014; Poisot et al., 2014; Bordes et al., 2015; Genrich et al., 2017). Using a widely used world dataset on infectious disease outbreaks, we here present results which demonstrate that the accelerated number of disease outbreaks and their increased global spread are two further threatening aspects of the accelerated infectious disease risk associated with the globalization process which characterizes the Anthropocene.

#### 2. Chemical emissions.

Julian Cribb 17, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 2017, “The Poisoner,” in Surviving the 21st Century, p. 113-117

There are two essential points about the Earthwide chemical flood. First it is quite new. It began with the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, but expanded dramatically in the wake of the two world wars—where chemicals were extensively used in munitions—and has exploded in deadly earnest in the past 50 years, attaining a new crescendo in the early twenty-first century. It is something our ancestors never faced—and to which we, in consequence, lack any protective adaptations which might otherwise have evolved due to constant exposure to poisons. ¶ Second, the toxic flood is, for the most part, preventable. It is not compulsory—but is an unwanted by-product of economic growth. Though driven by powerful industries and interests, it still lies within the powers and rights of citizens, consumers and their governments to demand it be curtailed or ended and to encourage industry to safer, healthier products and production systems. ¶ The issue is whether, or not, a wise humanity would choose to continue poisoning our children, ourselves and our world. ¶ Regulatory Failure ¶ Despite the fact that around 2000 new chemicals are released onto world markets annually, most have not received proper health, safety or environmental screening—especially in terms of their impact on babies and small children. Regulation has so far failed to make any serious curtailment of this flood: only 21 out of 144,000 known chemicals have been banned internationally, and this has not eliminated their use. At such a rate of progress it will take us more than 50,000 years to identify and prohibit or restrict all the chemicals which do us harm. Even then, bans will only apply in a handful of well-regulated countries, and will not protect the Earth system nor humanity at large. Clearly, national regulation holds few answers to what is now an out-of-control global problem. ¶ Furthermore, the chemical industry is relocating from the developed world (where it is quite well regulated and observes its own ethical standards) and into developing countries, mainly in Asia, where it is largely beyond the reach of either ethics or the law. However, its toxic emissions return to citizens in well-regulated countries via wind, water, food, wildlife, consumer goods, industrial products and people. The bottom line is that it doesn’t matter how good your country’s regulations are: you and your family are still exposed to a growing global flood of toxins from which even a careful diet and sensible consumer choices cannot fully protect you. ¶ The wake-up call to the world about the risks of chemical contamination was issued by American biologist Rachel Carson when she published Silent Spring in 1962, in which she warned specifically about the impact of certain persistent pesticides used in agriculture. Since her book came out, the volume of pesticide use worldwide has increased 30-fold, to around four million tonnes a year in the mid-2010s. Since the modern chemical age began there has been a string of high-profile chemical disasters: Minamata, the Love Canal, Seveso, Bhopal, Flixborough, Oppau, Toulouse, Hinkley, Texas City, Jilin, Tianjin. Most of these display a familiar pattern of unproductive confrontation between angry citizens, industry and regulators, involving drawn-out legal battles that deliver justice to nobody. By their spectacular and local nature, such events serve to distract from the far larger, more insidious and ubiquitous, universal toxic flood. ¶ Chemists and chemical makers often claim that their products are ‘safe’ because individual exposure (e.g. in a given product, like a serve of food) is too low to result in a toxic dose, a theory first put forward by the mediaeval scholar Paracelsus in the sixteenth century. This ‘dose related’ argument is disingenuous, if not dishonest—as modern chemists well know—for the following reasons: Most chemicals target a receptor or receptors on certain of your body cells, to cause harm. There may be not one, but hundreds or even thousands of different chemicals all targeting the same receptor, so a particular substance may contribute an unknowable fraction to an overall toxic dose. That does not make it ‘safe’. Chemicals not known to be poisonous in small doses on their own can combine with other substances in water, air, food or your body to create a toxin. No manufacturer can truthfully assert this will not happen to their products. Chemical toxicity is a function of both dose and the length of time you are exposed to it. In the case of persistent chemicals and heavy metals, this exposure may occur over days, months, years, even a lifetime in some cases. Tiny doses may thus accumulate into toxic ones. Most chemical toxicity is still measured on the basis of an exposed adult male. Babies and children being smaller and using much more water, food and air for their bodyweight, are therefore more at risk of receiving a poisonous dose than are adults. ¶ Chemicals and minerals are valuable and extremely useful. They do great good, save many lives and much money. No-one is suggesting they should all be banned. But their value may be for nothing if the current uncontrolled, unmonitored, unregulated and unconscionable mass release and planetary saturation continues.¶ Chemical Extinction ¶ Two billion years ago, excessive production of one particular poisonous chemical by the inhabitants of Earth caused a colossal die-off and threatened the extermination of all life. That chemical was oxygen and it was excreted by the blue-green algae which then dominated the planet, as part of their photosynthetic processes. After several hundred million of years, the planet’s physical ability to soak up the surplus O2 in iron formations, oceans and sediments had reached saturation and the gas began to poison the existing life. This event was known as the ‘oxygen holocaust’, and is probably the nearest life on Earth has ever come to complete disaster before the present (Margulis and Sagan 1986). Since it developed slowly, over tens of millions of years, the poisonous atmosphere permitted some of these primitive organisms to evolve a tolerance to O2—and this in time led to the rise of oxygen-dependent species such as fish, mammals and eventually, us. The takehome learning from this brush with total annihilation is that it is possible for living creatures to pollute themselves into oblivion, if they don’t take care to avoid it or rapidly adapt to the new, toxic environment. It’s a message that humans, with our colossal planetary chemical impact, would do well to ponder. ¶ While it is unlikely that human chemical emissions alone could reach such a volume and toxic state as to directly threaten our entire species with extinction (other than through carbon emissions in a runaway global warming event) or even the collapse of civilization, it is likely they will emerge as a serious contributing factor during the twenty-first century in combination with other factors such as war, climate change, pandemic disease and ecosystem breakdown. Credible ways in which man-made chemicals might imperil the human future include: Undermining the immune systems, physical and mental health of the population through growing exposure to toxins Reducing the intelligence of current and future generations through the action of nerve poisons on the developing brains and central nervous systems of children, rendering humanity less able to solve its problems and adapt to major changes; and by increasing the level of violent crime and conflict in society, which is closely linked to lower IQ. Bringing down the economy through the massive healthcare costs of having to nurse, treat and maintain a growing proportion of the population disabled by lifelong chronic chemical exposure. By poisoning the ecosystem services—clean air, water, soil, plants, insects and wildlife—on which humanity depends for its own survival and thereby contributing to potential global ecosystem breakdown By augmenting the global arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and hence the risk of their use by nations or uncontrollable fanatics.

#### 3. Soil erosion causes extinction.

George Monbiot 15, author and investigative reporter, “We’re treating soil like dirt. It’s a fatal mistake, as our lives depend on it,” 3/25/15, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/treating-soil-like-dirt-fatal-mistake-human-life

Imagine a wonderful world, a planet on which there was no threat of climate breakdown, no loss of freshwater, no antibiotic resistance, no obesity crisis, no terrorism, no war. Surely, then, we would be out of major danger? Sorry. Even if everything else were miraculously fixed, we’re finished if we don’t address an issue considered so marginal and irrelevant that you can go for months without seeing it in a newspaper.It’s literally and – it seems – metaphorically, beneath us. To judge by its absence from the media, most journalists consider it unworthy of consideration. But all human life depends on it. We knew this long ago, but somehow it has been forgotten. As a Sanskrit text written in about 1500BC noted: “Upon this handful of soil our survival depends. Husband it and it will grow our food, our fuel and our shelter and surround us with beauty. Abuse it and the soil will collapse and die, taking humanity with it.”The issue hasn’t changed, but we have. Landowners around the world are now engaged in an orgy of soil destruction so intense that, according to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation, the world on average has just 60 more years of growing crops. Even in Britain, which is spared the tropical downpours that so quickly strip exposed soil from the land, Farmers Weekly reports, we have “only 100 harvests left”.To keep up with global food demand, the UN estimates, 6m hectares (14.8m acres) of new farmland will be needed every year. Instead, 12m hectares a year are lost through soil degradation. We wreck it, then move on, trashing rainforests and other precious habitats as we go. Soil is an almost magical substance, a living system that transforms the materials it encounters, making them available to plants. That handful the Vedic master showed his disciples contains more micro-organisms than all the people who have ever lived on Earth. Yet we treat it like, well, dirt.The techniques that were supposed to feed the world threaten us with starvation. A paper just published in the journal Anthropocene analyses the undisturbed sediments in an 11th-century French lake. It reveals that the intensification of farming over the past century has increased the rate of soil erosion sixtyfold.Another paper, by researchers in the UK, shows that soil in allotments – the small patches in towns and cities that people cultivate by hand – contains a third more organic carbon than agricultural soil and 25% more nitrogen. This is one of the reasons why allotment holders produce between four and 11 times more food per hectare than do farmers.Whenever I mention this issue, people ask: “But surely farmers have an interest in looking after their soil?” They do, and there are many excellent cultivators who seek to keep their soil on the land. There are also some terrible farmers, often absentees, who allow contractors to rip their fields to shreds for the sake of a quick profit. Even the good ones are hampered by an economic and political system that could scarcely be better designed to frustrate them.This is the International Year of Soils, but you wouldn’t know it. In January, the Westminster government published a new set of soil standards, marginally better than those they replaced, but wholly unmatched to the scale of the problem. There are no penalities for compromising our survival except a partial withholding of public subsidies. Yet even this pathetic guidance is considered intolerable by the National Farmers’ Union, which greeted them with bitter complaints. Sometimes the NFU seems to me to exist to champion bad practice and block any possibility of positive change.Few sights are as gruesome as the glee with which the NFU celebrated the death last year of the European soil framework directive, the only measure with the potential to arrest our soil-erosion crisis. The NFU, supported by successive British governments, fought for eight years to destroy it, then crowed like a shedful of cockerels when it won. Looking back on this episode, we will see it as a parable of our times.Soon after that, the business minister, Matthew Hancock, announced that he was putting “business in charge of driving reform”: trade associations would be able “to review enforcement of regulation in their sectors.” The NFU was one the first two bodies granted this privilege. Hancock explained that this “is all part of our unambiguously pro-business agenda to increase the financial security of the British people.” But it doesn’t increase our security, financial or otherwise. It undermines it.The government’s deregulation bill, which has now almost completed its passage through parliament, will force regulators – including those charged with protecting the fabric of the land – to “have regard to the desirability of promoting economic growth”. But short-term growth at the expense of public protection compromises long-term survival. This “unambiguously pro-business agenda” is deregulating us to death.There’s no longer even an appetite for studying the problem. Just one university – Aberdeen – now offers a degree in soil science. All the rest have been closed down.This is what topples civilisations. War and pestilence might kill large numbers of people, but in most cases the population recovers. But lose the soil and everything goes with it.Now, globalisation ensures that this disaster is reproduced everywhere. In its early stages, globalisation enhances resilience: people are no longer dependent on the vagaries of local production. But as it proceeds, spreading the same destructive processes to all corners of the Earth, it undermines resilience, as it threatens to bring down systems everywhere.Almost all other issues are superficial by comparison. What appear to be great crises are slight and evanescent when held up against the steady trickling away of our subsistence.

#### 4. Insect loss.

Robert Hunziker 18, MA in Economic History from DePaul University, environmental journalist for over fifty publications, 3/27/18, “Insect Decimation Upstages Global Warming,” https://www.transcend.org/tms/2018/04/insect-decimation-upstages-global-warming/

Everybody’s heard about global warming. It is one of the most advertised existential events of all time. Who isn’t aware? However, there’s a new kid on the block. An alarming loss of insects will likely take down humanity before global warming hits maximum velocity.¶ For the immediate future, the Paris Accord is riding the wrong horse, as global warming is a long-term project compared to the insect catastrophe happening right now! Where else is found 40% to 90% species devastation?¶ The worldwide loss of insects is simply staggering with some reports of 75% up to 90%, happening much faster than the paleoclimate record rate of the past five major extinction events. It is possible that some insect species may already be close to total extinction!¶ It’s established that species evolve and then go extinct over thousands and millions of years as part of nature’s course, but the current rate of devastation is simply “off the charts, and downright scary.”¶ Without any doubt, it is difficult to imagine how humanity survives without insects, which are dropping dead in bunches right before our eyes. For proof, how many insect splats do people clean off windshields nowadays? Not many…. How many fireflies do children chase at night? Not many….¶ Several naturalists and environmental writers believe the massive loss of insects has everything to do with three generations of industrialized farming and the vast tide of poisons pouring over the landscape year-after-year, especially since the end of WWII. Ours is the first-ever pesticide-based agricultural society. Dreadfully, it’s an experiment that is going dead wrong… all of a sudden!¶ Insects are basic to thousands of food chains; for example, the disappearance of Britain’s farmland birds by over 50% in 40 years. Additionally, North America and Europe species of birds like larks, swallows, and swifts that feast on flying insects have plummeted.¶ But, these are only a few of many, many recorded examples of massive numbers of wildlife dropping dead right before our eyes.¶ Significantly, insects are the primary source for ecosystem creation and support. The world literally crumbles apart without mischievous burrowing, forming new soil, aerating soil, pollinating food crops, etc. Nutrition for humans happens because insects pollinate.

#### 5. Deforestation

Dominik Goldstein 16, “Eliminating deforestation and forest degradation in order to prevent species from extinction, especially with regard to areas in Asia, Africa and South America,” <http://www.balmun.de/fileadmin/2016/Research_Reports/RR_EC_I_Deforestation.pdf>

Deforestation and forest degradation are undoubtedly part of the largest environmental problems our world is facing today. Of the 16 million square kilometers of forest that once covered the earth’s surface, only 6.2 million remain up to date. 2.3 million have been destroyed between 2000 and 2012 alone. Not only does this threaten the balance of local important environmental factors such as water cycles and greenhouse gas decomposition and harm the economy and society of affected areas, but it also endangers many different species, as 80% of all biodiversity is found in forests. The entire planet and its population rely on the fate of forests, it is vital that the issues of deforestation and forest degradation are tackled thoroughly, however, it can only be achieved through close cooperation amongst all UN member nations.

### T/ Populism

#### Capitalism makes populism inevitable.

Gonzalez-Vicente 18, University Lecturer in Global Political Economy @ U Leiden (Ruben, “The liberal peace fallacy: violent neoliberalism and the temporal and spatial traps of state-based approaches to peace,” *Territoriality, Politics, Governance*, 8.1)

The contemporary rise of illiberal politics, nationalism and partially mercantilist worldviews – with the governments of the United States, Russia and China, among others, reinvigorating national discourses and agendas, and unilaterally initiating military action or entertaining expansionist agendas; and with the rise of the far-right looming over Europe – has left liberal elites in apparent distress. As they contemplate the extensive rejection of many of the values that have underwritten the global liberal project since the 1980s and 1990s, these elites fear not only a potential retreat of the policies that facilitated globalized accumulation in the last decades but also the breakdown of the Liberal Peace, or the idea that economic interdependence between nation-states is paramount in containing international violence. This has been followed by a proliferation of cautionary tales against a ‘populist rise’, as institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cling to market integration as the foremost recipe for prosperity and peace (Mayeda, 2016). Indeed, the clarion calls have resonated well beyond the liberal Atlantic heartland, as exemplified by the visit paid by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in January 2017. There, the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party attacked protectionism, promoted trade and investment liberalization, and cautioned that ‘no one will emerge as a winner in a trade war’, in a sui generis contribution to a long-standing narrative that couples anti-market resistance with international conflict (Xi, 2017).

Yet, the contemporary ascension of nationalist and populist movements and leaders that herald deeply illiberal views (Xi included) must come as no surprise after decades of neoliberal triumphalism and the promotion of a transnational order that placed the crafting of a world market above the needs of societies themselves. In such a context, the contemporary rise of nationalism and populisms across the world is not some liberal order antithesis emerging from a vacuum, but rather a logical consequence of this liberal order, constituting an often reactionary ‘counter movement’ that cannot be tackled with liberal prescriptions for increased market globalization (Polanyi, 2001). This paper takes aim at the now long-held and recently revitalized argument for a liberal peace. While not attempting to predict any specific outcome regarding the future of global peace, it argues that the rise of illiberal and reactionary discourses that we now observe, and their potential corollaries, must be understood in a dialectical sense as the result of a liberal market-oriented inter-state order that failed to tackle the great social dislocation that it played a fundamental role in fomenting.

To develop this critique, I draw upon three main bodies of literature that, despite their apparent affinities, are seldom brought together. These include Polanyi and Gramsci-inspired understandings of hegemonic crisis, counter-movements, and the rise of nationalism and populism (Gill, 2015; Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017); critical political economies of social conflict within a context of neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2005; Springer, 2015); and political geography analyses of international relations theory (IRT), and more specifically critical geographies of peace (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Flint, 2005; Koopman, 2016; McConnell, Megoran, & Williams, 2014; Megoran, 2011; Nagle, 2010; Williams & McConnell, 2011). Elaborating upon these, I contend that the methodological nationalism of the disciplines of economics and international relations – in which much of the liberal view is based – has left them in a sorry state in making sense of recent political development throughout the world, specifically when addressing the contemporary rise of reactionary forms of populism.

In this sense, the high degrees of violence and vulnerability associated with processes of market integration have often escaped the radars of economics and IR analyses, fixated as they are with mono-scale scrutiny of national economies and state-to-state relations. Although some liberal IR scholars have laid the grounds for a less normative paradigm that incorporates domestic variables and bottom-up societal processes into the understanding of state action, the assumption remains that policy interdependence and compatibility between states, combined with the Pareto-efficient outcomes of globally integrated production and trade, result in ‘strong incentives for coexistence with low conflict’ (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 521; see also Oneal & Russett, 1997; McDonald & Sweeney, 2007). Recent developments suggest there are fundamental flaws with this largely deductive hypothesis. Whereas on aggregate terms, and according to some measurements, nation-states may have benefitted more or less from globalization, social conflict occurring at multiple scales – and indeed in a class-based dimension – is an undeniable constitutive element of state action, the latter reflecting and/or attempting to contain particular constellations of social forces and their interests. In this way, the damage inflicted upon many by increasingly disembedded markets and post-political states that shield policy from popular deliberation (both the products of the liberal agenda) are at the very root of the current crisis of liberal hegemony (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017).

In what follows, I draw upon a variety of cases to explain how a dialectical approach to liberalism, neoliberalism and their illiberal responses,1 and a multi-scalar analysis of market violence are indispensable in explaining much of the turbulence that world politics faces today. To be clear, the paper’s goal is not to deny that state leaders factor in the economic repercussions of conflict when they contemplate its possibility – a logical assumption of liberal international relations scholarship. The aim is instead to argue that these calculations tell very little about the nature of peace and conflict as historically bounded processes that need to be studied in relation to broader transformations in the global political economy, the latter affecting state behaviour in terms of both economic policy and inter-state rivalry. In this way, and crucially, I also wish to refute the liberal argument that the pursuit of economic integration at any (social) cost will unequivocally lower the prospects for international conflict or, indeed, structural violence more broadly understood as a multi-scalar phenomenon.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section problematizes the concept of peace in IRT, with a more detailed discussion of economic liberalism. The following section presents a temporal critique, contextualizing the contemporary rise of illiberal politics within the transformation of the global political economy under world market capitalism. After this, I build upon Agnew (1994) to develop a scalar critique and argue that liberalism’s methodological nationalism hampers a proper assessment of the transnational dimensions of processes such as development, violence or peace. I chart various scales of market-induced violence and vulnerability (as a form of economic violence) in the global era, tracing the rescaling of violence and risk from the interstate scale to the individual sphere. I conclude by discussing the transition from a ‘durable disorder’ (Cerny, 1998) to an emerging (albeit contested) new populist order under world market capitalism. To do so, I echo Polanyi and Marx in contending that processes of marketization, replete as they are with contradiction, cannot engender liberal or capitalist peace, but result instead in anti-liberal reactions of various kinds (what Polanyi called ‘counter movements’) to the violence of unrestrained markets. Importantly, these counter movements can often take reactionary characteristics, as people under threat or the perception of threat retreat into culture and nationalism against the ‘other’ and internationalism in all its variants.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE LIBERAL PEACE

While the pursuit of peace is a central preoccupation for progressive IR scholarship, peace as a concept and as an actual manifestation is rarely discussed in the IR literature. Instead, peace often appears as a negative occurrence, intuitively understood as the avoidance of war or an absence of overt inter-state violence (Galtung, 1969; Richmond, 2016, p. 57). Thereby, most IR literature focuses on the challenges to state-based peace, with commentary typically dominated by the two main competing schools, realism and liberalism, both subdivided into further dissenting subcamps. Conventional realist approaches take the ‘anarchic’ or violent nature of international politics as a given and place their focus on states’ survival strategies. Offensive realists warn of the disruptive effects of ‘power transitions’ and in the contemporary context claim, for example, that as China grows economically and militarily, and as its interests expand and it seeks greater influence, tensions with other countries are certain to arise (Mearsheimer, 2014). Defensive neorealists hold similar assumptions about the foundations of the international system, yet contend that states privilege security over domination and that the incentives for conflict are contingent rather than endemic, with balances of power potentially keeping states at bay and preventing conflict (Waltz, 1979).

Liberal theorists dispute these interpretations and reject that competition alone guides state behaviour. Elaborating on the Kantian ideal of ‘perpetual peace’, and drawing upon Adam Smith, David Ricardo or John Stuart Mill, liberal theories contend that economic integration and institutional enmeshment or socialization exercise a constraining force on conflict and are conductive to peaceful scenarios (Doyle, 1986; Howard, 1981; Johnston, 2008; Keohane & Nye, 1977). While there is no absolute agreement on the exact shape that such ‘interdependence’ should take (Mansfield & Pollins, 2001), liberal IR scholars often hold that large-scale conflict in the 21st century can be avoided if the liberal world order survives the relative decline of the United States and manages to assimilate rising powers such as China. The emphasis is placed both on institutions and norms of reciprocity, on the one hand, and on economic integration, on the other. Regarding the latter, and evoking Smithian language, the agenda for a ‘capitalist peace’ assumes that free markets represent ‘“a hidden hand” that  …  build(s) up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states’ (Gartzke, 2007; Richmond, 2008, p. 23), and that ‘put simply, globalisation promotes peace’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003, p. 562). The theory is in many ways deductive, but relies also on the statistical data that on aggregate tends partially to support the liberal peace argument (except for the period leading to the First World War; see also Barbieri, 1996) and on the ‘logic’ that national leaders are not expected to act irrationally or be insensitive ‘to economic loss and the preferences of powerful domestic actors’ (Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010, p. 772).

A more nuanced exposition of the liberal argument suggests that what brings nations together and heightens the opportunity cost of conflict is market integration according to a set of commonly devised regulations – rather than the realization of an ideal ‘free’ trade archetype (Moravcsik, 2005). This results in a sort of ‘embedded liberalism’, with the successful integration of post-Soviet states and China in world market capitalism through World Trade Organization (WTO) membership and other liberalizing initiatives understood as a deterrent to military action and, hence, as an effective strategy for both global growth and security, particularly in the face of China’s rising economic and military might (Funabashi, Oksenberg, & Weiss, 1994). From this perspective, not only is violence avoidable but also peace may indeed be engineered with the creation of a world market society being key to this endeavour as well as to the broader goal of crafting a liberal hegemony able to deliver a veritable ‘end of history’ where markets and functioning liberal democracies prevail (Fukuyama, 1992). The engineering of market-orientated democracies has indeed often been the main task of liberal peace- and state-building operatives in post-conflict areas (Campbell, Chandler, & Sabaratnam, 2011).

Yet, decades of neoliberal integration have not brought Fukuyama’s prophecy closer to its realization. Across the world, liberal market integration has facilitated convivial relations among key countries and paid important dividends to elites, yet it has also resulted in the concentration of wealth in ever fewer hands, rising inequalities within countries (although not between them) and higher concentration of wealth at the top, and increased risks and vulnerability as the logic of market competitiveness takes hold of many aspects of our lives (Anand & Segal, 2015; Lynch, 2006). The relation between the United States and China or the processes of economic integration in the European Union are clear examples of these trends. In these places as well as others, inequalities, precarization and economic insecurity have given way to a populist and nationalist momentum that can be interpreted both as a popular response to the extreme and diverse forms of violence engendered by processes of market integration, or as a manoeuvre to channel discontent towards the ‘other’ in order to protect elite interests (Gonzalez-Vicente & Carroll, 2017). By prescribing ever more market globalization to counter populist politics and avoid conflict, liberal elites add fuel to the fire as they sever the very conditions that led to the disfranchisement of significant segments of the population in the first place. Thereby, it is crucial to understand how the argument for capitalist peace fails to factor in the crisis-prone and socially destructive tendencies of capitalism, particularly in a context of unfenced global competitiveness along market lines.2

### 2NC---Link---Slow Growth

#### Labor market monopsony collapses the economy---inequality and wage stagnation. ⁠— 1AC tag

#### Slow growth is key to empower degrowth movements---accelerating trades off.

Michael **Maniates 17**, Professor of Environmental Studies at Yale-NUS College, Singapore, 2017, “Suddenly More Than Academic: Higher Education for a Post-Growth World,” in EarthEd: Rethinking Education on a Changing Planet, p. 194-196

The rough outline of social innovations for this post-growth society is clear. As Speth explains: "[W]e already know the types of policies that move us toward a post-growth economy that sustains both human and natural communities .... [There is] a long list of public policies that would slow GDP growth, thus sparing the environment, while simultaneously improving social and individual well being." Speth's list, which draws on work by numerous scholars, includes shorter workweeks, longer vacations, and more investment in local, small-scale economic enterprises that prosper by staying small. A shift to worker cooperatives and community banking with a strong commitment to social equity and environmental limits also makes the list. So too do progressive taxation policies, seed grants to promote community entrepreneurship, and guarantees for part-time workers."4 Speth's recommendations could easily be dismissed by those unpersuaded by the post-growth argument, except for one glaring reality: for more than a decade, we have been living in the very low-growth world that many dismiss as impossible, hopelessly dismal, or a retreat to some dark age. "Economic growth," explains Neil Irwin of the New York Times, "has been weaker for longer than it has been in the lifetime of most people on Earth." Since 2001, U.S. economic growth per capita rose 0.9 percent a year, almost a 60 percent decline from the 2.2 percent annual increase between 1947 and 2000. Economic growth in Western Europe and Japan has been even lower. Because of a number of still-unclear factors—aging populations, slowing population growth, and the intermittency of economically transformative technologies, among others—there is good reason to expect this tepid growth to continue, with some ups and downs, for the foreseeable future. These will be turbulent times that call for a particular kind of education across colleges and universities. (See Box 16-1.)5 It is tempting to double-down on the economic growth machine by mobilizing multiple forces in society, including higher education, to get us back to the time of 2 percent-plus growth per year. In the short run, this might work, but it ultimately will heighten the conflict between exponential economic growth and the integrity of environmental systems upon which human prosperity rests. Much of this growth, after all, delivers ambiguous benefits, and some of it actively undermines human prosperity. In the end, we will still need to deal with the implications of persistent low- or no-growth—the material base of the economy cannot continue to grow exponentially—with an even more despoiled environment on our hands.6 More important, pining for the "good old days" of robust growth diverts us from the critical task of adjusting, now, to a low-growth world in ways that are just, equitable, democratic, and environmentally restorative. Even if we believed that a return to muscular growth was just a few years away, wouldn't we want to explore how to gracefully adapt to our current conditions, if only as an insurance policy against the possibility that the days of high growth are behind us? Few, if any, of the social innovations described by Speth are inherently anti-growth, so there is little to lose by assessing and spreading them as we are able. For reasons still opaque to economists, slow growth is no longer a fuzzy wish tossed about by environmental scholars. It is here, among us, in our communities, on the ground, affecting our pocketbooks and driving our politics. It is no longer just academic. Rather than treating tepid growth as a problem to be solved ("how do we get the economy growing again?"), higher education can reclaim its beacon of sustainability by attacking an altogether different but immediately relevant question: How do complex human societies thrive— environmentally, equitably, and justly—in a post-growth world?

#### The problem is not the type of growth---it is growth itself---even if they transition to a socially or financially sustainable growth model, we all still die!

Ted Trainer 19, Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales. PhD from University of Sydney, “Why De growth is Essential: A Rejection of Left Ecomodernists Phillips, Sharzer, Bastini, and Parenti,” Resilience, 10/17/2019, https://www.resilience.org/stories/2019-10-17/why-de-growth-is-essential-a-rejection-of-left-ecomodernists-phillips-sharzer-bastini-and-parenti/, kyujin

Our limits to growth predicament show that the main goal is not getting rid of capitalism, essential though that is. The goal must be to get those resource and ecological impacts right down. If the eco-socialists only got rid of capitalism but continued to pursue affluence and growth, we would have a more just society…still heading for ecological collapse.

### AT: Growth Solves Warming

#### No decoupling — data that accounts for offshoring and rebound effects prove energy efficiency is getting worse. Staying below 1.5° is biophysically impossible under growth.

Albert 20, M.D. @ John Hopkins. BA in Evolutionary Biology (Michael, April, The Dangers of Decoupling: Earth System Crisis and the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, *Global Policy*, Volume 11, Issue 2, DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12791)

Unfortunately for the ecomodernists, degrowth scholars and ecological economists have begun to poke holes in their optimistic assessments. Their response can be summarized according to three key counter-arguments: (1) the evidence that ecomodernists provide for relative decoupling is flawed and limited at best; (2) their evidence for the possibility of absolute decoupling is even weaker; and (3) even if absolute decoupling was possible in principle, there is even weaker evidence that this could occur with the necessary speed to stabilize the earth system before reaching irreversible tipping points. First, claims that rich countries have seen relative or even absolute decoupling of economic growth from domestic material consumption have been shown to focus solely on correlations between national GDP and material throughput while ignoring the material-energetic costs embodied in imported consumer goods. For example, Thomas Wiedmann and colleagues show that while the EU, the US, and Japan have grown economically while stabilizing or even reducing domestic material consumption, a broader analysis of their material footprint embedded in their imports shows that it has kept pace with GDP growth. They conclude that ‘no decoupling has taken place over the past two decades for this group of developed countries’ (Wiedmann et al., 2015, p. 6273). Focusing on the global economy as a whole, Krausmann et al. show that its resource intensity improved over the course of the 20th century, though the early 21st century has seen a faster rate of growing resource consumption than global economic growth (cited in Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Thus, as Kallis and Hickel (Kallis and Hickel, 2019, p. 4; italics added) explain: ‘Global historical trends show relative decoupling but no evidence of absolute decoupling, and twenty-first century trends show not greater efficiency but rather worse efficiency, with re-coupling occurring’. Second, given the limited evidence for even relative decoupling, it is little surprise that the evidential basis on which claims for the possibility of absolute decoupling rest is even flimsier. In the most comprehensive summary of the modeling evidence to date, Hickel and Kallis (2019) show that even the most optimistic scenarios fail to prove the possibility of absolute decoupling. For example, a modeling study by Schandl et al. (2016) shows that in a ‘high efficiency’ scenario, one that combines a high and rising carbon price plus a doubling in the rate of material efficiency improvement, global resource use grows more slowly (about a quarter the rate of GDP growth) but steadily to reach 95 billion tons in 2050, while global energy use grows from 14,253 million tons of oil equivalent in 2010 to 26, 932 million in 2050. The authors therefore conclude: ‘While some relative decoupling can be achieved in some scenarios, none would lead to an absolute reduction in ... materials footprint’ (Schandl et al., 2016, p. 8). A high efficiency scenario modeled by the UNEP comes to even less optimistic conclusions (with global resource use rising to 132 billion tons in 2050), since it incorporates the ‘rebound effect’ in which efficiency improvements lead to increased consumption due to resulting price reductions (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). In short, as they conclude, these ‘models suggest that absolute decoupling is not feasible on a global scale in the context of continued economic growth’ (Hickel and Kallis, 2019, p. 6). Third, the critics show that even if absolute decoupling (from both emissions and total environmental impact) were possible in principle, this would need to occur fast enough to prevent transgression of ecological tipping points. Just focusing on the climate problem, the 2018 IPCC report claims that emissions must be reduced 7 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2050 in order to achieve the 1.5 C target, whereas they must reduce 4 per cent annually to reach net zero by 2075 for a shot at the 2 degree target (IPCC, 2018, p. 15). However, even under optimistic assumptions (e.g. a near-term implementation of a high and rising carbon price, alongside heroic carbon intensity improvements), studies suggest that annual declines of 3–4 per cent might be the fastest rate possible assuming continued economic growth (Hickel, 2019). Thus, it would most likely be impossible to meet the 1.5 C target in a context of continuous compound growth. While the 2 degree target might be feasible in this context (assuming implementation of a globally coordinated program starting in 2020), many argue that the IPCC’s estimates downplay the existence of positive feedbacks in the earth system (e.g. Steffen et al., 2018), and thus more rapid emissions cuts might be needed even for 2 degrees. On top of this, economic growth must also be decoupled from impacts on other ‘planetary boundaries’ that may have already been overshot, especially land-use change and biodiversity loss (Raworth, 2017). A number of ecologists believe that to bring humanity back into a ‘safe operating space’, total resource consumption should be reduced from roughly 70 to 50 gigatons per year (Hoekstra and Wiedmann, 2014), while a ‘half earth strategy’ should be implemented that protects 50 per cent of the planet’s surface from direct human interference (up from roughly 18 per cent today) (Wilson, 2017), possibly by 2050 to prevent tipping points in biodiversity loss and land-use change (Hickel and Kallis, 2019). Even if these claims are exaggerated, the magnitude of the overall decoupling challenge remains clear. It would mean that total resource consumption and land use needs to shrink, remain stable, or only increase moderately (depending on our assumptions regarding the further stress (if any) that planetary boundaries can handle) even as the total output of the global economy triples by 2060. It is thus not hyperbole to say, as Boris Frankel puts it, that this goal of absolute decoupling is ‘overwhelmingly staggering in its ambition and historical novelty’ (Frankel, 2018, p. 127).

#### Their [[authors/ev]] is from the Breakthrough Institute---reject it---full of bias, lobbying and fraud.

BNI 20, Beyond Nuclear International, “Exposed!” BNI, 9/28/2020, https://beyondnuclearinternational.org/2020/09/28/exposed/, kyujin

BREAKTHROUGH INSTITUTE

Shellenberger is co-founder of the Breakthrough Institute, a lobbying group masquerading as a “think tank”. The Breakthrough Institute has “a clear history as a contrarian outlet for information on climate change [which] regularly criticises environmental groups”, according to Paul Thacker. Breakthrough has also been described as a “program for hippie-punching your way to fame and fortune.”

Shellenberger co-founded the Breakthrough Institute with Ted Nordhaus, nephew of economist, William Nordhuas. William Nordhaus features in Merchants of Doubt – Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway’s examination of the PR strategies used both by the tobacco and fossil fuel industries. His interventions in the 1990s helped set back essential action on climate change by decades.

Other figures associated with Shellenberger and the Breakthrough Institute include:

* Owen Paterson, one of the UK’s most prominent climate deniers who helped with the UK launch of the group’s Ecomodernist manifesto in 2015.
* Matt Ridley, coal mine owner, once hereditary Conservative Peer and famous climate delayer / ‘lukewarmist’ who spoke at the UK launch event.

#### Tech fails — doesn’t displace fossil fuels and increased consumption offsets efficiency gains.

Parrique et al. 19, Centre for Studies and Research in International Development (CERDI), University of Clermont Auvergne, France; Stockholm Resilience Centre (SRC), Stockholm University, Sweden, Barth J., Briens F., C. Kerschner, Kraus-Polk A., Kuokkanen A., Spangenberg J.H. (Timothee, July, Decoupling Debunked: Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability, *European Environmental Bureau*, https://mk0eeborgicuypctuf7e.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Decoupling-Debunked.pdf)

Not leading to relevant innovations

Innovation is not in and of itself a good thing for ecological sustainability. The desirable type of innovation is eco-innovation or one that results “in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of resources use compared to relevant alternatives” (Kemp and Pearson, 2008, p.5). But this is only one type among several. In general, firms have an incentive to innovate to economise on the most expensive factors of production to maximise profits. Because labour and capital are usually relatively more expensive than natural resources, more technological progress will likely continue to be directed towards labour- and capital-saving innovations, with limited benefits, if any, for resource productivity and a potential rise in absolute impacts due to more production. But decoupling will not occur if technological innovations contribute to saving labour and capital while leaving resource use and environmental degradation unchanged. Another issue is that technologies do not only solve environmental problems but also tend to create new ones. Assuming that resource productivity becomes a priority over labour and capital productivity, there is still nothing preventing technological innovations from creating more damage. For example, research into processes of extractions can lead to better ways to locate resources (imaging technologies and data analytics), to extract them (horizontal drilling, hydraulic fracturing, and automated drilling operations), and to transport them (Arctic shipping routes). These innovations may target resource use but with a result opposite to the objective of decoupling, that is more extraction. And this is not even considering unintended side-effects, which often accompany the development of new technologies (Grunwald, 2018).

Not disruptive enough

Another problem has to do with the replacement of harmful technologies. Indeed, it is not enough for new technologies to emerge (innovation), they must also come to replace the old ones in a process of “exnovation” (Kimberly, 1981). What is required is a “push and pull strategy” (Rockström et al., 2017): pushing environmentally-friendly technologies into society and pulling harmful ones, like fossil-based infrastructure, out of it. First, in reality, such a process is slow and difficult to trigger. Most polluting infrastructures (power plants, buildings and city structures, transport systems) require large investments, which then creates inertia and lock-in (Antal and van den Bergh, 2014, p. 3). Let us, for instance, consider the energy, buildings, and transport sectors, which account for the large majority of world energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Initial lifetime for a nuclear or a coal power plant is about 40 years. Buildings can last at least as much. The average lifetime for a car is 12-15 years, and this is about what it takes for an innovation to spread in the vehicle fleet. The wide availability of petrol refuelling stations gives an infrastructural advantage to petrol-based cars, whereas this is the opposite situation for electric, gas, or hydrogen vehicles that would require different and new supporting infrastructures. Building a highway or a nuclear plant is a commitment to emit for at least as long as these infrastructures will last – Davis and Socolow (2014) speak of “committed emissions.” Energy is a good case in point: using more renewable energy is not the same as using less fossil fuels. The history of energy use is not one of substitutions but rather of successive additions of new sources of energy. As new energy sources are discovered, developed, and deployed, the old sources do not decline, instead, total energy use grows with additional layers on the energy mix cake. York (2012) finds that each unit of energy use from non-fossil fuel sources displaced less than one-quarter of a unit of its fossil-fuel counterpart, showing empirical support for the claim that expanding renewable energies is far from enough to curb fossil fuel consumption. The relative part of coal in the global energy mix has been reduced since the advent of petroleum but this occurred in spite of absolute growth in the use of coal (Krausmann et al., 2009).

#### Renewables only solve 18% of growth-based emissions.

Alexander, 15—lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne (Samuel, *Sufficiency Economy* pg 109-110, dml)

There is one point deserving of further emphasis. In response to the problems of climate change and peak oil, many people naturally hold up renewable energy as the salvation of civilisation, arguing that all we need to do is transition to renewable energy and the problems of peak oil and climate change will be resolved. The problem is that it is highly doubtful that renewable energy will ever be able to sustain a growth-orientated, industrial civilisation. Although it may be technically feasible from an engineering perspective, the problems of intermittency and storage make renewable energy supply much more expensive and problematic than most analysts think (see Moriarty and Honnery, 2012; Trainer, 2013a; Trainer, 2013b). Even if electricity could be affordably supplied by renewables, electricity only constitutes about 18% of final energy consumption (IEA, 2012), meaning that there is still around 82% of energy to replace, including oil used for transport, pesticides, and plastics, etc. If we try to produce that remaining segment of energy with biofuels, the production of biofuels would compete with land for food production, a conflict that also seems to be already underway, despite the relatively low levels of biofuels production today (Timilsina, 2014). Biofuels also have a very low energy return on investment – between 1 and 3 (Murphy, 2014: 12), suggesting that they will never be able to sustain an industrial civilisation, as we know it today.

### Growth Unsustainable — 2NC

#### Financialization — make unsustainable credit bubbles and cyclical collapses inevitable.

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THE INTRINSIC INSTABILITY OF FINANCE

Finance markets radically differ from markets for goods and services. Whereas in normal times rising prices weaken demand in the real economy, the opposite is generally true of ﬁnancial securities: the ‘more prices increase, the more these securities are in demand. The same applies the other way around: during a crisis, the fall in prices engenders ﬁre sales, which translate into the acceleration of the price collapse. This peculiarity of ﬁnancial products derives from the fact that their purchase — dissociated from any use-value — corresponds to a purely speculative rationale; the objective is to obtain surplus-value by reselling them at a higher price at some later point. Blinded to the disaster of the inevitable reverse, agents take on more and more debt in order to buy the assets that the bubble is forming around. Moreover, the self-sustaining price rise fuelled by agents’ expectations is further exaggerated by credit. Indebtedness increases prices, and since the securities can serve as the counterpart to fresh loans, their increasing value allows agents to take on more debt. We ﬁnd this same mechanism in most speculative episodes, from the seventeenth-century Netherlands to the subprime crisis. In the former case, the speculation was on tulip bulbs; in the latter case, on residential properties.

The ﬁnancial instability hypothesis allows us to inscribe these speculation dynamics in an understanding of economic cycles. Minsky sets out from the recognition that capitalist economies experience periods of acceleration and inﬂation and periods in which they are caught in deflationary spirals in which debts become unsustainable. The 1960s and 1970s corresponded to the ﬁrst dynamic and the 1930s (paradigmatically so) to the second, as described by the economist Irving Fischer in 1933. The latter dynamic comes about when economic agents trying to meet the deadlines on their debt repayments are forced to sell what they have at discounted prices. This brings a general down- ward movement in prices and diminished revenues, and ultimately leads to a growth in the weight of debt relative to income. This in turn unleashes a self-sustaining movement toward depression, which only state intervention can interrupt.

According to Minsky, this alternation of cycles cannot be explained by the play of real macroeconomic relations alone. Following Michal Kalecki, the post-Keynesian tradition supposes that, at the macro- economic level, companies’ proﬁts ﬂow from their own investment decisions (‘the capitalists earn what they spend’). Minsky himself adopts this hypothesis, but suggests that it must be complicated by taking ﬁnancial relations into account.6 The past, present and future are linked not only by accumulated capital and labour power, but also by credit:

the inherent instability of capitalism is due to the way proﬁts depend upon investment, the validation of business debts depends upon proﬁts, and investment depends upon the availability of external ﬁnancing. But the availability of ﬁnancing presupposes that prior debts and the prices that were paid for capital assets are being val- idated by proﬁts. Capitalism is unstable because it is a ﬁnancial and accumulating system with yesterdays, todays, and tomorrows!

Credit relations are far from simple, for bankers and ﬁnancial intermediaries are capitalists like any other: since they are in competition with one another and seek to make proﬁts, they must constantly innovate. The result is a complex web of ﬁnancial mechanisms that separate the ultimate owners of wealth from the managers of the enter- prises that control and exploit this wealth. Finance’s tendency toward increased sophistication leads to three possible systems of relations between income and debts. The ﬁrst corresponds to a situation in which economic actors’ incomes cover their repayment obligations: thus ﬁnancial relations are solid and pose no problems to the overall reproduction of the economy. The second possibility is the establish- ment of speculative relations in which some economic units keep their debt rolling (they can only repay the interest, but not the principal). Such a conﬁguration produces vulnerability, and the slightest cojunctural difﬁculty risks tipping the situation into the third possibility: the development of Ponzi structures, where income ﬂows are insufficient to repay either the principal or the interest on the debt. The consequence is that indebtedness can only increase, ultimately leading to bankruptcies.

The stability of economies is largely dependent on the respective weights of these three types of ﬁnancing relations. Minsky enjoys a certain posthumous renown because he emphasised that across periods of prolonged prosperity, economies gradually evolve toward a ﬁnancing structure that makes the system unstable. Starting from a situation where ﬁnancial relations covered by incomes are predominant, they move on to a situation in which speculative ﬁnancial activities, and then Ponzi systems, become increasingly important, to the point that the insolvability of a small number of agents will end up provoking a collapse in asset prices. As Figure 2 shows, during periods of relative stability, the quest for proﬁt leads to the development of ﬁnancial innovations that accelerate credit circulation and reduce the quality of securities, which inevitably results in ﬁnancial crisis or even a crisis in the real economy. Falling asset prices and the contraction of credit feed one another: agents in ﬁnancial distress are forced to sell their holdings a whatever price they can; companies which are no longer able to obtain credit lay off staff, cut wages and lower the prices of their products; deflation leads to a growth in the weight of debts relative to less sustainable and threatens agents whose euphoric period becomes ever less sustainable and threatens agents whose economic situation had up till then seemed solid.

#### Boom and bust cycles — debt fuels instability.

Rammelt 19, PhD from the University of Amsterdam in Environmental Studies (Crelis, June 17th, “Capitalism inevitably leads to crises: alternative economic model explains how,” <https://ontgroei.degrowth.net/capitalism-inevitably-leads-to-crises-alternative-economic-model-explains-how/)>

Capitalism typically goes through cycles of expansion to contraction. We commonly refer to these as ‘business cycles’ or ‘economic cycles’. Every now and then, however, these cycles go off the hinges. They become unstable and can lead to recessions, crises and depressions. This inherent instability of the capitalist system cannot be explained by standard economic models. Instead, those models blame instability on excessive regulation, government interventions or other factors outside the market-economic system. Some unorthodox economists see it differently. Steve Keen, for example, developed an alternative kind of economic model—one that can mimic instability. The model provides compelling and urgent insights into how economic crises arise from within the structures of capitalism. Another crisis seems inevitable as long as the causes are misdiagnosed.

During a briefing on the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, Queen Elizabeth II asked academics at the London School of Economics why nobody saw it coming. The response was:

“Your Majesty, the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole”.

But in reality, many did see it coming (Bezemer 2009). They were simply looking at it from a different angle.

Neoliberal economists typically look for explanations that have little to do with the economic system itself, such as a political event, a bad policy or some other so-called ‘exogenous’ factor—something that originates from outside the economic system as such. In the words of a neoliberal think-tank:

“[I]t’s not capitalism that falls over, it’s those attempts to constrain it too rigidly”.

Alternative—mostly Marxian and post-Keynesian—explanations for the instabilities have been sought within the structure of the economic system itself. One such explanation is provided by heterodox economist Hyman Minsky. His argument is summarised in the following two-minutes excerpt from the documentary ‘Boom, Bust, Boom’.

Hyman Minsky suggested that stability leads to instability—a hypothesis that standard economics cannot effectively test. Economic models normally emphasise equilibrium between supply and demand. When there is a difference between the two, the market is assumed to balance this out. The transition from one equilibrium to another is assumed to be stable and any delay in the transition is perceived as irrelevant. However, real-world economies are hardly ever in equilibrium because of all sorts of delays in information or in getting goods on and off the market. As observed by Irving Fisher, one of Minsky’s inspirations:

“the exact equilibrium thus sought is seldom reached and never long maintained. New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below the ideal equilibrium” (Fisher 1933:339).

The idea of perpetual disequilibrium was picked up by Marxist economist Richard Goodwin. He proposed a model of a growing, yet always fluctuating, economy. In his model, high employment during phases of economic expansion pushes wages upward, which suppresses profits and leads to a reduction in investment. The contraction reduces employment and wages fall. This again increases profits and boosts investment (Goodwin, 1967). In short, downturns are caused by the increased bargaining power of workers—a result of high employment in upturn periods. A deceleration in the rate of growth brings about an acceleration, which brings about a deceleration again, etc. These fluctuations are driven by the internal clock of the economy, not by some external cause. In Marx’s own words:

“The mechanism of the capitalist production process removes the very obstacles that it temporarily creates” (Marx 1976:770).

Goodwin perceived a so-called predator–prey structure in the arguments put forward by Marx. As foxes eat chickens, chicken reproduction drops, which leaves fewer chickens for foxes to eat in the near future. Consequently, the fox population drops, which then allows the chicken population to rebuild. As its food source becomes available again, the fox population also rebuilds and the cycle starts again. In a predator–prey structure, the size of one population is continuously oscillating being constrained by the size of the other.Similarly, Goodwin’s model showed how economic cycles of expansion and contraction can be explained by “the inherent conflict and complementarity of workers and capitalists” (Goodwin 1967:8).

Goodwin’s model mimics perpetual cyclical behaviour. However, cycles sometimes amplify and become unstable. As explained in the earlier video fragment, the reason according to Hyman Minsky is an increase in private sector credit, or debt-fuelled growth.

#### marked

Economist Steve Keen recently incorporated Minsky’s hypothesis in Richard Goodwin’s model. Unlike standard economic models, Keen’s system dynamics model can generate instability as one of its outcomes. The model effectively mimics the behaviour of key indicators prior to, during and after the 2007/08 global financial crisis: dampening cycles in the short run and widening cycles in the long run—followed by collapse. The dynamic is visualised in the graph below.

To understand how the Keen’s model works, we must first ask: what is money? Nowadays, money is generally understood as a currency, i.e., a medium of exchange or a unit of account. However, money is also debt. This happens when credit is created by banks to be invested in the real economy, and to be paid back with interest. Credit money then appears in the economic system as a bank deposit (Daly & Farley 2012). This sort of debt reinforces itself: the more firms grow, the more confidence they enjoy, the more loans they get, the more they grow, and so on. It should be noted that it is in the interest of banks that the private sector gets and stays indebted to them. In the words of Willem Hoogendijk:

“Business needing money is caused by money needing business” (Hoogendijk 2015:9).

With an understanding of money as debt, let’s get back to Keen’s model. This is how it works. In the short run, the interest payments on rising debt reduce profits and investment. The next peak is lessened and the oscillations gradually dampen. In the long run, however, debt has continued to accumulate

#### . Higher and growing interest payments reduce investment and employment, which leads to a more rapidly falling wage bill. This causes a surge in profits, loans and investment. This again boosts employment, raises the wage bill, and so on. Rather than dampened, however, the cycles now become more intense. Eventually, the peak is so extreme that the incurred debt brings profit down below zero and keeps it there. The system collapses (Keen, 1995).

(Keen’s model is much more detailed that what I have described here. As a start, you can find a description of a simpler version of his model in Rammelt (2019). You can also play around with the model itself here. For deeper insights into the topic, I suggest listening to Steve Keen’s lectures here.)

The ultimate question is: “Can ‘It’—a Great Depression—happen again?” Minsky famously asked. Standard economics does not provide the right toolset to reflect on this questions. It is high time to look outside of conventional textbooks:

“the dynamic, non-equilibrium social system that is a market economy should be analysed with dynamic, non-equilibrium tools” (Keen 2011:33).

If crises in pure free-market capitalism are inevitable, as Minsky, Keen and others have concluded, it is then also high time to consider systemic alternatives.

One such alternative is degrowth. The movement asserts that economic expansion fails to achieve meaningful social and environmental goals, while slowdown destabilises the inner workings of the current economic system itself. Indeed, recessions, unemployment and foreclosures loom when the mechanisms of debt-fuelled growth slow down. The degrowth movement asks how we can escape this prison?

#### Stranded assets.

Cambridge 18, Citing a study conducted by researchers from Cambridge University (UK), Radboud University (NL), the Open University (UK), Macau University, and Cambridge Econometrics (University of Cambridge, June 4th, "'Carbon bubble' coming that could wipe trillions from the global economy: study,” *Phys*, https://phys.org/news/2018-06-carbon-trillions-global-economy.html)

Fossil fuel stocks have long been a safe financial bet. With the International Energy Agency projecting price rises until 2040, and governments prevaricating or rowing back on the Paris Agreement, investor confidence is set to remain high. However, new research suggests that the momentum behind technological change in the global power and transportation sectors will lead to a dramatic decline in demand for fossil fuels in the near future. The study indicates that this will now happen regardless of apparent market certainty or the adoption of climate policies—or lack thereof—by major nations. Detailed simulations produced by an international team of economists and policy experts show this fall in demand has the potential to leave vast reserves of fossil fuels as "stranded assets": abruptly shifting from high to low value sometime before 2035. Such a sharp slump in fossil fuel price could cause a huge "carbon bubble" built on long-term investments to burst. According to the study, the equivalent of between one and four trillion US dollars could be wiped off the global economy in fossil fuel assets alone. A loss of US$0.25 trillion triggered the crash of 2008 by comparison. Publishing their findings today in the journal Nature Climate Change, researchers from Cambridge University (UK), Radboud University (NL), the Open University (UK), Macau University, and Cambridge Econometrics, argue that there will be clear economic winners and losers as a consequence. Japan, China and many EU nations currently rely on high-cost fossil fuel imports to meet energy needs. They could see national expenditure fall and—with the right investment in low-carbon technologies—a boost to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as increased employment in sustainable industries. However, major carbon exporters with relatively high production costs, such as Canada, the United States and Russia, would see domestic fossil fuel industries collapse. Researchers warn that losses will only be exacerbated if incumbent governments continue to neglect renewable energy in favour of carbon-intensive economies. The study repeatedly ran simulations to gauge the outcomes of numerous combinations of global economic and environmental change. It is the first time that the evolution of low-carbon technologies has been mapped from historical data and incorporated into 'integrated assessment modeling'. "Until now, observers mostly paid attention to the likely effectiveness of climate policies, but not to the ongoing and effectively irreversible technological transition," said Dr. Jean-Francois Mercure, study lead author from Radboud University and Cambridge University's Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance (C-EENRG). Prof Jorge Viñuales, study co-author from Cambridge University and founder of C-EENRG, said: "Our analysis suggests that, contrary to investor expectations, the stranding of fossil fuels assets may happen even without new climate policies. This suggests a carbon bubble is forming and it is likely to burst."

### Transition — 2NC

#### Economic crisis is a game changer that powers existing movements---austerity fuels existing dissatisfaction with capitalism and globalization.

Flor Avelino 14, transition researcher and lecturer at DRIFT, Erasmus University Rotterdam, scientific coordinator of the Transformative Social Innovation research project, “Game Changers and Transformative Social Innovation: The Case of the Economic Crisis and the New Economy,” 2014, http://www.transitsocialinnovation.eu/content/original/Book%20covers/Local%20PDFs/178%20TRANSIT\_WorkingPaper1\_Gamechangers\_Avelino.pdf

The economic crisis is generally perceived to have profound impacts on society. The resulting ‘austerity’ measures and governmental budget cuts put pressure on public sector employment, transfer payments and social welfare systems, contributing to rising un- and under- employment among young and old and lower disposable incomes for many in society. There is also a growing dissatisfaction with capitalism leading, among others, to a rise of responsibility pressures on companies, a lack of trust in financial institutions, and a growing pressure on democratic political institutions (Castells 2010; Murphy 2011; Hudson 2014; Rifkin 2014; Weaver 2014). These in turn focus attention on the meaning and quality of life which can intensify individuals’ desires to live in a more responsible and meaningful way as citizens, workers and consumers, which again are accompanied by an increasing attention to social value creation (based on the attention to these issues in magazines and business literature).

Intertwined with these developments are counter-narratives and movements that propose alternative visions. From anti-globalisation or occupy movements, we can discern a loss of trust in the dominant economic model of the growth society and its associated livelihood model where most material needs are satisfied through impersonal market exchange. This formalised and impersonal market exchange is questioned, resulting in concepts such as sharing, reciprocity, generalized exchange, or restricted exchange (see Befu 1977, Peebles 2010 for an overview). These are reflected in calls for a more localized or sharing economy, which are now heard increasingly in many Western countries. While the mainstream discourse is still about how to regain adequate rates of economic growth, and underlying longer-sighted discourse (i.e. counternarrative) is emerging about what might replace the growth-society model. This includes (longstanding and more recent) ideas on de-growth (Schumacher 1973, Fournier 2008), green growth (OECD 2013), or post growth (Jackson 2009). These (counter-)narratives also question the market logic that constructs human beings as well as nature as resources and commodities in the production of goods (Freudenburg et al. 1995).

Contemporary discourses on a ‘new economy’ include calls to replace, complement, or transform the mainstream economic system with alternative paradigms. These include a wide variety of notions, e.g. ‘social economy’, ‘informal economy’, ‘solidary economy’, ‘sharing economy’, the ‘cooperative movement’, ‘the commons’, ‘green economy’, ‘blue economy’, ‘circular economy’, and so on (e.g. Rifkin, 2014). Many of these narratives and associated ideas are not necessarily ‘new’ as such. Indeed many have existed for decades (or even centuries), but the ‘game-changing’ economic crisis has triggered new and revitalised interest in these narratives, thereby translating relatively ‘old’ narratives into a modern narrative on ‘the new, social economy’ as a forward-looking response to contemporary challenges (ibid).

#### Transition will be forced---crisis causes degrowth by involuntarily ending growth.

Giorgos Kallis 18, ICREA Research Professor at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, environmental scientist working on ecological economics and political ecology, formerly Marie Curie International Fellow at the Energy and Resources Group of the University of California at Berkeley, PhD in Environmental Policy and Planning from the University of the Aegean in Greece, et al., 5/31/18, “Annual Review of Environment and Resources: Research On Degrowth,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources, Vol. 43, p. 308-309

The fate of such openings will play out amid coevolutionary processes involving institutional organization, technology, environmental conditions, values, and knowledge (149). Although current worlds seem trapped in continuity, history is rife with surprise, fueled by the incessant creativity of humans and their ability to come up with new ways of seeing the world and new forms of living and producing their societies and their environments (150). ¶ From this perspective, recent debates on the possibility of voluntary paths to degrowth versus the more probable event of forced reductions provoked by an involuntary crash (10, 77) is misleading (78). Change is always voluntary and is always enacted through unchosen conditions (such as the availability of fossil fuels or the thermodynamics of production processes). History is shaped by collective action or inaction. As economic growth falters and as the toll of its limits and costs becomes unbearable, a transition in the direction of something akin to degrowth could emerge from dynamics among unforeseeable reactions, experiments, adaptations, and political struggles. Such a transition does not have to be in the name of degrowth. As with the eco-communes of Barcelona that Cattaneo & Gavalda (107) studied, the reduction of resource use can be the outcome of broader processes of social transformation driven by an ambition to co-live autonomously and democratically (1). ¶ In contexts where life under growth is already disastrous for many people, and threatens to become even more so with climate change and the overshooting of planetary boundaries, literature reviewed here studies, envisages, and advocates changes in institutions, policies, values, understandings, and everyday modes of living. Without the voluntary work to conceive and embody alternative ideas, explanations, practices, and institutions today, an involuntary end to growth may well lead to a state of continual economic depression in which islands of wealth are sustained in seas of deprivation, without pretense of democracy and social justice.

### Framing — 2NC

#### Politics can change, but biophysical limits can’t — degrowth is more feasible than green growth.

Lenzen & Keyßer 21, Dr. Manfred Lenzen: Professor of Sustainability Research at Integrated Sustainability Analysis (ISA) in the School of Physics at the University of Sydney. Lorenz T. Keyßer: University of Sydney (May 11th, 1.5 °C degrowth scenarios suggest the need for new mitigation pathways, *Nature Communications* 12, 2676 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-22884-9)

Political and economic feasibility. Compared with technology driven pathways, it is clear that a degrowth transition faces tremendous political barriers9,49. As Kallis et al.9 state, currently (p. 18) ‘[a]bandoning economic growth seems politically impossible’, as it implies significant changes to current capitalist socioeconomic systems in order to overcome its growth imperatives9,19,49. Degrowth, moreover, challenges deeply embedded cultures, values, mind-sets21 and power structures9,19. However, as Jewell & Cherp state, political feasibility is softer than socio-technical feasibility25, with high actor motivation potentially compensating for low action capacity and social change being complex, non-linear and essentially unpredictable50. Political feasibility further depends to a large extent on social movements formulating and pushing for the implementation of political programs, changing values, practices and cultures and building alternative institutions49,51 as well as scientists pointing the way to alternative paradigms49. Consequently, degrowth implies modifications to the strategies for change, with a stronger focus on bottom–up social movements9,19,49. As many research questions on degrowth remain open9,19 and the state of political feasibility can change with better knowledge about and awareness of alternative paradigms, strengthened social movements and a clearer understanding about transition processes49–51, it is even more crucial to investigate degrowth pathways.

### Offense — 2NC

#### Decline increases cooperation.

Christina L. **Davis &** Krzysztof J. **Pelc 17**, Christina L. Davis is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton; Krzysztof J. Pelc is an Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University, “Cooperation in Hard Times: Self-restraint of Trade Protection,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2): 398-429

Conclusion Political economy theory would lead us to expect rising trade protection during hard times. Yet empirical evidence on this count has been mixed. Some studies find a correlation between poor macroeconomic conditions and protection, but the worst recession since the Great Depression has generated surprisingly moderate levels of protection. We explain this apparent contradiction. Our statistical findings show that under conditions of pervasive economic crisis at the international level, states exercise more restraint than they would when facing crisis alone. These results throw light on behavior not only during the crisis, but throughout the WTO period, from 1995 to the present. One concern may be that the restraint we observe during widespread crises is actually the result of a decrease in aggregate demand and that domestic pressure for import relief is lessened by the decline of world trade. By controlling for product-level imports, we show that the restraint on remedy use is not a byproduct of declining imports. We also take into account the ability of some countries to manipulate their currency and demonstrate that the relationship between crisis and trade protection holds independent of exchange rate policies. Government decisions to impose costs on their trade partners by taking advantage of their legal right to use flexibility measures are driven not only by the domestic situation but also by circumstances abroad. This can give rise to an individual incentive for strategic self-restraint toward trade partners in similar economic trouble. Under conditions of widespread crisis, government leaders fear the repercussions that their own use of trade protection may have on the behavior of trade partners at a time when they cannot afford the economic cost of a trade war. Institutions provide monitoring and a venue for leader interaction that facilitates coordination among states. Here the key function is to reinforce expectations that any move to protect industries will trigger similar moves in other countries. Such coordination often draws on shared historical analogies, such as the Smoot–Hawley lesson, which form a focal point to shape beliefs about appropriate state behavior. Much of the literature has focused on the more visible action of legal enforcement through dispute settlement, but this only captures part of the story. Our research suggests that tools of informal governance such as leader pledges, guidance from the Director General, trade policy reviews, and plenary meetings play a real role within the trade regime. In the absence of sufficiently stringent rules over flexibility measures, compliance alone is insufficient during a global economic crisis. These circumstances trigger informal mechanisms that complement legal rules to support cooperation. During widespread crisis, legal enforcement would be inadequate, and informal governance helps to bolster the system. Informal coordination is by nature difficult to observe, and we are unable to directly measure this process. Instead, we examine the variation in responses across crises of varying severity, within the context of the same formal setting of the WTO. Yet by focusing on discretionary tools of protection—trade remedies and tariff hikes within the bound rate—we can offer conclusions about how systemic crises shape country restraint independent of formal institutional constraints. Insofar as institutions are generating such restraint, we offer that it is by facilitating informal coordination, since all these instruments of trade protection fall within the letter of the law. Future research should explore trade policy at the micro level to identify which pathway is the most important for coordination. Research at a more macro-historical scope could compare how countries respond to crises under fundamentally different institutional contexts. In sum, the determinants of protection include economic downturns not only at home but also abroad. Rather than reinforcing pressure for protection, pervasive crisis in the global economy is shown to generate countervailing pressure for restraint in response to domestic crisis. In some cases, hard times bring more, not less, international cooperation.

#### Empirics prove austerity pressures overwhelm.

Christopher **Clary 15**, Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 22, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5 Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination? Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### There are empirical inconsistencies, and increasing interdependence causes uncertainty about state resolve which raises conflict risk – it’s offense because the uncertainty effect is stronger than peaceful effects

Spaniel and Malone 3/5/19 [William Spaniel, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. Iris Malone, Department of Political Science, Stanford. The Uncertainty Tradeoff: Re-Examining Opportunity Costs and War. March 5, 2019. <https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/uncertainty-tradeoff-final.pdf>] **Italics in original**

However, not all scholars believe opportunity costs are a panacea for war.2 The historical record contains empirical inconsistencies in this relationship. At times, conflicts have arisen despite increased economic interdependence between parties, fueling concerns over when and whether opportunity costs reduce conflict. We therefore ask a simple question: holding all else equal, does increasing opportunity costs for war decrease the probability of conflict?3

In this paper, we develop a model that reconciles this puzzle by showing both proponents and skeptics of the opportunity cost mechanism are right. Instruments like trade have competing effects on the probability of war. How is this true? Despite raising the price of war, opportunity costs also have an indirect, second-order effect of exacerbating uncertainty about a state’s resolve, which is among the most popular mechanisms that explain war.4 Which effect is stronger? We show that the latter effect can dominate in equilibrium—that is, the probability of war increases *despite* raising opportunity costs.

#### As economic costs of war grow, they incentivize more aggressive negotiation strategies that exploit leverage – that makes conflicts more likely

Spaniel and Malone 3/5/19 [William Spaniel, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh. Iris Malone, Department of Political Science, Stanford. The Uncertainty Tradeoff: Re-Examining Opportunity Costs and War. March 5, 2019. <https://wjspaniel.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/uncertainty-tradeoff-final.pdf>]

The intuition falls back on screening models where a proposer is uncertain about its opponent’s willingness to fight. Broadly, the uninformed state can pursue two strategies under these conditions. First, it can offer a generous amount that resolved types would accept. This has the benefit of avoiding the costs of war. Alternatively, it can propose a stingy settlement and screen the opponent’s willingness to fight, causing unresolved types to accept while inducing resolved types to reject. The latter benefits the proposer by giving it a large share of the settlement when the opponent accepts, but also forces it to pay the costs of war if its screening offer backfires.

When the difference between the costs of war for types is small, the proposing state has less incentive to screen. Why? Screening still forces the proposer to risk war, but the prospective gains from such a settlement are minimal. However, as the costs of conflict grow, a state is more likely to issue more aggressive demands because of a divergence in relative valuations among types. As the difference in relative costs between types increases, stingy offer strategies become more attractive. For the proposer, the increased screening incentives can outweigh the increased opportunity cost of conflict. This causes the proposer to risk war and trade breakdown by making more aggressive demands. Thus, increasing opportunity costs can have a countervailing effect of raising the risk of war even though these costs are common knowledge.

Our model verifies this counterintuitive relationship. It also generates comparative statics on when the uncertainty effect dominates over the opportunity cost effect. We focus on the role of opportunity costs in economic interdependence theory given its popularity. To preview, the effect arises as trade flows increase because a state cannot observe how its opponent weighs the benefits of trade relative to the costs of fighting. The probability of war increases when the state facing this uncertainty internalizes a larger portion of the military costs than the benefits of trade relative to their opponent’s internalization. The conditional effect introduced here suggests caution in making broad claims about the relationship between trade and war, though the scope conditions the model generates provide a straightforward substantive interpretation that scholars can exploit.

# 1NR

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### 1NR---AT: Condo

## CP---Advantage

## Inequality

### 1NR---!

#### Retrenchment key to a concert strategy---that unlocks global governance---solves multilat scenarios

Pampinella 19, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the State University of New York (SUNY) at New Paltz. He is on leave from SUNY New Paltz during Spring 2019 and is conducting research on the practice of diplomacy in the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry in Quito, Ecuador. (Stephen, 1-23-2019, "The Internationalist Disposition and US Grand Strategy", *Disorder of Things*, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/01/23/the-internationalist-disposition-and-us-grand-strategy/)

I think there is a strategy consistent with the international disposition: great power concert. A concert strategy requires that all great powers pursue mutual accommodation and recognize each other’s interests as part of a larger commitment to maintain international stability. Patrick Porter and Amitav Acharya argue that a great power concert strategy is the best suited to adapt to the transfer of wealth and power to Asia along with the “multiplex” nature of world politics (not to mention a global perspective on international relations). The emergence of a diverse range of state and non-state actors bound together by extreme interdependence makes it impossible for any one actor, such as the United States, to establish rules for global governance which can mobilize all others. On this basis, a concert strategy would lead the United States to collaborate with others on the basis of mutual co-existence and embrace joint decision-making at the global level for coping with macrostructural processes that threaten all peoples around the world. In this way, a concert strategy is firmly grounded the international disposition and can serve as the realization of progressive internationalism.

Security and The Balance of Power

A concert strategy can do what establishment foreign policy cannot, namely de-escalate great power competition by giving up US hegemony. If adopted, the United States would treat other great powers, like Russia, China, and Iran, as equal partners in the maintenance of global stability and incorporate their interests into regional security agreements. The United States would give up its self-assumed role as an unrivaled global hegemon and seek a balance of power based on mutual respect with other great powers as partners rather than enemies. This kind of international posture would result in a more horizontal great power system, one that Stacie Goddard as identified as being productive of status quo rather than revisionist intentions. It would be compatible with recognition of the great power identities of other states and provide them with ontological security.

Transitioning from a hegemonic security strategy to a balance of power one will require that the United States engage in some degree of retrenchment from its already expansive commitments. But supporters of hegemony are wrong when they claim that retrenchment will encourage great power aggression and lead to the abandonment of our allies. The United States can engage in moderate forms of retrenchment consistent with great power recognition while still maintaining commitments to allies that strive to uphold human dignity. For example, were the United States to support a moratorium on NATO expansion, as Michael O’Hanlon suggests, it would signal that the United States is no longer interested in moving the frontiers of its influence to the gates of Moscow and remove the sense of threat experienced by Russian leaders. By recognizing the validity of Russian security interests as well as its great power identity, the equal relationship made possible by a concert strategy will better deal with the threat of interstate conflict compared to US hegemony.

Reviving Global Governance

A concert strategy informed by the internationalist disposition can further enable more robust forms of global governance. Rather than attempt international cooperation based on a priori liberal normative templates, the United States would accept the validity of all claims made by collective actors in world politics in an open-ended and inclusive process of deliberation. The result would be less of a hegemonic order and more of a constitutionalist one, in which the United States binds itself to a truly democratic process of decision-making at the global level. The emergence of global governance norms would be a function less of hegemonic socialization and more of a right held by all actors to contest the validity of standards of expected behavior. In other words, a concert strategy would enable the United States to accept processes of norm contestation as the motor of transnational cooperation and generate more legitimate rules for regulating global governance. It would expand the US order building project initially identified by Ikenberry on the basis of restraint and institutional self-binding, but without retaining its own hierarchical position in world politics or engaging in hypocritical forms of dominance.

The implications for economic governance are profound: the United States would no longer exclude from consideration the notion of social democratic regulation of global capitalism and instead promote non-capitalist perspectives on the economy. Todd Tucker provides one great example of this approach when he argues that ISDS arbitration should include labor leaders and social justice advocates rather than international lawyers chosen by multinational firms which initiate legal action against sovereign states. It would also enable the United States to seriously consider Piketty’s call for a global wealth tax, Palley and Chow’s call for minimum wage floors, and a binding multilateral treaty that regulates global business activities on the basis of human rights. And finally, it would enable the drastic shift away from fossil fuels necessary to avoid climate apocalypse.

In Search of a Global Public

Naysayers might argue that all this degree of international cooperation sounds idealist, but all are possible in a context of declining great power competition. Once the United States recognizes the equal membership of all others in world politics on the basis of our extreme interdependencies, it can make possible what Mitzen has referred to as collective intentionality, or the emergence of a plural subject composed of several individuals who make and uphold joint commitments to each other and demand adherence as members of a global public. This kind of action is what the internationalist disposition can help us conceptualize, and even realize, through a concert strategy.

If progressive internationalists want to realize their objectives, they should be willing to turn away from the US establishment and embrace a concert strategy. By prioritizing cooperation on non-state issues and resolving great power competition through equal recognition, they can realize security for their own citizens as well as others. However, IR constructivists remind us that no foreign policy can be enacted by policymakers without a legitimating national security narrative. Progressive internationalists must continue to develop a new story about the United States that rationalizes a concert strategy and renders US national identity compatible with the pluralism we find in both world politics and US domestic politics. To develop this narrative, progressive internationalists should engage radical critiques of democracy, like those offered by Chantal Mouffe, which seek maximal inclusion of others and accept difference and conflict as irreducible elements of political life. A pluralist strategic narrative can thereby serve as the basis for mutual respect of others and enable the democratization of world politics.

#### Pursuing heg causes illiberal populism---financial strain, xenophobia, and welfare cuts.

Blagden & Porter 21, \*David, Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Exeter, \*\*Patrick, Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. (2-21-2021, “Desert Shield of the Republic? A Realist Case for Abandoning the Middle East”, *Security Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2021.1885727, pg. 33-37) \*typo corrected---brackets

Embroilment in the Middle East damages America’s republic, its institutions, and the wider health of its civic life. More than Europe or Asia, the pursuit of Middle Eastern hegemony in its current condition, which shows no sign of easing, damages democracy at home. Not only is the region volatile, violently contested, and difficult to stabilize. It is also where the interests of the superpower and its clients are most misaligned.

America’s wars in the Middle East contribute to the coarsening and corruption of its public life and politics. While division and disagreement are inherent to democracy, some forms of polarization threaten a republic’s survival, if political actors reject mutual tolerance and their opponents’ legitimacy. Two decades of conflict in the name of combating global terrorism and defeating alien enemies accentuated the rise of an unhealthy, xenophobic, and paranoid populism. By “populism,” we mean specifically a politics that is not only critical of elites, but a politics that is an antipluralist, authoritarian form of identitarian division, pitting a virtuous people against illegitimate “non-people,” outsiders and elites, propagating a violent intolerance.106

In particular, embroilment in disappointing wars in the Middle East contributed to Trump’s election to the presidency. Active-duty personnel [were] was twice as likely to choose Trump over Hillary Clinton. And as a recent study found, based on regression that controlled for alternative explanatory variables, there is “a significant and meaningful relationship between a community’s rate of military sacrifice and its support for Trump … if three states key to Trump’s victory—Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin— had suffered even a modestly lower casualty rate, all three could have flipped from red to blue and sent Hillary Clinton to the White House.” 107 Other studies, likewise, suggest a causal linkage between rates of military sacrifice and voting behavior.108 Military communities represent important votes in the electoral college, in Sunbelt states such as South Carolina and Florida, and in Rust Belt states suffering deindustrialization such as Ohio and Pennsylvania. An aggrieved constituency of military veterans and their families and friends has formed, after bearing the brunt of America’s wars. Two-thirds of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans now say the wars were not worth fighting.109 Military suicides average 20 per day, higher than the general population rate.110 The linkage is further suggested by the migration of significant amounts of military donations to Senator Bernie Sanders’s election campaigns, Sanders having denounced Trump for breaking his word about ending perpetual wars.111 There remains a constituency open to the appeal of candidates denouncing the failure of US hegemony and its wars in the Middle East, a constituency that could again support Trumpian-style populism, or perhaps something more destructive.112 Indeed, after the insurrection in Washington, D.C., in January 2021, veterans appear to have been overrepresented among the violent mob that sacked the Capitol building, with almost one in five of those prosecuted having served in the military.113 Of course, most veterans do not express dissatisfaction with the existing order in this way, and those among the mob may have had motives other than disaffection with intractable warfare, but the dangers are apparent.

Most realists look at this with regret. For those concerned that continuous war threatens the republic, Trump’s rise was a bad thing, because he is authoritarian114 and thus inimical to republican traditions that look to prevent excessive concentrations of power, and because he (and his administration) have been corrupt. According to Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, the United States under Trump’s presidency fell six places from 2017, reflecting the “erosion of ethical norms at the highest levels of power.” 115 The Trump administration’s corrupt practices include the selling of diplomatic posts, attacks on the freedom of the press (for instance, revoking the press credentials of inquisitive reporters), family profiteering on the state, and coercing Ukraine to investigate domestic political opponents by withholding military aid.

Some caveats are in order. First, the wars since 2001 and Trump’s opposition to liberal hegemony were not the only cause of his political ascent. Nonetheless, registered Trump voters ranked foreign policy high among their priorities, suggesting his broader message—of putting America first, ending other countries’ free-riding at its expense, and that a self-serving establishment had failed the country by involving it in endless war—resonated.116 Neither did the problem begin with him and his “America First” movement. Trump was a symptom and a result of an increasingly damaged public life, while also embodying and exploiting a political revolt against it. And regular military campaigns are not a necessary condition for these problems: states can fall prey to harmful populism without continuous war, just as someone can develop lung cancer without regularly smoking. But just as smoking’s correlation with lung cancer reflects a demonstrated causal relationship, so too is there a causal link between continuous war and a state’s political condition. It would be naive, of course, to argue that simply abandoning one region would swiftly cure all ills of Western domestic politics. But it would be a valuable exorcism of one of the most corrupting influences—not least because, although Trump himself may have lost the 2020’s presidential election to a restorationist candidate (Joe Biden), some variant of Trumpism looks set to remain a potent force in US politics for the foreseeable future.

Primacy realists, like liberal hawks, are strangely inattentive to the domestic, constitutional, and civic impact of hegemony on American life. Primacists who advocate more primacy, with increased defense spending purchased through reductions in collective provision (such as welfare entitlements and social security), betray a perverse attitude to means and ends. US hegemony and power projection become the end rather than the means to protecting US security interests and safeguarding a healthy civic life. The consensus among security experts in Washington is to assume only a state of preponderance over all rivals will suffice.117 They assume the problem lies in Washington’s failure to apply enough power efficiently enough. The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission report, produced by a congressionally appointed bipartisan committee of national security experts, is a case in point. It takes dominance as America’s obvious national interest. It complains that as rivals challenge American power, US military superiority and its capacity to wage concurrent wars have eroded because of reduced defense expenditure, and advises that Washington spend yet more on military forces while further cutting entitlements.118 On this logic, a defense budget already ten times the size of Russia’s and four times the size of China’s cannot be enough, for US grand strategy must go beyond defense and deterrence to the achievement of unchallengeable strength. That the pursuit of dominance could be the source of the problem, not the answer, is under-considered.

America’s recent and current posture toward the region, and its particular mode of war-making, has led to deficit-financed, capital-intensive, and protracted wars. In turn, this results in concentrations of power at odds with the founding principles of the Constitution. It damages the authority of Congress, which has helped marginalize itself in foreign affairs policymaking and in checking the exertions of the executive branch. A state of near-permanent war became institutionalized. The Patriot Act wrought an era of secret sites, extraordinary rendition and torture, extrajudicial assassinations on an industrial scale, and involvement in the aggression of client states, without the influence such involvement was supposed to generate. The apparatus of unaccountable, secretive powers stretched also to “national security letters,” exorbitant instruments of state power whereby the federal authorities can audit and investigate an individual while prohibiting them from seeking counsel or informing anyone.

This era of institutionalized war, with military activity of varying intensity across eighty countries, has also exacerbated inequality and social strain.119 The wars since 2001 were “credit card” wars, financed by borrowing, and fought by a volunteer military. This financing helped to secure political acquiescence by shifting immediate burdens away from most citizens.120 Consequences for the population still flowed. Wealthy individuals and institutions were able to enrich themselves by purchasing bonds, while all others must take on the fiscal burden of repaying the (increasingly vast) debt. Indirect taxes also are regressive, as increased sales, value-added, excise, and customs taxes fall more on low and middle-income households, for whom spending is a larger share of disposable income, just as various forms of inflation—another means of debt-servicing—most negatively affect that same demographic. The wars of the “market state,” which deploy grandiose rhetoric but impose burdens so inequitably, helped to entrench the oligarchic concentrations of wealth from which American civic life now suffers. Of course, America’s domestic political choice of a regressive taxation model is hardly the fault of its MENA allies. But the era of “forever war” centered on the greater Middle East, and the vast defense expenditure to which it contributes, explains a lot about why such taxes must be used so extensively while delivering so few domestic services to those who pay them. Furthermore, insofar as the United States has had to sell ever more debt abroad, facilitating the economic model (and associated industrialization strides) of a developing power such as China,121 this cycle of war and debt has contributed to both the rise of a US peer competitor and the decline of Western manufacturing. That, in turn, has eroded American working-class living standards, which is both a negative outcome on its own terms and a contributor to rising political polarization, populism, and strategic atrophy.

### 1NR---AT: Heg Good

### 1NR---AT: No Transition

#### Biden retrenches now---solves overextension.

Nuechterlein 20, PhD, professor of international relations at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. (Donald, 7-12-2020, "Biden and Trump are not far apart on foreign policy", *NewsAdvance*, https://newsadvance.com/opinion/columnists/nuechterlein\_don/biden-and-trump-are-not-far-apart-on-foreign-policy/article\_6c21d345-2c06-5423-b4d4-8f34005a2244.html)

When President Trump instructed the Pentagon to cut 9,500 troops from Germany, he was denounced by editorial writers, pundits, members of Congress, and European leaders. He also put a limit of 25,000 military personnel that can be stationed in Germany. Critics charged he was abandoning NATO.

Joe Biden didn’t join the chorus. It’s possible he agrees that America is overextended in Europe and needs to retrench. As the presidential campaign heats up, Trump and Biden agree on most foreign policy issues, except how to deal with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Regarding China, Europe, and the Persian Gulf, their positions are not in conflict, although they differ on tactics for handling them. They agree that Putin interfered in 2016 elections and that China is a dangerous threat to U.S. global interests. They share the view that a nuclear-armed Iran would be dangerous in the Persian Gulf and to Israel. In sum, the two candidates believe America must reduce its involvement abroad, especially military presence, in order to strengthen itself for the long-term competition with China.

American foreign policy since World War II may be divided into three distinct periods that correspond to changing world conditions: 1. Containment, from 1948 to 1990 when the Cold War ended; 2. Globalization, from 1990 to 2008 when the U.S. was the sole superpower and promoted international trade and investments; 3. Retrenchment, 2009 to 2020 when Obama and Trump decided to limit America’s military and political exposure abroad. Here’s the situation today:

Russia and Europe. Biden hasn’t disagreed with Trump on major decisions on relations with Europe, or on sanctioning Russia for its moves into Ukraine and harassment of three Baltic States. His reticence to criticize Trump on his troop withdrawal from Germany and threat to impose tariffs on imports from the European Union reflects the reality on Capitol Hill: Democrats haven’t challenged the president on reducing the costs of stationing the military abroad, or on taking a stand against what he calls “unfair trade practices.” When Hillary Clinton eventually opposed Barack Obama’s Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement (TPP), that potential trade issue disappeared from the campaign.

A major issue for both parties is how to challenge Vladimir Putin’s determination to reestablish Russian influence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. The next president will need the cooperation of Western Europe’s leaders, particularly Germany’s because it emerged from the Cold War as the dominant economic and political power in Europe. Trump alienated European leaders with his anti-NATO rhetoric and U.S. tariffs on imports from Europe. Biden believes in cooperation with Europe and will make those views known in coming months.

China’s ambitions in Asia. There is consensus in Congress and the business community that China is a dangerous long-term threat to U.S. interests in Asia and potentially in Europe. In just twenty years, Communist China has become an economic power with spreading trade relations across the globe. It builds a formidable military force, including cyber warfare capability, to confront commercial shipping in the South China Sea and in Japanese and South Korean seas. It sponsors a global espionage network that steals technology from U.S. and European businesses and laboratories

As on Russia’s ambition in Europe, congressional attitude on China is openly negative, especially after Beijing’s clamp down in Hong Kong. Biden hasn’t criticized Trump’s handling of rocky relations with North Korea or its pressure on South Korea. But Trump and some members of Congress think 28,000 U.S. troops in South Korea is excessive and should be reduced.

Iran and the Persian Gulf. Like Xi Jinping in Asia and Vladimir Putin in Europe, Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei is determined to recover Iran’s lost influence in the Persian Gulf area. At present, the U.S. 5th fleet, based in Bahrain, stands in his way. It protects the major oil production facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Iraq, vital to the economies of Japan, South Korea, and several European countries. Tehran’s drive to become a nuclear power, designed to increase its influence in the entire Middle East, prompted Barack Obama in 2015 to agree to a time-limited nuclear agreement with Iran in return for lifting economic sanctions. Joe Biden as vice president favored the agreement, but Donald Trump did not. He soon withdrew U.S. support after reaching the White House. Biden has not raised this as a campaign issue, and congressional Democrats have avoided the question.

If Trump and Biden agree that U.S. troops in Afghanistan and Iraq should be reduced and withdrawn, and approve reducing forces in Germany and Korea, a serious domestic issue results: What happens when those troops return home? It reopens this question: Should the Army be reduced in size and the defense budget cut? That issue will no doubt confront the next Congress.

### 1NR---AT: Transition War

#### The only impact is about China, but No Chinese hegemony.

Shifrinson 21, Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University. (Joshua R. Itzkowitz, Winter 2021, “Neo-Primacy and the Pitfalls of US Strategy toward China”, *The Washington Quarterly*, 43:4, pg. 88-89)

The China Threat May Be Over-Hyped

First, and at the most basic level, it is not obvious that the China threat is as draconian as neo-primacy allows. To be sure, China is a more capable competitor than the United States has faced in many decades (and perhaps ever). Even compared to the Soviet Union, China enjoys a more dynamic economy, is better integrated into international institutions, has a larger and more homogenous population, and is geographically closer to the arena of major strategic contestation.51

That said, China is in a less advantageous position to do much with the capabilities at its disposal. On one level, Beijing does not enjoy the power vacuums along its periphery enjoyed by the Soviet Union during the heyday of the USSR’s post-war growth. It remains hemmed in by geography while potential balancers such as Japan, India, and Australia all retain significant latent capabilities that could be devoted to defense; many such counter-balancers have given strong signals of their inclination to oppose Chinese aggrandizement.52 These points also interact, giving a defensive advantage to many of the states along China’s periphery and underlining that a Chinese quest for regional hegemony or sphere of influence can be opposed by states positioned to help frustrate Chinese ambitions.

In essence, China is a threat, but it may not be the near-hegemon poised to ride roughshod over East Asia, cowing all local actors or carving off a sphere of influence, that neo-primacy assumes. By making more of the China threat than warranted, neo-primacy thereby risks creating a broader and deeper contest with Beijing than is warranted.

#### CCP is risk averse

Shifrinson, 19 – Joshua, Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University; “Should the United States Fear China’s Rise?,” *The Washington Quarterly*, http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2019/01/Winter-2019\_Shifrinson\_0.pdf

Nevertheless, considered in light of what a true relegation strategy would entail and the steps China might but has not taken, the comparatively limited nature of Chinese predation becomes clear. For one, China has not increased the rate of its military spending over the last decade even as its economy has grown; in fact, Chinese military expenditures remain below the rates witnessed in both the late Cold War period and in the early 2000s.39 Likewise, Chinese land reclamation and military deployments in the East and South China Seas have only involved territories previously claimed by the Chinese government; China has not expanded its maritime claims so much as taken a unilateral approach toward resolving existing disputes.40 It has also done little to strengthen its nuclear arsenal even though this force remains vulnerable to American disruption.41 Above all, it has made no moves to try to evict the United States from East Asia by either declaring a sphere of influence in the region42 or undercutting the U.S. alliance network.43 In fact, facing suggestions by the Trump administration that the United States might retrench, Chinese leaders have signaled they want the United States to remain active in the area.44 Ultimately, and as other analysts note, Chinese efforts contain some competitive elements, but these are also notably constrained in their scope and degree.45 This strategy makes sense. On one level, China’s rise has moved it near the top of the East Asian pecking order. A quarter century ago, China lagged behind states such as Russia and Japan economically and militarily, but now its economy outstrips all states involved in the region except for the United States.46 The military balance tells a similar story: China is far from a military hegemon, but given Japan’s limited investment in its military, Russia’s focus on Europe (and friendly relationship with China), the still-nascent emergence of India as a regional player, and the relative weakness of other countries around China’s periphery, the United States is the principal external security impediment to China’s continued rise.47 Under these conditions—absent another great power competitor—China faces incentives to try to shift the distribution of power further against the United States. By the same measure, however, China’s relative rise from a position of marked inferiority vis-à-vis the United States means it also faces strong incentives to avoid provoking the United States too much or too soon.48 Not only might overly aggressive Chinese activities court a war with the United States that the PRC might well lose, but—even short of war —it might prompt further U.S. efforts to stymie China’s continued growth. Given these conditions, Chinese leaders have good reason to embark on a slow and cautious predatory campaign—a weakening strategy—that tries to shift the distribution of power against the United States while operating below a threshold that might catalyze a hostile response. In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China’s current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.49 As one analyst notes, China’s decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.50 Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly address[ing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational approaches.” 51 Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.” 52 Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [… China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.” 53 Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a stillpotent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

### 1NR---AT: No Overstretch

#### Yes Overstretch:

#### Kupchan says Trump caused nativism that reduced public support for overseas engagement, but the plan is key Restoring popular support for the country’s internationalist calling. 1ac cross ex says international perception of domestic support is essential for new recommitment to global leadership, we conceded that 2ac can’t say they didn’t.

#### Stabilizing domestic life increases public support for international military engagement --- turns solvency because the plan decreases cooperation

Kurt M.Campbell 14 [KU BLUE]**.** Chairman and chief executive of the Asia Group investment and consulting firm was assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2009 to 2013. “How income inequality undermines U.S. power” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-income-inequality-undermines-us-power/2014/11/28/53fab4e4-74e5-11e4-9d9b-86d397daad27\_story.html?utm\_term=.40bd11b21cf7

Much has been written about the domestic consequences of growing income inequality in the United States — how inequality depresses growth, puts downward pressure on the middle class, accentuates wage stagnation and creates added difficulty paying for a college education and buying a home — but much less has been said about how inequality will affect America’s role in the world. How will the social science experiment of allowing wealth to settle so unequally between the top 1 percent and rest of the United States impact the foundations and contours of U.S. foreign policy? In fact, there are likely to be subtle and direct consequences of growing inequality both for the United States’ international standing and its activism. In most critical respects, the United States has helped to create and underwrite the global operating system since the end of World War II. This required a citizen’s sense of external responsibility and belief that the United States had something unique and valuable to confer to the world. Americans over these generations have regularly demonstrated in word and deed that they were prepared to bear burdens and advance ideas. Coinciding with this era was a general sense of overarching optimism that reinforced a post-World War II period of unprecedented American activism on the global scene. It is likely that as a growing segment of the population strains just to get by, it will increasingly view foreign policy — foreign assistance and military spending alike — as a kind of luxury ripe for cuts and a reduction in ambition. It is possible to see early indicators of these sentiments on the right and left, in the form of both tea party isolationism and Occupy Wall Street suspicion that corporate interests drive America’s foreign entanglements. It is also the case that other countries have long emulated aspects of the American Way in designing their own development models. Having access to higher education, creating conditions that support innovation and allowing for greater upward mobility have all been deeply attractive qualities to many nations. But it is the construction of a durable U.S. middle class that has been perhaps most compelling to highly stratified societies across Latin America, Asia and Africa. Now, however, the United States is moving in the other direction, toward an unstable society divided between astronomically rich elites and everyone else. This undermines a critical component of U.S. soft power and is a model for societal engineering that few would choose to emulate. It is also the case that the most recent era of U.S. exertion on the global stage has involved nearly 15 years of conflict in the Middle East and South Asia. The most important features of these largely military engagements have involved refinements in counterinsurgency technique and adaptations in military technology. A different 1 percent of the U.S. population has been primarily involved in this struggle: the U.S. military and others associated with the defense establishment. Aside from clapping when a uniformed military member greets an emotional family at an airport homecoming, the vast majority of the population has been largely unaffected by these conflicts. They neither paid for nor fought these wars. The next phase of intense global engagement is likely to demand much more from a larger share of the population. The lion’s share of 21st-century history will play out in Asia, with its thriving and acquisitive middle classes driving innovation, nationalist competitions, military ambitions, struggles over history and identity, and simple pursuit of power. The United States is in the midst of a major reorientation of its foreign policy and commercial priorities that will draw it more closely to Asia in the decades ahead. The competition for power and prestige there rests on comprehensive aspects of national power — as much to our product and service offerings, the strength of our educational system and the health and vitality of our national infrastructure as to the quality of U.S. military capabilities. Each of these efforts require substantial and sustained longer-term investments; all face funding shortfalls due to myriad challenges. A corresponding consequence of growing inequality has been a reduction in support for these building blocks for comprehensive and sustained international engagement. The worrisome dimensions of income inequality on the quality of domestic American life should be enough to cause us to consider enacting remedies. However, the potential negative implications on U.S. performance internationally can only add to the case. Ultimately, a sustained and purposeful American internationalism is inextricably linked to the health of our domestic life, to which gaping inequality is the biggest threat.

#### Unipolarity fails to contain china

Layne 20, University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University. (Christopher, “Preventing the China-U.S. Cold War from Turning Hot”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pg. 358-360, doi: 10.1093/cjip/poaa012)

American Decline—Reality, not Myth

The waning of US economic dominance may not be obvious to American denialists, but to many observers in the real world, it is apparent that America’s global economic leadership is waning.69 The 2008 Great Recession did not cause the relative decline of American power. However, it did focus attention on the shifting distribution of power between the United States and China. In 2010, China became the world’s largest exporter (passing Germany).70 In 2011, wresting away a title the United States had held for a century, China became the world’s largest manufacturing state.71 Most tellingly, in 2014 the International Monetary Fund announced that measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), China had passed the United States as the world’s largest economy.72 The latest IMF data (using PPP) pegs China’s share of world GDP at 19.3% and the United States’ share at 15.1.%.73 It is only a matter of time before China overtakes the United States as the leading economy based on market exchange rate (MER) as well.74

Denialists also assert that per capita GDP is a better indicator of states’ relative power than aggregate GDP. This is debatable. Per capita GDP may provide a useful method for comparing living standards between states. However, aggregate GDP arguably still is a better measure of a state’s overall economic power and its ability to mobilize resources to build up its military capabilities. After all, if per capita GDP is really the best indicator of a state’s geopolitical weight, US policymakers would now be worrying about the Norwegian threat and not about China.75 In any event, even with respect to per capita GDP, China is chipping away at the America’s lead. In 2000, China’s per capita GDP was 8% of the United States’. By 2016, China’s per capita GDP was 28% of the United States’, and the trend lines suggest that China will continue narrowing significantly—if not altogether closing—the per capita GDP gap with the United States.76 Although denialists do not want to admit it, China’s GDP growth—its sheer economic muscle—is, in fact, fueling China’s drive to reduce dramatically the gap between its military and technological capabilities and the United States’.77

With respect to military power, denialists focus on global military power. But this is not the correct metric. China and the United States face different grand strategic challenges. As a self-styled global hegemon, America must be able to project decisive military power to the three regions it considers vital to both its security and its prosperity: Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.78 In contrast, at least for now, China’s grand strategy is focused on attaining regional hegemony in East and Southeast Asia. This is what ascending great powers do: they aim at dominating the regions in which they are situated.79 This means China and the United States are on a collision course in East Asia—the region where the United States has been the incumbent hegemon since 1945 and which an increasingly powerful and assertive China sees as its own backyard.80 This means that the relevant yardstick of how the United States and China stack up against each other militarily is regional, not global.

In the competition for preeminence in East and South East Asia, China is beginning to pull even with the United States. In a recent study of the Sino-American military balance, the RAND Corporation stated that the ‘frontier of US military dominance’ in East Asia is ‘receding’.81 1 As the RAND study observes, ‘Although China has not closed the gap with the United States, it has whittled it - and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who track military developments in Asian on an ongoing basis, the speed of change ... was striking’.82 Similarly, in his 2015 book, RAND East Asian security expert Roger Cliff stated that by 2020—that is, now—China’s military almost will be on an equal footing with America’s in such key areas as doctrine, equipment, personnel, and training (though still lagging behind in organizational structure, logistics, and organizational culture).83 Consequently, he said, by 2020—now—American military dominance in East Asia would be significantly eroded. Moreover, Cliff predicted that during the 2020s, a power transition will occur in East Asia, and that China will be able to stake its claim to regional hegemony.84

### 1NR---AT: Sustainability

#### More Warrants:

#### 1---COVID, China, and populism.

Cooley & Nexon 20, \*Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, \*\*Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (\*Alexander, \*\*Daniel H., 6/9/20, “How Hegemony Ends”, *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends)

CONSERVING THE U.S. SYSTEM

Great-power contestation, the end of the West’s monopoly on patronage, and the emergence of movements that oppose the liberal international system have all altered the global order over which Washington has presided since the end of the Cold War. In many respects, the COVID-19 pandemic seems to be further accelerating the erosion of U.S. hegemony. China has increased its influence in the World Health Organization and other global institutions in the wake of the Trump administration’s attempts to defund and scapegoat the public health body. Beijing and Moscow are portraying themselves as providers of emergency goods and medical supplies, including to European countries such as Italy, Serbia, and Spain, and even to the United States. Illiberal governments worldwide are using the pandemic as cover for restricting media freedom and cracking down on political opposition and civil society. Although the United States still enjoys military supremacy, that dimension of U.S. dominance is especially ill suited to deal with this global crisis and its ripple effects.

Even if the core of the U.S. hegemonic system—which consists mostly of long-standing Asian and European allies and rests on norms and institutions developed during the Cold War—remains robust, and even if, as many champions of the liberal order suggest will happen, the United States and the European Union can leverage their combined economic and military might to their advantage, the fact is that Washington will have to get used to an increasingly contested and complex international order. There is no easy fix for this. No amount of military spending can reverse the processes driving the unraveling of U.S. hegemony. Even if Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic nominee, knocks out Trump in the presidential election later this year, or if the Republican Party repudiates Trumpism, the disintegration will continue.

The key questions now concern how far the unraveling will spread. Will core allies decouple from the U.S. hegemonic system? How long, and to what extent, can the United States maintain financial and monetary dominance? The most favorable outcome will require a clear repudiation of Trumpism in the United States and a commitment to rebuild liberal democratic institutions in the core. At both the domestic and the international level, such efforts will necessitate alliances among center-right, center-left, and progressive political parties and networks.

What U.S. policymakers can do is plan for the world after global hegemony. If they help preserve the core of the American system, U.S. officials can ensure that the United States leads the strongest military and economic coalition in a world of multiple centers of power, rather than finding itself on the losing side of most contests over the shape of the new international order. To this end, the United States should reinvigorate the beleaguered and understaffed State Department, rebuilding and more effectively using its diplomatic resources. Smart statecraft will allow a great power to navigate a world defined by competing interests and shifting alliances.

The United States lacks both the will and the resources to consistently outbid China and other emerging powers for the allegiance of governments. It will be impossible to secure the commitment of some countries to U.S. visions of international order. Many of those governments have come to view the U.S.-led order as a threat to their autonomy, if not their survival. And some governments that still welcome a U.S.-led liberal order now contend with populist and other illiberal movements that oppose it.

Even at the peak of the unipolar moment, Washington did not always get its way. Now, for the U.S. political and economic model to retain considerable appeal, the United States has to first get its own house in order. China will face its own obstacles in producing an alternative system; Beijing may irk partners and clients with its pressure tactics and its opaque and often corrupt deals. A reinvigorated U.S. foreign policy apparatus should be able to exercise significant influence on international order even in the absence of global hegemony. But to succeed, Washington must recognize that the world no longer resembles the historically anomalous period of the 1990s and the first decade of this century. The unipolar moment has passed, and it isn’t coming back.

#### 2---debt.

Bandow 20, JD, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. (Doug, 5/28/20, "Want to Fix the Deficit? Bring Home the Troops.", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/28/us-deficit-military-spending-budget-bring-home-troops/)

The financial burdens of this activist military policy had been growing difficult to bear long before the economic crisis created by the coronavirus pandemic. In June 2019, the Congressional Budget Office forecast trillion-dollar annual deficits as far as the eye can see. The agency warned: “Large budget deficits over the next 30 years are projected to drive federal debt held by the public to unprecedented levels—from 78 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 to 144 percent by 2049.” For comparison: Greece was at a similar deficit level when it was battered by its own debt crisis in the wake of the global financial crisis. If interest rates in the United States grow by just 1 percent, in three decades the federal government’s debt will run 199 percent of GDP. However, well before that level is reached, Washington would risk what the Congressional Budget Office terms “a fiscal crisis—that is, a situation in which the interest rate on federal debt rises abruptly because investors have lost confidence in the U.S. government’s fiscal position.” This would greatly intensify the fiscal crunch.

With the ongoing economic collapse and massive federal bailouts, the federal financial situation has dramatically worsened. At the end of April, the budget office projected a 12 percent drop in real GDP this quarter, an unemployment rate of 14 percent, a likely annual deficit of $3.7 trillion in 2020 and $2.1 trillion next year, and debt at 101 percent of GDP by the end of the fiscal year. Those numbers may well rise. The Manhattan Institute’s Brian Riedl believes the red ink might even hit $4.2 trillion this year. If so, Washington will borrow more this year than during 2014 to 2019 combined.

States also face enormous economic pressures. Most are forced to at least nominally balance their budgets, as only Uncle Sam has a printing press, but their pension funds, which collectively faced a $1 trillion funding hole at the start of the year, are likely to have $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion in unfunded liabilities by December. Some states, most notably Illinois, Kentucky, and New Jersey, already are at risk. The Democratic House has proposed including a state bailout in its proposal for another $3 trillion in aid.

The debt tsunami cannot continue indefinitely. Last year, Washington spent $4.4 trillion, of which nearly a quarter was borrowed.

There are no simple solutions. Congress is unlikely to raise taxes. In 2017 the federal budget was awash in red ink, but Congress passed a large tax cut. Making ends meet was pushed even further into the future, when government programs presumably would be paid by someone somehow sometime. The alternative is to scale back spending programs—but there isn’t much to cut. Domestic discretionary outlays, which Congress normally targets when intent on reducing expenditures, ran only $661 billion in 2019. These expenditures, at 6.3 percent of GDP, already were below their historical average, 8.4 percent over the last half-century, and wiping out everything would still leave a deficit. A trillion dollars went for Social Security and $644 billion for Medicare last year—both of which make up the traditional, untouchable third rail of U.S. politics. Although proposals for reform abound, President Donald Trump has refused to trim either, and progressive activists continue to push for benefit increases. Other mandatory entitlement programs, with benefits set by law, constituted $642 billion. Medicaid ran $409 billion; it already provides the lowest reimbursement rates of any government program or private health insurance. Net interest payments came to $375 billion. Interest rates have nowhere to go but up, and these outlays cannot be cut without repudiating the debt.

Meanwhile, last year’s military budget was $676 billion. Today most of that is “defense” only in the sense of protecting allies, many of which can defend themselves and little of which can be considered essential for this nation’s security. (Of course, the United States has other less-than-vital interests, in stability, for instance, and thus the defeat of a group like the Islamic State. Yet Washington, too, has proved to be a major force for instability—as in the cases of Iraq and Libya.) Americans may not mind their government turning military alliances into welfare programs when the United States dominates the global economy. But the calculations change when the federal government is racing toward insolvency. In another decade or two, when entitlements are competing with the national debt in spiraling upward, priorities will finally have to be set. And missions that are not essential, such as engaging in nation-building and protecting prosperous, populous allies, are likely to lose out.

Some right-leaning hawks acknowledge the imminent fiscal crunch but blame social programs. The answer, they argue, is simple: entitlements, not the Pentagon, should be slashed. Alas, they have yet to find a credible presidential candidate willing to make that case. Liberal interventionists have an even bigger problem, as most leading progressives want to spend more, much more, on domestic priorities. Creating “Medicare for All” and wiping out student debt would cost trillions of dollars. Despite the veneer of moderation retained by former Vice President Joe Biden, the presidential candidate has shifted leftward to bolster his support among activists.

The bipartisan advocates of promiscuous intervention are likely to resist any military cutbacks. However, once a fiscal crisis hits, dramatic and rapid if not instant reductions will be required. That risks creating a dangerous mismatch with international objectives.

Policymakers should begin, today, by scaling back their interventionist strategies that require such a large and expensive military, with hundreds of bases and hundreds of thousands of troops around the globe. The military budget is the price of America’s foreign policy. A new approach should exercise restraint, scale back national ambitions, and then construct the force structure necessary to achieve more limited goals.

#### 3---Trump---damage is done.

Kirshner 1-29-2020, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. (Jonathan, "Gone But Not Forgotten: Trump’s Long Shadow and the End of American Credibility", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-29/trump-gone-not-forgotten)

This is why even though Donald Trump has become a member of a rather exclusive club—one-term U.S. presidents—the Trump presidency will have enduring consequences for U.S. power and influence in the world. Leo Tolstoy warned that “there are no conditions to which a man may not become accustomed, particularly if he sees that they are accepted by those around him,” and it is easy, especially for most insular Americans, to implicitly normalize what was in fact a norm-shattering approach to foreign policy. Level whatever criticisms you may about the often bloodstained hands of the American colossus on the world stage, but Trump’s foreign policy was different: shortsighted, transactional, mercurial, untrustworthy, boorish, personalist, and profoundly illiberal in rhetoric, disposition, and creed.

Some applauded this transformation, but most foreign policy experts, practitioners, and professionals are breathing a sigh of relief that a deeply regrettable, and in many ways embarrassing, interlude has passed. (It is exceedingly unlikely that any future president will exchange “beautiful letters” with and express their “love” for the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.) But such palpable relief must be tempered by a dispiriting truth, rooted in that notion of anarchy: the world cannot unsee the Trump presidency. (Nor, for that matter, can it unsee the way members of the U.S. Congress behaved in the final weeks of the Trump administration, voting opportunistically to overturn an election and helping incite violence at the Capitol.) From this point forward, countries around the globe will have to calculate their interests and expectations with the understanding that the Trump administration is the sort of thing that the U.S. political system can plausibly produce.

Such reassessments will not be to the United States’ advantage. For 75 years, the general presumption that the United States was committed to the relationships and institutions it forged and the norms it articulated shaped the world in ways that privileged U.S. interests. If it is increasingly perceived to be feckless and self-serving, the United States will find the world a more hazardous and less welcoming place.

POWER AND PURPOSE

One country tries to anticipate the foreign policy behavior of another by making assessments about two factors: power and purpose. Measuring the former seems straightforward, although it is often not. (France seemed to boast a formidable military in 1939, and the Soviet Union was considered a superpower a half century later, yet both countries suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed under pressure.) Measuring the latter—purpose—requires more guesswork in practice but is even more important. Is a country a friend or a foe, and in either case, for how long? Is a country’s word its bond, or are its commitments ephemeral and its pronouncements little more than shallow, opportunistic posturing? Ultimately, these are questions of trust and confidence that require judgment calls. And for better or worse, it is easier to partner with a country whose underlying foreign policy orientation is rooted in purposes that are reasonably consistent over time.

For U.S. partners in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, however, Washington’s priorities on the world stage must now be interrogated, and any conclusions reached must be held with qualifications rather than confidence. And there is nothing that President Joe Biden and his team of immaculate professionals can do to stop that. From now on, all countries, everywhere, must hedge their bets about the United States—something that will unnerve allies more than adversaries. Whatever promises are made and best behaviors followed over the next few years, a resurgence of knuckle-dragging America firstism will loom menacingly in the shadows. That possibility will inevitably shape other states’ conclusions about their relations with the United States, even as nearly every world leader rushes to shake the hand of the new U.S. president.

Thus, even with the election of Biden—a traditional, centrist liberal internationalist, cut from the same basic foreign policy cloth of every U.S. president (save one) across nine decades—countries will now have to hedge against the prospect of an indifferent, disengaged, and clumsily myopic U.S. foreign policy. After all, anarchy also demands that states see the world as it is, not as they wish it might be. And the warning signs that the United States is perhaps not the country it once was could not be flashing more brightly.

Although the margin of victory in the 2020 U.S. presidential election was wide (the two candidates were separated by seven million votes, a 4.5 percent edge in the popular vote, and 74 electoral votes), it was not, by any stretch of the imagination, a renunciation of Trump. In 2016, some argued that Trump’s election was a fluke. This was always whistling past the graveyard, but the case could be made. After all, the election hinged on only about 80,000 votes, spread across three swing states. Even with that, but for the historically contingent geographic quirks of Michigan (the Upper Peninsula) and Florida (the Panhandle), those states would have gone blue. And the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton (who did walk away with the popular vote by a large margin), was, for some key constituencies, a suspect candidate.

The 2020 election put to rest the comforting fable that Trump’s election was a fluke. Trump is the United States—or at least a very large part of it. Many Americans will choke on that sentiment, but other countries don’t have the luxury of clinging to some idealized version of the United States’ national character. Trump presided over dozens of ethical scandals, egregious procedural lapses, and startling indiscretions, most of which would have ended the political career of any other national political figure of the past half century. But the trampling of norms barely registered with most of the American public. Nor did the sheer, horrifying incompetence of the administration’s handling of the gravest public health crisis in a century chase Trump from the political scene in disgrace. (Imagine what would have happened to Jimmy Carter, a decent man dealt a difficult hand by an oil shock and the Iranian hostage crisis. Those events were enough to have his approval rating plummet into the 20s and soon send him packing after his landslide defeat in 1980.) Rather, Trump characteristically treated a pandemic that killed well more than a quarter of a million of the people under his charge as a personal inconvenience, to be managed exclusively for perceived political advantage. Even so, 74 million people voted for him—nine million more than did in 2016 and the most votes ever cast for a U.S. candidate for president, with the exception of Biden, who garnered 81 million.

One cannot paint a picture of the American polity and the country’s future foreign policy without including the significant possibility of a large role for Trumpism, with or without Trump himself in the Oval Office. Looking ahead four years, America watchers must anticipate that the next U.S. presidential election could turn out quite differently. This does not bode well for U.S. interests and influence in world politics. As Mark Leonard, the director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, observed, “If you know that whatever you’re doing will at most last until the next election, you look at everything in a more contingent way.”

#### 4---polarization.

Kirshner 1-29-2020, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. (Jonathan, "Gone But Not Forgotten: Trump’s Long Shadow and the End of American Credibility", *Foreign Affairs*, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-29/trump-gone-not-forgotten)

Worse, foreign assessments of the United States must consider the possibility that it will soon simply be out of the great-power game altogether. Looked at objectively, the country boasts a colossal economy and commands the world’s most impressive military. But as the old saying about sports teams goes, they don’t play the games on paper, and there are reasons to question whether Washington has the wherewithal to behave as a purposeful actor on the world stage and pursue its long-term interests. The problem is not just that with politics no longer stopping at the water’s edge, U.S. foreign policy could veer unpredictably from administration to administration. It is that the United States is taking on water itself. The country has entered what can only be characterized as an age of unreason, with large swaths of its population embracing wild conspiracy theories. The United States today looks like Athens in the final years of the Peloponnesian War or France in the 1930s: a once strong democracy that has become ragged and vulnerable. France, descending into appeasement, would soon well illustrate that a country consumed by domestic social conflict is not one that will likely be capable of practicing a productive, predictable, or trustworthy foreign policy.

NO MORE BLANK CHECKS

This dystopian scenario may not come to pass. It might not even be the most likely American future. But the logic of anarchy requires that all countries must at least process the United States’ polarization and domestic dysfunction, think through the implications of that scenario in which all bets are off, and imagine a world in which Washington, for all its raw power, is less relevant in world politics. This prospect will invite major reassessments of U.S. behavior.

#### 5---overstretch.

Montgomery 20, PhD, MA, senior fellow and the director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (Evan Braden, 10-31-2020, “Primacy and Punishment: US Grand Strategy, Maritime Power, and Military Options to Manage Decline”, *Security Studies*, 29:4, 769-771, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2020.1811463)

Perhaps the most significant foreign policy decision facing the United States is whether to retain its global security commitments or retrench from key regions. This choice has been at the center of a longstanding debate between proponents of continued primacy and advocates of greater restraint. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly relevant as US military superiority starts to wane. A grand strategy of primacy, which is characterized first and foremost by a network of alliances and partnerships, has often gone hand in hand with a defense strategy of denial, which seeks to protect allies and partners from coercion and conquest. Although denial is extremely demanding, for nearly three decades Washington has been able to count on conventional military overmatch in a clash with any opponent. That is no longer the case, however, due to a confluence of factors, including the costs of post-9/11 conflicts, legal limits on defense spending, and, most importantly, balancing by rivals. China and Russia, for example, have identified vulnerabilities in the American approach to power projection and are fielding a variety of tools to exploit them. As a result, past US military advantages might not be present in future wars.1

These developments have prompted the United States to reassess its priorities. According to the Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy, competing with China and Russia should take precedence over other objectives, especially for the Department of Defense, to ensure Beijing and Moscow do not upend the status quo. At the same time, however, Washington still intends to counter North Korea and contain Iran.2 In fact, its recent maximum-pressure campaigns against Pyongyang and Tehran demonstrate a preoccupation with minor-power adversaries, even as major-power rivalries intensify. Meanwhile, combatting these adversaries continues to influence US military plans and posture, even as the resources needed to address more capable rivals are being stretched thin.3

Can the United States preserve primacy and maintain denial under these conditions? Primacists are confident it will stay ahead of any challengers. Thus, it should be able to keep its legacy strategies more or less intact. Restrainers are skeptical that it can address so many threats. Consequently, the United States should adjust its strategies and begin to retrench. I argue instead that gaps exist on both sides of this debate. Like previous global leaders, the United States is a maritime power: it enjoys unconstrained access to the sea, has extensive economic and security interests in many regions, and relies on naval capabilities to overcome its insular location and project force abroad.4 This geopolitical orientation has significant implications for the durability of its military dominance and its response to relative decline. Below, I develop this case in three stages.

First, I argue that the commanding position of the United States is more precarious than most primacists acknowledge. In general, primacists base their optimistic assessments on indicators that show Washington at the peak of the international pecking order. Yet these assessments underestimate the costs of sustaining and enforcing its commitments. As a maritime power that chooses to shoulder a broad set of responsibilities, the United States often confronts many different adversaries, including both major and minor powers, in many distant locations.5 Today, for example, it is focused on four serious antagonists across three separate theaters. Although taxing on its own, institutional processes magnify this problem. When preparing to confront multiple opponents, a tendency exists to regard the strongest as “pacing threats” that determine what operational concepts and military capabilities are adopted, whereas the weakest are relegated to “lesser included cases” that can be addressed with the same concepts and capabilities, only more easily. The result is a zero-sum situation for defense, where measures directed against one opponent hinder the ability to take action against other opponents, and where losses sustained against one adversary erode power relative to other adversaries. Therefore, as antagonists multiply, gain strength, or both, the structural pressure for strategic adjustment should be considerable, even if Washington retains its top ranking.